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 Abstract: “Aristotle’s Theory of Prohairesis and Its Significance for Accounts of Human  
Action and Practical Reasoning” 
By Michael Angelo Formichelli 
Arthur Madigan, S.J., Adviser 
 
The relationship between intention, intentional action, and moral assessment is of 
fundamental importance to ethical theory.  In large part, moral responsibility is based on 
an assessment of agent responsibility, which in turn is based on the connection between 
an agent’s intentions and the actions which they cause.  In the last twenty-five years, 
there has been a debate in contemporary action theory about the relationship between 
intentions and intentional action.  Objecting to what he calls the “Simple View,” which 
he characterizes as the view that all intentional actions are intended under some 
description, Michael Bratman, among others, argues that not all intentional actions are 
intended.  In this dissertation, we will defend the Simple View by appealing to Aristotle’s 
theory of action as developed in his psychological and ethical works.   
In the first part of the dissertation, we argue that all intentional actions are 
intended under some description; however, we argue that distinctions between different 
types of intention are essential: specifically, the distinction between deliberate and non-
deliberate intentions and the distinction between the intention of the end and the intention 
of the means.  Our account centers on Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis, which he 
identifies as the distinctly human principle of action.  The term prohairesis in Aristotle’s 
works seems to have at least three senses: 1) primarily, the deliberate intention with 
which a person acts, an ‘occurent’ choice; 2) the habitual or ‘dispositional’ choice or 
    
resolve of ‘decent’ people; and 3) general purposes that men have which may encompass 
voluntary action as a whole.   The first sense of the term is the primary one that properly 
signifies the concept.  Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion 
which Aristotle sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium.  For Aristotle, orexis 
or desire is the cause of all animal motion, including human motion.  Prohairesis is a 
deliberate desire for the means to an end.  It is a principle of action peculiar to mature 
human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result of 
deliberation.  It marks off a narrow but important stretch of intentional action.  
Prohairesis is set off against other types of intention, like boulēsis, which is an intention 
of the end, and epithumia (bodily appetite) and thumos (anger), which are non-deliberate 
intentions relating to non-rational appetites like lust and anger.   
Aristotle, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional action, is unusually 
specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention.  Different orexeis differ not 
only with regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail.  
Aristotle traces both the causal and moral responsibility agents have for their actions to 
the action of these internal principles of desire.  Moral assessment is linked to the 
operative internal principle of an act.  This allows for an action to be voluntary and 
intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the consequences of an 
action.  Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis and what results 
from orexis, is not reducible to one mode but is irreducibly plural.    Furthermore, each 
person’s capacity for intentional action is shaped by his character, and each character has 
correspondingly different kinds of intention, both with respect to the objects of intention 
and in their relation to action.  Finally, the scope of intention is not definite, and 
    
depending on the agent, can include those things which attend to the means of which he 
has cognizance, for instance, harmful side-effect consequences or other costs of his 
action. 
 In the second part of the dissertation, we examine at length the objections to the 
Simple View, lodged by Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe.  We give an 
overview of objections by Bratman, Harman, and Knobe which center on three cases and 
four objections.  The cases are: 1) a hypothetical video game; 2) unexpected success; and 
3) unintended consequences.  The objections are: 1) with respect to the hypothetical 
video game, the Simple View ascribes an irrational intention to a gamer playing the 
game; 2) When agents are doubtful of the success of an action they undertake, the Simple 
View requires that they intend the act the perform rather than that they merely try to 
perform the act, which opponents argue that this is irrational and false; 3) The Simple 
View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight which itself 
entails that agents intend all the results of their actions, even when those results are 
merely foreseen and not intended; 4) The Simple View does not adequately explain 
ordinary language usage with respect to ascriptions of intention for side-effect 
consequences, and therefore does not reflect basic, commonly shared notions of 
intentional action.   
The first two objections center on cases where it seems irrational for an agent to 
intend the act he performs.  In the case of the video game, the scenario is so set up that 
the player wins a prize for hitting either target but knows that he cannot hit both or the 
game will shut down.  It seems irrational for him to intend to hit both if he cannot; 
however, in order to maximize his chance winning, it would be rational to aim at both.  In 
    
the case of unexpected success, it seems that agents do not intend acts whose chances of 
success they doubt because intending seems to require the positive belief that one will 
succeed; rather, it is argued that agents merely try but do not intend the act they perform.  
Against these cases and objections, we argue that agents are capable of conditional and 
complex intentions, such that one may conditionally intend to hit whichever target is 
opportune, while aiming at both.  Likewise, we argue that intending to act does not 
require the positive belief that one will succeed; only that it is possible for one to 
succeed.  Furthermore, the distinction between trying and intending is specious.  
Finally, we respond to the third and fourth objections centering on the 
intentionality of side-effect consequences.  It is argued by Bratman et al. that the Simple 
View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight, and that such 
a rejection further entails consequentialism.  Likewise it is also argued that the Simple 
View fails to account for ordinary language ascriptions of intentionality for side-effect 
consequences.  We agree that the Simple View entails rejecting the distinction between 
intention and foresight as it is currently applied, but deny that this entails 
consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action are the primary basis 
for moral evaluation and not the agent’s intentions.  Likewise, we agree that the Simple 
View does not model ordinary language ascriptions of intention; however, this is not 
necessarily a defect since such ascriptions are inconsistent and imprecise.  Furthermore, 
we argue that the Simple View might be used to more adequately explain such usage.   
We center our response to these objections on the Doctrine of Double Effect.  We 
argue that the doctrine arises from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
treatment of defensive killing.  We argue that Aquinas does not hold that the death of an 
    
attacker is a foreseen but not intended side-effect, as proponents of Double Effect and 
opponents of the Simple View hold; rather it is intended as a means to the end of self-
defense.  Therefore, the two effects are not the desired end and a side-effect but rather the 
intended end and the intended means.  Furthermore, we argue that this does not entail 
doing evil for the sake of good because Aquinas’ Aristotelian account of action 
specification incorporates circumstances as essential components of intentions which 
give an act its moral quality.  Furthermore, the necessary references to an agent’s 
intentions show how the rejection of the application of the distinction between intention 
and foresight does not entail consequentialism.   
Finally, we tackle the underlying assumptions about intention and desire which 
lead to the rejection of the Simple View.  Opponents of the Simple View hold that 
intention is not a form of desire because then it would not have an essential role in the 
genesis of action or in rational deliberation.  We, however, argue that the major 
objections to the Simple View are defeasible once one understands intention as a species 
of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope includes consequences beyond acts 
performed and goals achieved.  The paradoxes at the heart of the debate hinge on the 
ambiguity of the English word ‘intention’ and its usage, as well as the inherent difficulty 
of examining psychological concepts.  ‘Intention’ has several senses unified by the 
purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is referred.  These senses can often, 
but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the degree and kind of deliberation  
attendant to them. 
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 Introduction to the Dissertation 
 
 The relationship between intentions and intentional action seems to be rather 
straight-forward, almost tautological: An action is intentional only if it is intended.   
Intentions seem to be necessary for the species of events which are called intentional 
actions.  More than this, intentions seem to be necessary for any human doing to be 
properly called an action, that is, to distinguish the things that happen to a human agent 
from the things for which that agent is the efficient cause.  If I act, I do so with and for a 
purpose, and that purpose is my intention.  Therefore, it seems that for an action to be 
voluntary, it must be intentional under some description.  Likewise, it seems that if an 
action is intentional under some description, it must also be voluntary – for how could 
one intentionally act without doing so voluntarily?  This rather straight-forward account 
of the relationship between intentions and intentional action gets complicated, however, 
when we are pressed to determine the precise content, structure, and scope of our 
intentions.   
It is clear that intentions are by their nature purposive, but it is not clear that 
purposiveness is the same thing as intention.  For instance, it is a philosophical 
commonplace to distinguish human action from animal behavior even though the latter is 
generally held to be purposive and in some cases (e.g., primates and dolphins) even 
consciously purposive.  Intentional behavior is often held to require rational thought 
which in turn seems to require language.  Animals, lacking language, therefore, seem to 
lack the ability to form intentions and perform intentional actions.   
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Likewise, not all human actions are rational and deliberate: some are quick and 
impulsive; others, though not quick, are held to be impulsively caused by desire against 
one’s prior calculations.  This latter class of behavior is often called incontinence or 
akrasia.  The akratic impulse is often called a desire rather than an intention, and fits of 
akrasia are often followed by remorse and avowals expressing a lack of intention, ‘I 
didn’t want/intend/mean to do X’.  Whether and to what extent such non-rational and 
irrational behaviors are intentional is a continuing area of debate.   
Finally, while an intention includes some end, purpose, or goal, and often includes 
some means or course of action, it is not clear that it also includes consequences beyond 
the goal or means to the goal.  If I intend to act and act such that I realize a goal by a 
certain chosen means but I also foresee necessarily or with a high degree of probability 
that it will have other, undesirable consequences, do I intend those consequences too?  
The distinction between intention and foresight is often held to exempt agents from 
blame for merely foreseen consequences which were not intended.  This, however, raises 
further questions: the most obvious being how you distinguish intention and foresight 
when it comes to one’s own actions and not an external event.  It is one thing to foresee a 
solar eclipse or to predict presidential candidate responses in a debate; it is another thing 
entirely when it comes to what one chooses to do and how one reasons and evaluates 
one’s choices, since consequences are often factors in deliberation and agents are often 
held accountable for them, especially in criminal law. 
 The issues we have just raised are at the heart of a contemporary debate about 
what Michael Bratman calls the “Simple View” – that all intentional actions are intended.  
Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe all argue against the Simple View, and they 
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use the connection between intention and rationality as well as the difficulty we have in 
determining the intentionality of side-effect consequences to argue that not all intentional 
actions are intended and that some consequences are intentional without being intended.  
This view poses difficulties for conventional assessments of praise and blame, which 
often account a range of consequences beyond ends and means as intended because 
intentional.    
A significant weakness for opponents of the so-called Simple View is that their 
conclusions largely hold good only for a subset of English speakers, if they hold good at 
all.  Even then, it is not entirely clear that the larger psychological and practical 
implications that they draw from examining expressions about intention, i.e., avowals and 
ascriptions, are valid or sound. 
In order to show both the limitations of the attacks on the Simple View and a 
fruitful alternative approach to the problem of intention and intentional action, we will 
examine the theory of action which Aristotle presents in his ethical and psychological 
works.  Aristotle’s account of action is particularly salient because he distinguishes 
different kinds of intentions by the level of their deliberateness and rationality.  Unlike 
contemporary philosophers, he does not assume that desires and intentions are two 
different genera; rather the latter is a species of the former.  Likewise, he does not assume 
that what are often called desires are distinguished functionally from intentions.  That is 
to say, it is not the unique function of deliberate intentions to generate actions.  
Furthermore, Aristotle does not tie himself to the colloquial usage of his language 
community (although he often begins with it) or to the assumption prevalent today that 
the content of an intention is limited to some postulated mental proposition.   These 
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differences in approach allow an Aristotelian account of action to avoid several pitfalls of 
contemporary action theory.  First, Aristotle can account not just for the directedness of 
animal behavior but also for its intentionality.  Second, Aristotle can also account for 
degrees of intentionality within human behavior in a way that makes akrasia intentional 
without making it rational or deliberate.  Third, Aristotle can also account for the 
intentionality of consequences or side-effects because of the relationship between reason, 
knowledge and desire in deliberation, in which these different capacities are brought 
together.  As we shall see, Aristotelian psychology in general is much more comfortable 
with composite intentional states than contemporary action theory.  This is both more 
psychologically accurate and philosophically more satisfactory than multiplying the 
number of irreducible mental states to accommodate unique functions with respect to 
action generation. 
The central concept in Aristotle’s account of human action is choice or 
prohairesis, and it is in examining prohairesis that we will be able to show the complex 
relationship between reason, desire, and deliberation in the genesis of characteristically 
human intentional action.  According to Aristotle, prohairesis is a bouleutikē orexis, or a 
deliberate desire.  It derives from boulēsis, or wish, and bouleusis, or deliberation.  All 
three, prohairesis, boulēsis, and bouleusis are unique to human beings; prohairesis and 
boulēsis are forms of orexis, but there are other forms of orexis which both animals and 
humans possess.  These other forms of orexis and the capacity of phantasia, or 
imagination, explain the intentionality of animal behavior as well as the intentionality of 
non-deliberate and akratic forms of human behavior.  Boulēsis, the orectic precursor of 
prohairesis, does not differ from other kinds of orexis in its connection to the genesis of 
   5 
action; rather, it differs from the other kinds of orexis in the kinds of action it gives rise to 
and the types of objects it pursues.  Prohairesis as the product of wish and deliberation is 
the proximal intention with which mature human agents act when they act deliberately; 
prohairesis is involved in human action par excellence.  However, Aristotle’s account of 
human action extends beyond action derived from deliberation and caused by 
prohairesis.  He also considers non-deliberate forms of action as well as action which is 
generated by deficient deliberation in his treatment of akrasia.   Thus, our examination of 
prohairesis will allow us to account for the range of human intentionality as well as the 
degrees, range, scope and kinds of intentionality present in human action.  This will 
provide a counterpoint to contemporary accounts of action which attack the Simple View. 
With the insights gleaned from Aristotle’s theory of action, we can proceed to 
defend an account of the Simple View which avoids the pitfalls of contemporary action 
theory while defending the important psychological and ethical connections between 
intention and intentional action.  All intentional actions are intended, but not all 
intentions are as discrete or conceptualized as those which characterize the behavior of 
mature adults acting rationally and deliberately.  Likewise, every intention is a desire for 
the fulfillment of some purpose, whether that purpose is an end in itself, a means to a 
further end, merely pleasant, or rationally understood as good.  Intentions include those 
things that attend to our purposes, i.e., many things often classed as side-effects or 
consequences, because such things factor in human deliberation and are part and parcel of 
what makes an action or goal good or bad, desirable or undesirable.   
Therefore, we begin with a treatment of Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis, tracing 
its origins in ordinary Greek usage and its appearances in works outside of the 
   6 
Nicomachean or Eudemian Ethics.  We then proceed to give context to Aristotle’s 
discussion of prohairesis in the ethical works, in the De Anima and the De Motu 
Animalium, by examining orexis, its kinds, its role in the animal and human action, as 
well as its interaction with phantasia.  With insights from Martha Nussbaum, we will 
give an account of desire (orexis) as the fundamental intentional capacity in Aristotle’s 
account of action, which, when coupled with imagination (phantasia), allows both 
humans and some animals to perceive objects as desirable.  For animals, this perception 
is of the object as pleasant; for humans, objects can be perceived or judged to be pleasant 
or good, the latter requiring the rational capacity native to humans.  Proceeding to 
Aristotle’s ethical works, we can see how Aristotle’s account of human action centered 
on prohairesis fits within his larger psychological framework: prohairesis is a composite 
of reason and desire, that is, desire modified by reason.  Incorporating Nussbaum’s 
account of orexis and phantasia, we can present prohairesis as an “inclusive mental 
state,” a state with an indefinite horizon framed by the agent’s cognizance1 of his goal, 
means, circumstances and capacities.2
                                                 
1 I will be using the word ‘cognizance’ here and throughout to denote the knowledge of ethically relevant 
particulars.  I have chosen this word over a word like ‘perception’ in order to highlight the active rather 
than passive element in the knowledge the agent has of his circumstances.  Likewise, I have chosen this 
word to distinguish this kind of active, particular awareness from a general kind of knowledge an agent 
might have which may or may not apply to his present circumstances.   
  Finally, we present an exegesis of Aristotle’s 
account of akrasia that features a contest between two different types of intentional state 
rather than one between the somatic pangs of desire and an intentional state, as in 
contemporary accounts. 
2 Christopher Hill, “Harman on Self-Referential Thoughts” Philosophical Issues, 16: “Philosophy of 
Language” (2006): 355.  I borrow the quoted phrase from Hill.  Although Hill does not examine Aristotle’s 
psychology in his article, I believe the expression is apt, since prohairesis through deliberation includes 
rational and cognitive elements as well as appetitive elements.   
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In the midst of our analysis of Aristotle’s account of voluntary action and its 
relation to prohairesis, we also take a brief detour to discuss Aristotle’s view of the 
permissibility of intentional instrumental harm.  We argue in light of Aristotle’s account 
of mixed action that Aristotle views intentional instrumental harm as permissible under 
certain restricted circumstances.  This is signaled by his use of the verb haireisthai, 
‘choose’, as well as by expressions like ti anti tinos, ‘this as the price of that’.  Focusing 
on the example of the sailors in the storm who jettison cargo to save their own lives, we 
argue that such an action is chosen and the loss of the cargo is intended as a means; the 
loss of the cargo is not merely foreseen.  Aristotle nowhere uses the distinction between 
intention and foresight but rather focuses on the nature of compelling circumstances to 
explain why such intended harm is not blameworthy.  Although not central to our 
treatment of Aristotle’s theory of action, this aside will be instructive for dealing with 
objections to the Simple View in the second part of the dissertation, especially in our 
examination of objections to the Simple View related to the Doctrine of Double Effect. 
From Aristotle, we jump ahead to the contemporary debate about the accuracy of 
the Simple View.  Opponents of the Simple View attack it along two main axes.  The first 
axis involves two cases which seem to make it impossible to rationally intend what one 
nevertheless does intentionally.  The first case involves a hypothetical video game with 
two mutually exclusive goals that an agent must pursue simultaneously.  The second case 
involves an agent who succeeds at a task unexpectedly, in the face of his own significant 
doubts prior to acting.  In this case, it seems that an agent cannot rationally intend to act if 
he believes that he will fail; therefore, his intentional action is unintended.  The second 
axis involves cases of side-effects and foreseen consequences apart from the goal of the 
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act intended.  It is argued by opponents of the Simple View that while we often say that 
the side-effects are intentional, it seems that we cannot say that they are intended; 
otherwise an agent would seem to be irrational for intending something he does not find 
desirable or good, which would be a reason against his so acting and intending. 
As we will show, the objections which arise along the first axis are easily dealt 
with.  An agent is not committed to irrationality either in the case of the contrived video 
game or in cases where he doubts his ability to succeed.  In the first case, although it is 
impossible for the agent to succeed at both tasks simultaneously, it is not irrational for 
him to pursue both tasks more or less simultaneously and to intend conditionally to fulfill 
one or the other depending on the conditions of the game.  In the second case, it seems to 
be the case that it is only irrational for an agent to intend that which he believes is 
impossible, not that which he thinks is unlikely.  So long as the agent believes it is 
possible to succeed, there seems to be nothing hindering him from so intending.   
The second axis of attack against the Simple View is far more salient than the 
first; however, proponents of the Simple view offer two counterarguments about the 
intentionality of side-effect consequences.  First, they argue that one need not classify 
such side-effect consequences as intentional because one need not say that they were 
intended.  Second, one can argue that such consequences were not intended precisely 
because there would be no reason for an agent to pursue them; they would constitute 
reasons against an agent intending them.  Since an intention to act is essentially directed 
towards the realization of a goal an agent values under some description, and such side- 
effect consequences are not valued by the agent, it seems that they cannot be intended. 
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Therefore, an agent acts in spite of such consequences and not because of them.   All the 
same, the agent is aware of such consequences but foresees rather than intends them. 
These counterarguments fail to disarm the side-effect objection to the Simple 
View.  The counterarguments attempt to include consequences and side-effects which 
result either immediately or directly from a given intentionally chosen means in the 
category of events that are foreseen but not intended.  While it is obvious that there are 
many things human agents foresee but do not intend -- eclipses for instance -- it seems 
somewhat less clear that what results directly or immediately from our own actions is 
relevantly similar to the other members of that class.  The inclusion of side-effect 
consequences in this category of event is motivated by a desire to absolve agents for 
bringing about indirectly what they would be prohibited from and censured for doing 
either instrumentally or for its own sake.  The counterarguments therefore entail that we 
should not be held responsible for consequences beside our end if we could argue that we 
did not intend them as our end.  The difficulty for this argument is that, for the most part, 
moral and legal assessments contradict it: we are held responsible for much of what we 
foresee as resulting from our actions, even things beyond the end desired.  The fine 
distinction made between intention and foresight in the case of side-effect consequences 
is specious and fails to provide either a basis for conventional moral and legal 
assessments of responsibility or an adequate replacement. 
To adequately defend the Simple View, it is therefore necessary to re-examine the 
classification and description of side-effect consequences as well as the distinction 
between intention and foresight.  To do this, we will examine a related issue: the Doctrine 
of Double Effect.  Proponents and opponents of the Simple View often share the belief 
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that the distinction between intention and foresight is necessary to describe the nature of 
side-effect consequences and that this distinction is further necessary for the Doctrine of 
Double Effect.  Proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect often argue that to reject the 
application of the distinction between intention and foresight to side-effect consequences 
(which entails rejecting the Doctrine of Double Effect) entails consequentialism.  
Likewise, those who affirm the use of the distinction between intention and foresight with 
respect to side-effect consequences argue that it is necessary for an adequate account of 
moral assessment.  Therefore, since the distinction and the doctrine are so closely linked, 
we shall examine the history of the Doctrine of Double Effect, with a special attention to 
its origin in Aquinas’ philosophy, to provide a way of describing the intentionality of 
side-effect consequences without relying on the distinction between intention and 
foresight.   
There has been a resurgence of interest in the Doctrine of Double Effect in 
contemporary applied ethics, especially medical and bioethics.  The Doctrine, as it is 
currently understood, is held to allow, under certain circumstances, certain actions which 
produce both harmful and helpful consequences so long as only the helpful ones are 
intended.  The harmful consequences or side-effects are held to be merely foreseen and 
not intended.  Opponents of Double Effect argue that the distinction between foresight 
and intention used in Double Effect cases is specious, and that an agent must seem to 
intend the harms that result from his actions as instrumental to the help that he intends.   
Euthanasia is among the heated cases over which the proponents and opponents of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect argue. The case hinges on the permissibility of killing and 
whether or not a given killing is in fact instrumental to the achievement of some other 
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end or merely accidental to that achievement.  The argument is over whether a physician 
may licitly prescribe a dose of a palliative drug he believes will probably be lethal to a 
terminally ill patient in excruciating pain if it is his intention merely to relieve pain and 
no other dose will work.  Proponents of Double Effect argue that the administration of the 
drug is licit but that the death, if it occurs, is merely a foreseen probable consequence of 
the administration of the drug and the physician’s act does not constitute euthanasia.  
Opponents argue that the narrow construal of intention in this case is dishonest and 
artificial. 
The origin of Double Effect has historically been attributed to the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, specifically Aquinas’ treatment of homicide in self defense in the 
Summa Theologiae, II-II Q. 64 a. 7.  In that article, Aquinas defends certain types of 
homicide in self defense by arguing that the homicidal act has a ‘double effect’: one is the 
death of the attacker; the other is the saving of one’s life.  Aquinas argues that the latter 
effect is intended but the former is not; the death of the attacker is praeter intentionen or 
‘beside the intention’.  Interpreters of Aquinas, at least since the Jesuit Gury in the late 
nineteenth century, have taken him to mean that the death of the attacker was not 
intended in any sense, either as an end or as a means, and that the death is merely 
foreseen and not intended.  As we will show, contemporary writers are conflicted about 
whether or not this is an accurate interpretation of Aquinas even if they agree with the 
moral prohibition of instrumental killing.  We shall draw on the work of Gregory 
Reichberg as well as the writings of fifteenth century Dominican Francisco de Vitoria to 
argue that in his treatment of self defense, Aquinas is using intentio, translated as 
intention, to denote the intention of the end as opposed to the intention of the means; 
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thus, Aquinas does not in fact endorse the Doctrine of Double Effect as it is now 
understood.  The two effects to which he refers are the effect intended as end, the saving 
of one’s life, and the effect intended instrumentally, the death of the attacker.  This is 
consistent with Aquinas’ account of intention in the Summa Theologiae and Summa 
Contra Gentiles, where Aquinas explains that what is praeter intentionem includes things 
that are chosen and voluntary though not intended as ends.  Of note is that Aquinas refers 
explicitly to Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics and the scenario of the sailors in the 
storm to illustrate this distinction.  Therefore, Aquinas, like Aristotle, held that killing 
was permissible under certain circumstances, and he did not utilize the distinction 
between foresight and intention in his account of self-defense.  Moreover, where he does 
use the distinction between foresight and intention, it is largely to include what we 
foresee as a result of our actions within the bounds of our instrumental intentionality – we 
are responsible for many of the things we foresee as a result of our actions. 
Aquinas employs a varied and subtle intentional vocabulary that makes a 
distinction between the intentionality of ends and the intentionality of means.  In English 
usage, this distinction is often blurred.  The English word ‘intention’ generally 
corresponds to the intention of the end, as does Aquinas’ intentio; however, it can also 
designate the proximate, instrumental goal of an action.  Likewise, the use of the adverb 
‘intentionally’ to describe an action denotes that it was done with or for some purpose.  
Describing an action as intentional, however, does not designate or specify that purpose 
or the relationship of the act and its immediate consequences to that purpose.  A killing in 
self defense may be just as intentional as a killing for sadistic pleasure; however, whether 
the killing was instrumental or an end in itself is not specified by describing it as 
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intentional.  This goes to the heart of the debate about the Simple View and the recent 
surveys conducted by Joshua Knobe which attack it.   
Proponents and opponents of the Simple View make the same mistake for the 
same reasons.  Both assume that to call an act or consequence intentional is to assume 
that the act or the consequence was the purpose or end of the act rather than the 
instrument or component of the instrument by which the purpose or end is brought about.  
Both assume that instrumental harm is unconditionally prohibited, and for this reason 
they attempt to argue alternately that harmful consequences are either not intentional or 
not intended.  Proponents of the Simple View take refuge in the distinction between 
intention and foresight; thus, the harm resulting from an intentional action is neither 
intentional nor intended.  Opponents argue for intentional actions which are not intended; 
therefore, the harmful consequences can be intentional without being intended.  Both 
sides start from a deontological presupposition about the impermissibility of intentional, 
instrumental harm and work backwards toward an account of intention and intentional 
action that allows agents to accomplish what they cannot intend.   
With Aquinas as our guide and primary example, we can see that by rejecting the 
Doctrine of Double Effect and challenging the application of the intention/foresight 
distinction to the most salient cases of side-effect consequences we can have an intention 
centered account of human action which can serve as a basis for moral evaluation which 
does not erode into consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action 
rather than the agent’s intention are the primary basis of moral evaluation .  What must be 
rejected is not the role or importance of intention but the pernicious connection between a 
deontological prohibition on instrumental harming and action theory.  Whether or not 
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such a prohibition is true, valid, or morally valuable is a separate issue from an accurate 
philosophical description of human action. 
 Having refuted the most salient objection to the Simple View and having 
defended ourselves against the charge of consequentialism, we can examine the problems 
associated with intention and intentional action at a deeper level and use the insights 
gained from our earlier analysis of Aristotle.  One problem with contemporary accounts 
of intention is a narrow focus on deliberate action and intention.  While it is the case that 
mature human action, human action par excellence, is deliberate, not every human action 
is.  Human actions may be more or less deliberate, and the intentionality behind action is 
often indefinite, even when deliberate.  Action description is notoriously imprecise, and 
while there may be thin and thick descriptions of action, there is no description of an 
action so thick that it rules out further re-description.  Contemporary writers in the field 
of action theory often suppose that real human intentions are as precise and discrete as 
the propositional constructions used in academic articles and classroom hypotheticals.  
The analytic reduction of intentional states to propositional attitudes has a corollary in 
action theory and philosophical psychology: the distinction between intention and desire.  
Intentions, which are considered to be rational, linguistically-mediated propositional 
attitudes, are considered to be distinct from desires, which are considered to be somatic 
brute psychic forces which work on intentions.  The former are considered to be subject 
to unique rational requirements by reason of their internal structure or genesis in 
deliberation, while the latter are not.  The claim that intentions are differentiated from 
desires by being structurally different propositional attitudes, that is, by being self-
referential propositional attitudes, is easily refuted.  Likewise, the claim that intentions 
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are closer to the genesis of actions is also refutable since many contemporary thinkers 
allow either that desires can autonomously cause intentional action or that they can 
generate corresponding intentions.  It seems, therefore, that the opposition between 
intention and desire is largely misunderstood, since intentions are not distinguished from 
desires on the basis of their proximity to the genesis of action.   
We must replace this opposition with an analysis of intention in terms of desire.  
Language and rational reflection are certainly involved in the genesis of most human 
action; however, we must avoid the temptation to which so many have succumbed to 
argue that language and reason somehow replace desire in the genesis of human action, 
creating a fully autonomous capacity known was intention.  As Alasdair MacIntyre 
insightfully argued in Dependent Rational Animals, language facilitates deliberation and 
the specification and conceptualization of desire, but it does not facilitate action in the 
absence of desire.  Desire is fundamentally purposive, and desire is the fundamental 
intentional state.  When English speakers modify action descriptions by adding the 
adjective ‘intentional’ or the adverb ‘intentionally’ they are usually pointing out the 
premeditation and deliberateness of an action; however, when they describe the purpose 
of the action, they call that the intention of the act, and this latter use seems not to entail 
deliberation.  What is common throughout the uses of ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ is 
purposiveness.  What distinguishes the different purposive states is the level of 
specification, conceptualization, and deliberateness.  Intentions, in the full sense, are 
deliberate desires, like Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis.  However, intentions, in a 
wider sense, include any desiderative, purposive state.  The actions of an incontinent 
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when he is incontinent are motivated not by deliberate intentions, but rather by non-
deliberate intentions often labeled desires, which conflict with his deliberate intentions.    
The Aristotelian solution to the challenges to the Simple View is to affirm the 
Simple View in its bare formulation but also to insist that the terms ‘intention’ and 
‘intentional’ are ambiguous; require specification in terms of the classification of 
deliberate and non-deliberate desires as well as whether the intention in questions refers 
to the end or the means. The conundrum surrounding the Simple View stems from the 
fact that not every intentional action is the result of a deliberate and conceptualized 
intention.  The wide range of human action suggests that what is primarily marked out by 
the term ‘intentional’ is the purposiveness, the goal-directedness, of an action; likewise, 
this suggests that the term ‘intention’ corresponds in its basic meaning to the notion of an 
agent’s end or goal.   Agents do not always act deliberately or with an intention which is 
precisely conceptualized.  They may not have a greater notion of what they want than 
‘this’, whatever this object is at that moment.  However, agents can also act with much 
more conceptualized and deliberate intentions.  Deliberateness and conceptualization are 
not necessary conditions of intentionality but rather are qualifications of a basic 
intentional capacity.  Thus, every intentional action is the result of some intention, 
construed broadly to include non-deliberate intentions often classed as desires.  Likewise, 
the choice of means is intentional and intended as means to a further end and not in 
themselves. 
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I.1: Introduction to the First Part 
 
 Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis presents many difficulties for a contemporary 
interpreter.  In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Aristotle with 
respect both to his ethical theory and his theory of action.  While there is a distinction 
between these two fields today, Aristotle treated them together in his ethical works.  
Aristotle’s theory of human action is also distinguished from contemporary theories of 
action by being a subdivision of his account of animal motion in general, which he treats 
in the De Anima and the De Motu Animalium.  This is in contrast to most modern and 
contemporary accounts of human action which draw a firm distinction between animal 
and human motion, the two being events of entirely different sorts: the former attributable 
to a mechanical, natural causality, the later to intention and free will.  Intention and will 
are taken to be the foundation of moral evaluation and responsibility because they are the 
causes of our actions and choices.  It is, therefore, difficult, to reconcile these accounts 
with Aristotle, since Aristotle’s notion of prohairesis, translated often as ‘choice’ or 
‘moral purpose’ or simply ‘purpose’, is not the single or universal cause of human action.  
Not all actions are chosen according to Aristotle, yet we are still morally responsible for 
them.  Thus, it seems that Aristotle offers, at best, a problematic account of intentional 
action and one which cannot adequately account for important instances of moral fault, 
like akrasia (which is either against choice or without it).  
 In this part, we will attempt a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle’s notion 
of prohairesis situated in both his ethical works and his works on animal motion, but also 
looking to its appearance and role in his other works.  We will begin with a brief survey 
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of the instances of prohairesis outside of the ethical works.  This survey will show that 
the term prohairesis and its root verb prohaireisthai have a several related meanings, 
involving intention, moral evaluation and causality.  We will then begin our account of 
prohairesis by first examining Aristotle’s theories on animal motion, desire, imagination, 
and thought to properly situate the accounts of human action in the ethical works.   Once 
we have a grasp of Aristotle’s larger theory of animal motion, and a better understanding 
of the intentional aspects of desire and imagination, we will be in a position to properly 
interpret prohairesis in the ethics, where it is called a ‘deliberate desire’ (bouleutikē 
orexis).   Within the ethical works, we will start with Aristotle’s discussion of voluntary 
action, and show how this account flows from his discussion of animal motion in the De 
Anima and the De Motu Animalium.   We will demonstrate that there is one account of 
voluntary action in Aristotle and that the essential element of voluntary action is orexis. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that orexis corresponds most closely with the English word 
‘intending’ and that orexis has several forms, boulēsis, epithumia, thumos and prohairesis 
with differing objects and degrees of forethought, planning, coordination, deliberation 
and temporal directedness.   
From our account of orexis we will show that prohairesis is a composite of orexis 
and nous by examining the process of deliberation, whose model is the practical 
syllogism. As we will show, the practical syllogism is a model of the actual process of 
deliberation but also of the general process of intentional actions in humans and animals, 
some of which are not deliberate; thus, the ‘practical syllogism’ does not necessarily 
involve fully linguistic, propositionally mediated thought.  The ‘practical syllogism’ may 
involve two types of ends presented by some type of orexis, which are not explicitly 
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differentiated by Aristotle: an end achieved by some instrumental means and an end 
achieved through a means which itself is constitutive of the end.  There are three possible 
outcomes for a practical syllogism or practical thinking in general: action with and 
caused by a prohairesis, action without a prohairesis, and action against a pre-existent 
prohairesis.  From this and an examination of virtue and akrasia, it will be shown that 
prohairesis is not a strictly univocal term, but has a range of meaning with three main, 
related senses: primarily, the deliberate proximal intention with which an action is 
performed and according to which it is done (an ‘occurrent’ choice), best exhibited in the 
correct choices of the virtuous in action; secondarily, the habitual or ‘dispositional’ 
choice of ‘decent’ people, which is exhibited in intentions on the order of prior 
resolutions and general judgments; thirdly, in the widest sense of the things voluntarily 
done by human beings. Our account of akrasia will be critical to establishing these 
points. We will argue that akrasia is explained by Aristotle in two ways: 1) by epithumia 
causing ignorance of the particular; and 2) by epithumia causing action without 
discursive thinking.  Neither case requires a prohairesis for action to result; however, 
both cases are voluntary.  Thus, it will be shown that an akratēs may possess a 
prohairesis in a secondary sense without also possessing it in the primary sense.   
In the course of our exegesis we will also make some conjectures about 
Aristotle’s positions on two issues of central importance to the second part of the 
dissertation: 1) the permissibility of instrumental harm; and 2) the intentionality and 
responsibility related to consequences beyond those directly as ends by agents.  In the 
first case, we will argue that based upon Aristotle’s discussion of mixed action and the 
example of sailors in the storm, under certain conditions for certain ends, it is permissible 
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to intend instrumental harm.  In the second place, we will argue that the description of 
‘means’ or ‘what is toward the end’ that Aristotle gives as the object of prohairesis is 
indefinite enough to include consequences beyond the end intended and the immediate 
instrument of action; moreover, the inclusion of such consequences is more than likely 
given Aristotle’s discussion of ignorance and responsibility. 
After we have finished our exegesis, it will be clear that Aristotle’s account of 
human action distinguishes types and degrees of intention, which contemporary discourse 
often does not consider essential.  Contemporary analytic theories of action tend to treat 
intentions as if they were all of the same level of conceptual clarity and deliberateness; 
whereas, for Aristotle, ‘intention’ is never a discrete entity but always needs to be 
specified in relation to its object and the degree to which this has been informed by some 
kind of thought.  This conclusion will provide the basis for the next chapter of this 
dissertation where we will examine how this multi-valent theory of intention can help to 
dissolve some of the difficulties in contemporary action theory, particularly paradoxes 
involving causal chains, as well as foresight and unintended consequences. 
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I.2: A Survey of Prohairesis in the Aristotelian Corpus 
 
The word prohairesis is the noun-substantative form of prohaireisthai, which is 
the combination of the prefix pro with the verb haireisthai.  The verb means ‘to choose’, 
although it originally meant ‘to grasp with the hand’ or ‘to seize’, and over time it was 
extended to mental grasp or understanding and to indicate preference or choice in 
general, whether this was indicated by one’s hands or not.  The prefix indicates temporal 
priority, i.e., ‘before’, so that ‘prohairesis’ indicates “something chosen before other 
things” after prior thought or deliberation (NE III 2, 1112a15-19).3  The etymology is 
somewhat indefinite as to the ontological, psychological or other status of the word.  The 
verb prohaireō appears as early as the 6th century B.C. in writings attributed to 
Hecataeus, Pythagoras and Anaxagoras.4
                                                 
3 All translations from the Nicomachean Ethics, unless otherwise noted, will be taken from Irwin’s 
translation: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin, 2d. ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999). 
  In the 5th century, Thucydides uses it once; 
Isocrates and Plato each more than twenty times.  The verb and the noun prohairesis 
appear more than seventy times in the political speeches of Aristotle’s contemporary, 
Demosthenes.  So it would seem to be a word in everyday use by ordinary Greeks.  
Prohairesis or prohaireō, in its various conjugations, appear more than 350 times in 
Aristotle’s writings; the vast bulk of these appearances are in the Eudemian and 
Nicomachean Ethics.  Many interpreters of the Nicomachean Ethics assume that 
prohairesis is a technical term, if not of Aristotle’s own making, then one marked by his 
4 Here and for the remainder of this section, when I refer to the number of appearances of a Greek term in 
Greek literature or the Aristotelian Corpus, I will be referring to the results of searches conducted on the 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae CD ROM E  (University of California, Irvine: 2000), held at the O’Neill 
Library at Boston College.  I am also indebted to the database for pointing me to a number of references 
cited below. 
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peculiar use.5
 While prohairesis
  This does not seem to be borne out by its presence either in other writers 
or in the larger Aristotelian Corpus.  As we shall see, Aristotle uses prohairesis and 
prohaireō both in a narrower, technical sense, and in wider non-technical senses.  
Specifically, Aristotle uses prohairesis in three main ways: 1) in the abstract, as a cause 
or principle of human action (praxis); 2) the deliberate intention or purpose with which 
an action is performed, which is a primary element in moral evaluation; 3) the general 
purpose, intent, goal or preference of an argument, law, regime, or person.   
6
 In the Physics, Aristotle discusses prohairesis in his discussion of necessity, 
chance and luck, in Book Beta, chapters 5 and 6, and this discussion similarly appears in 
Metaphysics Delta and Kappa.  The first mention of prohairesis in the Physics describes 
prohairesis as a cause of something’s coming to be for the sake of something.  Not all 
 has an origin in common speech about human actions, 
intentions and purposes, Aristotle takes an interest in speaking about it as a distinct causal 
principle that he attempts to fit into his larger metaphysical system.  It does not appear 
frequently in the Physics or the Metaphysics, but when it does, it is defined in relation to 
other important concepts such as necessity, chance, luck, potency, and ‘beginning’ or 
principle (archē).  Prohairesis is a principle and potency opposed to necessity but among 
things that can be affected by chance and luck. 
                                                 
5 “The writer here examines the operation of the Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing 
between alternatives of conduct. The technical term employed, ‘choice’ or ‘preference,’ has appeared in the 
formal definition of virtue (2.6.15). In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to means: at the 
moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible (or expressing it more loosely, among 
the various things here and now obtainable by our action) the one which we think will conduce to the end 
we wish. Elsewhere however (3.1.15 and 6.12.8) it is used of the selection of ends, and it is almost 
equivalent to ‘purpose’; while at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means (see also 7.9.1). The writer returns 
to the subject in Bk. 6.2.” See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in 
Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 19, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934) 
128-129, translator’s footnote a. 
6 For the remainder of this section, I will use prohairesis to also stand in for the verb prohaireisthai  for 
ease of writing. 
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things come to be for the sake of something, and not all things come to be for the sake of 
something because of prohairesis.  Things that come to be through prohairesis can 
possess a final cause even though they do not come about through necessity or for the 
most part (Phys. B 5, 196b18-19).7  Moreover, necessity can be an obstacle to motion or 
chance, and in this sense, it can be a source of compulsion or a hindrance opposed to 
prohairesis (Meta. Δ 5, 1015a20-35).8  Prohairesis’ place outside of the realm of 
necessity leads Aristotle to discuss it in relation to chance and luck.  It often happens that 
men go out with one purpose and on their way they accomplish another, and the 
accomplishment of the other purpose is attributed to luck because the prohairesis was not 
present in them as the cause of their original trip (Phys. B 5, 197a2).9
                                                 
7 From Apostle’s translation of the Physics: Aristotle, Aristotle’s Physics, trans. H. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: 
Peripatetic Press, 1980). 
  Luck, as opposed 
to chance, applies specifically to things caused by prohairesis: “It is clear, then, that luck 
is an accidental cause of things done according to choice and for the sake of something: 
and so both thought and luck are concerned with the same thing, for choice is not without 
thought” (Phys. B 5, 197a6-8; Meta. K 8, 1065a29-32).  Aristotle distinguishes chance as 
a wider term than luck: anything that happens by luck, happens by chance, but not 
everything that happens by chance is a matter of luck.  Chance applies to any happening 
whatsoever, not just those involving human actions and prohairesis, and prohairesis is a 
unique feature of human action.  Neither animals nor children, Aristotle says, are said to 
8 All translations of the Metaphysics, unless otherwise noted, will be from Tredennick’s Loeb translation: 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol.17, trans. H. 
Tredennick (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1933). 
9 All further translations of the Physics will be from Wicksteed and Cornford’s Loeb translation: Aristotle. 
Physics, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 4, trans. P.H. Wicksteed 
and F.M. Cornford (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929). 
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be lucky because they do not possess prohairesis (Phys. B 6, 197b21-22, see also Pol. III, 
5, 1280a34).10
The discussion of necessity, chance, luck and prohairesis points to its importance 
in Aristotle’s philosophy, which is underscored by Aristotle’s classification of 
prohairesis as a fundamental kind of archē or principle as well as a kind of dunamis or 
potency that causes motion to occur in the manner that it does, like phusis or ousia (Meta. 
Δ 1, 1013a10-11; 1013a18-25; 11, 1018b22-26; see also Oec. II, 1345b9).
 
11
                                                 
10 All references to the Politics will be from Rackham’s Loeb translation: Aristotle, Politics, The Loeb 
Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 21, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1944). 
  In particular, 
prohairesis plays a crucial, guiding role in the ways in which a being’s other potencies 
are realized.  In Metaphysics Θ, chapter 5, Aristotle examines the different kinds of 
dunamis or potency.  Potencies can be divided into the rational and the irrational, of 
which living things can possess both.  Rational potencies can have contrary effects 
whereas irrational potencies are determined to one type of actualization.  It would seem, 
then, that a rational potency could produce contrary effects simultaneously, but this, 
Aristotle says, is impossible.  It is impossible because it violates the law of contradiction, 
two contrary attributes cannot be predicated about the same subject, at the same time, etc.  
However, the account also omits key components in the account of motion in living 
things.  The realization of these potencies is directed by orexis or prohairesis, such that 
the controlling desire (hopoterou gar an oregētai kuriōs) will select the actualization of 
the potency in the circumstances, if nothing hinders it. It seems here that prohairesis is 
equivalent to a kind of controlling desire, though Aristotle’s use of a disjunction suggests 
that it is not identical with orexis (Meta. Θ 5, 1048a1-24). 
11 See Aristotle, Oeconomica, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 18, 
trans. C.G. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935). 
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 The importance of prohairesis as a cause of some animal motion, i.e., that of a 
mature human being, makes it surprising that it appears only once in the De Anima and 
only three times in one passage in the De Motu Animalium.  In the De Anima, it appears 
during a survey of predecessors’ views on how the soul moves the body, specifically 
where Aristotle rejects Democritus’ atomic theory because, “In general the living creature 
does not appear to be moved by the soul in this way, but by some act of mind or will (dia 
proaireseōs tinos kai noēseōs)” (DA I 3, 406b25).12   Similarly, in the De Motu 
Animalium, Aristotle merely names prohairesis as a cause of the movement of animals, 
along with thought (dianoia), imagination (phantasia), wish (boulēsis), sensual desire 
(epithumia), and anger (thumos).  All of these essentially boil down to thought (taken 
widely to include imagination) and desire or appetite (orexis), of which wish, sensual 
desire, and anger are all types.  Prohairesis, Aristotle says, shares in both thought and 
desire, which makes its position ambiguous.  At the end of the passage where prohairesis 
is named, Aristotle suggests that either orexis or prohairesis is the cause of motion, much 
like his conclusion in the Metaphysics, which would seem to put prohairesis on the side 
of thought, although the reasoning is neither stated nor obvious (DM VI, 700b11-
701a4).13
                                                 
12 All references to and translations of the De Anima , unless otherwise noted, will be taken from Hett’s 
Loeb translation: Aristotle, De Anima, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, 
Vol. 8, trans. W.S. Hett (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. For future reference, it will be 
abbreviated as “DA” in parenthetical citation. 
  Since both works treat of ensouled beings in general and not just human 
13 All references to and translations of the De Motu Animalium, unless otherwise noted, will be taken from 
E.S. Forster’s Loeb translation: Aristotle, On the Movement of Animals, The Loeb Classical Library: 
Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 12, trans. E.S. Forster (Carmbridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1998).  For future reference, it will be abbreviated as “DM” in parenthetical citation.  In DA III 9, 
432b4-7, Aristotle cites the location of boulēsis in the calculative part (to logistikon) of the soul as a 
problem for dividing the soul into parts, since boulēsis is a species of orexis and other orexeis are irrational.  
In the Rhetoric I, 10, 1369a1-4, Aristotle contrasts the longing for the good which is characteristic of 
boulēsis with the irrational desires, epithumia and thumos.   
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beings, it may be that Aristotle has saved a specific, rigorous treatment of prohairesis for 
his ethical works.  Likewise, it might be suggested that the brevity of Aristotle’s 
treatment of prohairesis in the Physics and Metaphysics stems from those works’ wider 
scope and their theoretical, as opposed to practical, subject matter.   
 In any case, outside of these works Aristotle does have more to tell us about 
prohairesis’ causal relation to human action, particularly in the Rhetoric.  Since the 
Rhetoric is directed towards instructing orators on how to make persuasive speeches, 
especially those that call for praise or blame, it is no accident that prohairesis figures 
prominently.  Aristotle says that praise is based on actions (praxis), and that morally 
praiseworthy men, spoudaioi, characteristically act according to prohairesis.  A man we 
mean to praise must be shown to act in that way and to do so habitually.  Aristotle 
advises that we should even attribute accidents or strokes of luck to the man’s prohairesis 
to induce our listeners into believing they are signs of virtue and prohairesis.  As much as 
we may focus on the manner of a man’s actions, it is imperative to show that the actions 
themselves are good, virtuous and praiseworthy.  Without achievements (ta erga), there 
is nothing to praise (Rhet. I 9,1367b19-33).14 It is interesting to note that in this passage, 
Aristotle equates to ergon, “work” or “achievement”, with praxis or action. As Aristotle 
uses it here, praxis has a wide sense; it seems to indicate anything voluntarily done by 
human beings.15
                                                 
14 All references to the Rhetoric will be from Freese’s Loeb translation: Aristotle, Rhetoric, The Loeb 
Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 22, trans J.H. Freese (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1926). 
  It is important for the speaker to describe what an agent has done as 
being the result of prohairesis, though it need not have been to have happened.  This is 
15 See Irwin’s translator’s notes for the Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2, page 239 and the translator’s glossary 
entry for “action”, page 315, on the range of meaning of praxis.  Irwin notes that praxis can be used in a 
wide sense to include any action which is either intentional or voluntary, and it can also be used in a 
restricted sense to include only those actions which result from deliberation and decision.  Terence Irwin, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 2d. ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999). 
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confirmed later when Aristotle says that “What is done voluntarily is not always done 
with premeditation” (Rhet. I 10, 1368b10-11).  Prohairesis contributes a moral quality to 
actions through being their cause; it seems to contribute a characteristic manner, which 
can make them better or worse than if they had been performed without it.  If someone 
commits injustice not simply voluntarily but with a prohairesis, which Aristotle links to 
the agent’s knowledge of himself and his circumstances, that person is worse than 
someone who commits the same act merely voluntarily (Rhet. I 10, 1368b6-22; 13, 
1373b27-37; 13, 1374a10-16).  As Aristotle discusses elsewhere, it is the prohairesis 
with which man speaks that makes his statement a lie (Meta. Δ 29, 1025a1-14; see also 
Top. IV 5, 126b9-10 on slander and imposture).16
 The causal relationship between prohairesis and praxis is not, however, entirely 
clear in the material outside of Aristotle’s ethical works.  In Metaphysics E, chapter 1, for 
example, Aristotle claims that “the thing done and the thing willed are the same (to auto 
gar to prakton kai prohaireton)” (Meta. E 1, 1025b23-25).  Yet, earlier in the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle says that among the senses of potency is “The power of 
performing [an act] well or according to intention (kata prohairesin); because sometimes 
we say that those who can merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they 
intended (mē kalōs de ē mē hōs proheilonto),
  We shall return to this below. 
17
                                                 
16 See Aristotle, Topica, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 2, trans. E.S. Forster 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
 cannot speak or walk” (Meta. Δ 12, 
1019a.22-23).  Likewise, in the Rhetoric, when Aristotle discusses equity (epieikeia), he 
says that it is equitable to look “not at the action itself, but to the moral purpose (kai mē 
pros tēn praxin alla pros tēn prohairesin)” (Rhet.  I 13, 1374b14).   So it seems that, as 
we have seen, human action, in the widest sense, does not require prohairesis, and that 
17 Proheilonto is the second aorist indicative middle third person plural form of prohaireisthai 
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even when there is a prohairesis present in an agent in the moment of action, there is no 
guarantee that it is sufficient to give the action its stamp or character.   An action may or 
may not reflect or be caused by an agent’s prohairesis, and it is sometimes necessary to 
evaluate them separately.  Yet this raises questions about how we are able to judge 
prohairesis at all on the basis of action, and Aristotle seems, more often than not, to want 
a direct causal connection between praxis and prohairesis, when prohairesis is present in 
an agent at the moment of action.  He tends to speak of this as representative of all 
voluntary human action even though there are significant exceptions. 
 For Aristotle, prohairesis is a key element in moral evaluation because of its 
causal link to action and its link to character (ēthos).  In the Poetics, Aristotle says that 
character “is that which reveals choice, shows what sort of thing a man chooses or avoids 
in circumstances where the choice is not obvious,” and a writer demonstrates character 
through speeches about what the speaker chooses (Poet. 1450b9-b10a; 1454a18; see also 
Rhet. I 8,1366a15).18
                                                 
18 See Aristotle, Poetics, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. 23, trans. 
W.H. Fyfe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932). 
   There is a reciprocal relationship between character and 
prohairesis: if one has a certain character, one tends to have certain intentions and make 
certain choices; likewise, it is through making choices that one’s character is assessed: 
“for the wicked are always so called because of their deliberate choice (kata prohairesin) 
of evil” (Top. IV 5, 126a36).   The possession of a prohairesis reflecting a certain type of 
character is not, however, merely an affective or passive capacity, it is executive, as 
Aristotle says in the Topics:  “For a just man is rather he who deliberately chooses (ho 
prohairoumenos) to distribute what is equal than he who has the capacity for doing so” 
(Top. VI 7, 145b37; see also Top. IV 5, 126b9-10; Rhet. II 12, 1388b31-35).  Further, as 
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Aristotle remarks in the Rhetoric, prohairesis is closer to action than other states or 
affections of the soul.  Those who seek to commit injustice or revenge wish to harm 
others, and this is exhibited by emotions such as anger or expressions of enmity.  Having 
the wish, however, does not entail committing the action, for often one has neither the 
opportunity nor the power to commit injustice or exact revenge; however, once the 
opportunity presents itself, especially in the case of “outraged virtue”, one chooses 
(prohairetai) to exact revenge (Rhet. II 4, 1382a33-b2).19  Generally, what is the result of 
a prohairesis is good, or is seen as good by the agent, just as what is wished or even 
desired is seen as good for some reason, even if only because it is pleasant.  However, 
prohairesis is directed towards the accomplishment of a goal, “things which might 
happen, and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen 
without labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time (Rhet. I 
6, 1363a19-b4; see also Rhet. II 23, 1400a35-b3).   Thus, a sophist is defined not by his 
use of persuasive speech but by the particular conclusions he wishes his listeners to draw, 
the goals of his speech; those are his prohaireseis (Rhet. I 1, 1355b18-22).20
 As is already evident, the various meanings that prohairesis takes in Aristotle 
bleed into one another: the physical sense leads to the ethical sense, and both lend 
themselves to wider extension.  We started by examining prohairesis’ appearance in 
theoretical works and Aristotle’s naming it as a cause of motion unique to human beings 
and characteristic of action, exhibiting intention or purpose, which is the subject of moral 
evaluation.  The final sense of prohairesis, the widest sense of the term, is the sense 
   
                                                 
19 The phrase “outraged virtue” is quoted from the Loeb translation of the Rhetoric. 
20 The use of prohaireo to mean the goal of a speech also occurs in the Topics (Top. I 3, 101b7) 
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which would be familiar to those listening to Demosthenes: prohairesis as a term for a 
general intention of an end, a purpose, one which is not necessarily good or practical.   
As Aristotle says in the Rhetoric, prohairesis “has reference to an end” and as 
prohairesis goes, so follows the character and the end of the agent (Rhet. I 8, 1366a15; III 
16, 1417a15-17).  Aristotle does not there specify which things count as ends, such as 
physical movements, states of affairs, things to be obtained instrumentally, things 
constituted by actions, or artifacts.  In the sense of the term that concerns persuasive 
speeches, it seems to pertain only to moral matters, since he denies that mathematical 
treatises, or theoretical treatises, can involve prohairesis because they do not concern 
character; whereas the Platonic dialogues may involve prohairesis, since they 
customarily have character as a subject.21
The sense of a prohairesis as an intention of a general goal, policy or resolution 
occurs in the Poetics, Rhetoric, Topics, and the Politics.  The verb prohaireō can express 
a general preference for a choice of life, such as the choice between the contemplative 
life and the life of politics, the place of friendship has as the purpose of social life, or the 
tendency of some to choose to get more than their fair share of good such as money or 
  One expresses a prohairesis in speech by 
expressing one’s preferences, purposes or resolutions, of which he gives the following 
example: “But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if I profited nothing, it is better” 
(Rhet. III 16, 1417a15-33; see also Rhet. II 21, 1395a28-1395b1; 22, 1395b14-16).   
                                                 
21 This division is not strictly followed by Aristotle himself. In the Topics, prohairesis also occurs in a non-
moral sense, in the selection of the terms and premises of an argument (Top. VIII 1, 156a34).  This is 
similar to at least one occurrence of prohaireō in Plato, in the Parmenides at 143c where the Stranger 
discusses ‘selecting’ or ‘choosing’ the terms or topics of discussion,  whether being, otherness, or unity.  
That dialogue is not, as most other Platonic dialogues are, concerned with virtue.  It also occurs at the very 
beginning of the Politics, where Aristotle announces the selection of his subject matter (Pol  II, 1, 1260b27-
29).   See Plato, Parmenides, The Loeb Classical Library: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, trans. H.N. 
Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926). 
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honor (Pol. VII 1, 1324a31;  III 5, 1280b39; II 4, 1266b35-28).   The sense of preference 
also occurs in the Poetics, where Aristotle counsels that “What is convincing though 
impossible should always be preferred to what is possible and unconvincing” (Poet. 
1460a26).  This also occurs in Plato, in the Theaetetus at 147d5, for example, where it is 
said that one should have a preference for a good friend.  Aristotle also uses it to signify a 
habitual direction of choice or preference, as when he says that  “the best form of citizen 
is one who has the capacity and the will to be governed and to govern with a view to the 
life in accordance with virtue” (Pol. III 7, 1284a1-2).    Likewise, in the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle describes “those who have been slandered” as the easiest to slander because 
they do not choose (prohairountai) to go to court because they fear the judges’ prejudice 
(Rhet. I 12, 1372b35-36)  
The most common use of prohairesis in the Politics is for the intentions of 
legislators in written laws and constitutions, i.e., the spirit of the law.  For instance, 
Aristotle regards the freedom of women as harmful to the fundamental aims of a regime 
(pros tēn prohairesin tēs politeias) (Pol. II 6, 1269b12-14).   In one passage, prohairesis 
is set as the equivalent of what a legislator wishes (bouletai), as where the Spartan law 
demanding contributions from all citizens for the common mess, regardless of wealth or 
poverty, had effects that went against what the legislator wished and intended by the law 
(Pol. II 6, 1271a30-35).22
                                                 
22 This also occurs in the Topics, where Aristotle announces his intention or prohairesis not to give an exact 
definition for all the kinds of reasoning, but rather “wishes” (boulometha) to proceed “in outline” (Top. I 1, 
101a22). 
  The connection between prohairesis and boulēsis also occurs 
when Aristotle discusses revolutions: sometimes rebels choose (prohairountai) the same 
form of government, “but wish (boulōntai) it to be in their own control” (Pol. V 1, 
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1301b11-13).  Similarly, Aristotle criticizes Pericles for instituting a fee for service on 
the law-court, against the prohairesis of Solon (Pol. II 9, 1274a10-12).   
As this brief survey illustrates, prohairesis is not a word peculiar to Aristotle or 
alien to the ordinary Greek usage of his time; although Aristotle is probably peculiar in 
making prohairesis a distinct metaphysical and psychological principle.  In any case, just 
as the ordinary Greek could use it or its parent verb to indicate concrete, particular 
choices or more abstract resolutions or intentions, so too Aristotle can use it for the same 
range of meanings, and he does so in a number of his works.  The fact that prohairesis 
has this range of meaning in Aristotle’s own works outside of the ethical works will be 
important for interpreting its appearances within the ethical works, where we must pay 
careful attention to the context of its use to determine how precisely and in what manner 
Aristotle is using it. 
Before we examine the place of prohairesis in the ethical works, we need to 
examine the larger psychological framework in which it is placed.  Many scholars 
approaching the place of prohairesis in Aristotle’s ethical works neglect to examine the 
psychological works in any great detail.  The failure to incorporate Aristotle’s account of 
the soul in the genesis of both human and animal motion through desire (orexis), 
imagination (phantasia) and thought (dianoia) means that many scholars do not 
adequately understand the genesis and work of prohairesis in human action.  Specifically, 
as we shall see, without the psychological works, Aristotle’s account of voluntary action 
and akrasia seems incomplete, incoherent, or implausible. 
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I.3: Sources of Voluntary Motion in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium 
 
I.3.1:  Desire, Imagination and Action in the De Motu Animalium and De Anima  
 
While prohairesis is mentioned a combined four times in the De Anima and De 
Motu Animalium, both works deal with human action as a species of animal motion.  
Since man is an animal, albeit a rational animal, the psychological mechanics of human 
action, though specifically different, is still generically the same as that of other animals.  
Indeed, the bulk of Aristotle’s examples in both works are human actions, even though 
the subject of each is the larger genus of animal motion.  In these works, as we shall 
subsequently argue, Aristotle presents the basis for his account of the voluntary in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  The principle involved in all animal motion is orexis, and this 
principle is an intentional capacity, directed towards an end, which is presented by the 
faculties of sensation, imagination (phantasia) and intellect.  The process by which orexis 
produces motion is similar in all instances of animal motion, and Aristotle uses a 
syllogistic analogy to demonstrate this.  This analogy also illustrates the power of the 
imagination, which is not a merely passive faculty of reproduction.  Aristotle’s accounts 
in these works provide the basis for his ascription of voluntary action to animals and 
children as well as his claims that prohairesis directs only a subset of voluntary human 
motion in the ethical works.  In our examination of the psychological works, we will 
show how action without prohairesis can be intentional through the operation of orexis 
and phantasia.   
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In the De Anima, Aristotle begins his own analysis of the soul and its parts in 
Book II, after having surveyed his predecessors.  In chapter 1, he asserts that the soul is 
the form of a body, and so they both are united while remaining intelligibly distinct, as 
wax and the impression it bears are.  In chapter 2, he makes his own ‘fresh start’ by 
looking at the many senses the word ‘life’ (hē zōē) has.  ‘Life’ is said in many ways, but 
particularly, living seems to consist in mind (nous), sensation (aesthēsis), motion 
(kinēsis), rest (stasis), nutrition (hē kata trophēn), decay (phthisis) and growth (auxēsis).  
All ensouled beings, even, Aristotle notes, plants, have some nutritive capacity and the 
capacities of growth and decay.  All animals, even immobile ones, share these capacities 
but they also have sensation, that is, at least the sense of touch.   However, sensation is no 
stand-alone faculty: “if it [an animal] has sensation, it must also have imagination and 
appetite (orexis); for, where sensation is, there is also pain and pleasure, and where these 
are, there must also be desire (epithumia)” (DA II 2, 413b23-25).  Here, Aristotle 
identifies two of the important elements of human action he discusses in the Ethics, 
orexis and epithumia, as well as their connection to pain, pleasure and imagination.  
These powers exist in animals other than human beings, which will have important 
consequences for our discussion of the train of human practical thinking.  Shortly 
thereafter, in chapter 3, Aristotle tells us how orexis and epithumia are related: epithumia, 
thumos and boulēsis are each a form of orexis.  To have sensation is to be able to 
perceive pleasure and pain, and to perceive them is the basis for desiring the former and 
avoiding the latter.  The most basic orexis is epithumia, “for desire (epithumia) is our 
appetite (orexis) for what is pleasant” (DA II 3, 414b2-7).  Theoretical and practical 
thinking are added, specifically human, capacities to sensation and imagination (DA III 3, 
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427a17-22; 427b7-9).23
Imagination (phantasia) is different both from sensation (aisthēsis) and thought 
(dianoia), but, even without being ‘thought’, properly speaking, it “always implies 
perception and is itself implied by judgment (hupolēpsis)” (DA III 3, 427b15-17).  The 
close conceptual proximity of imagination to sense, judgment, and thought introduces a 
puzzle as to what imagination is.  Although it seems to follow judgment, it seems that it 
cannot be judgment: imagination seems to be an affection (pathos) in our power (eph’ 
hēmin) which we observe like spectators (theōmenoi) looking at a drawing (graphē); 
whereas judgments imply opinions, whose objective truth or falsity is not up to us, and 
which, once formed, immediately affect us, e.g., inspiring fear or courage (DA III 3, 
427b15-26).  Imagination, then, is not judgment, but it seems to be something by which 
we judge (kath’hēn krinomen)
  Since the capacity for imagination is not a specifically human 
faculty, it is easy to overlook its significance for Aristotle’s account of practical thought 
and action, specifically its connections to deliberation and incontinent behavior.   
24
                                                 
23 Aristotle says that “all living creatures have a share in the former [sensation], but only a few in the latter 
[practical thinking]” (DA III, 3, 427b7-9).  It is curious to note that this seems to leave open the possibility 
of higher order animals having some level of practical intelligence.    
, and this includes sensation (aisthēsis), opinion (doxa), 
knowledge (epistēmē), and intellect (nous).    Sensation and imagination are not identical 
since: 1) they do not always occur together, as we do not see when we are asleep but can 
dream of things seen; 2) they do not seem to occur in every animal with sense, e.g., ants, 
bees and grubs; and 3) all sensations of primary sensibles are true, while most imaginings 
are false.  Imagination cannot be knowledge or intellect because neither of those faculties 
can err according to Aristotle (DA III 3, 428a1-17).   
24 The importance of the role of imagination to judgment will be examined below in our treatment of 
Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
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Opinion or belief (pistis) is the only dubious candidate which remains to be 
eliminated.  Opinions have the following qualities according to Aristotle: 1) they may be 
true or false; 2) they entail belief “for one cannot hold opinions which one does not 
believe”; 3) if they entail belief and belief entails conviction (to pepeisthai), then opinion 
requires reason (logos).  While animals have the capacity for imagination, they do not 
have reason (logos), and this means that opinion and imagination cannot be identical.  
Moreover, Aristotle concludes that, “It is clear, then, that imagination cannot be either 
opinion in conjunction with sensation, or opinion based on sensation, both for the reasons 
given, and because the opinion relates to nothing else but the object of sensation” (DA III 
3 428a18-28).  The position of imagination in between sensation and opinion gives it 
great importance in animal and human behavior:  
because imaginations persist in us and resemble sensations, 
living creatures frequently act in accordance with them, 
some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and 
some, viz., men, because the mind is temporarily  clouded 
over by emotion, disease, sleep (DA III 3, 429a5-9) 
 
The persistence of the imagination beyond the immediate sensation allows it to act, in the 
case of non-human animals, like intellect or reason and to be forward-looking.  For 
example, we might imagine that wolves seeking lambs retain the lamb not in sensation, 
which would disappear with the sight of the lamb when the wolf hid for an ambush, but 
through imagination.  More importantly, for ethics, passion can make the intellect passive 
and the imagination operative.  The behavior of the incontinent need not be bestial or 
wanton; it can be goal-directed and forward-looking, even discursive in the procession of 
imagined pleasures, without being fully rational or requiring deliberation or conviction.   
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The Aristotelian conception of the imagination is important to keep in mind for 
the discussion of the practical syllogism because the practical syllogism is an analogy 
that models the actual activities of the soul in generating motion.  Aristotle begins this 
analogy by talking about the role of sensation in this process: 
Sensation, then, is like mere assertion and thinking; when 
an object is pleasant or unpleasant, the soul pursues or 
avoids it, thereby making a sort of assertion or negation.  
To feel pleasure or pain is to adopt an attitude (to energein) 
with the sensitive mean towards good or bad as such.  This 
is what avoidance or appetite (orexis), when actual, really 
means, and the faculties of appetite (orektikon) or 
avoidance are not really different from each other or from 
the sensitive faculty, though their actual essence is different 
(DA III 7, 431a8-18).   
 
Here Aristotle describes a ‘thought’ process without thought, something that can take 
place in lower animals on the analogy with thought, which takes place properly only in 
man.25
                                                 
25 See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 274-276 for the relation of orexis and phantasia to 
‘thought’ in animals.  We shall examine this further below. 
  In the imagination, a sensation can be thought to take on the role of an assertion 
when it is associated with pain or pleasure: with the former, it is an assertion, the latter a 
negation.  The feeling of pleasure and pain is, in itself, already to be actualized (to 
energein) towards goodness or badness; in animals, natural instincts align their pleasures 
with their ends.  Desire (orexis) goes part and parcel with having a sensitive faculty and 
imagination; however, it is distinguishable in its operation from them.  Thus, animals are 
capable of self-motion from an internal principle towards a perceived good, which is, in 
essence, the account of the voluntary Aristotle offers in Book III, chapter 1, of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and in Book II of the Eudemian Ethics.  Sensation is to the 
imagination in lower animals as the imagination is to the intellect in the human soul.  
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Human thinking takes place at a higher level, but we are meant to see how lower animals 
act in a similar fashion by means of the imagination (DA III 7, 431a14-17).26
The analogy between theoretical and practical thinking roughly sketched in the 
De Anima is more completely drawn in the De Motu Animalium.
   
27
For example, when you conceive that every man ought to 
walk and you yourself are a man, you immediately 
(eutheōs) walk; or if you conceive that on a particular 
occasion no man ought to walk, and you yourself are a 
man, you immediately (euthus) remain at rest. In both 
cases, action follows unless there is some hindrance or 
compulsion. Again, I ought to create a good, and a house is 
a good, I immediately create a house.  Again, I need a 
    In the De Anima, 
Aristotle analogizes the premises of the theoretical syllogism with the data of sense and 
the combinative powers of imagination and desire.  In the De Motu Animalium, he shows 
how these premises are related in practical syllogisms.  The lead-in problem, to which the 
illustration of the practical syllogism is the solution, is the disconnect between thought 
and action: “But why is it that thought sometimes results in action and sometimes in 
movement and sometimes not?”  Aristotle says that the same issue exists in theoretical 
thinking, where thought sometimes does and sometimes does not reach a conclusion or 
make an inference about unchanging entities based upon premises.   In speculative 
thinking, the premises combine to form a conclusion, whereas in practical thinking the 
premises combine to produce an action, the conclusion becomes the action (to 
sumperasma ginetai hē praxis) (DM VII, 701a7-13). After making this comparison, 
Aristotle gives several examples of thought leading to action via the analogy of the 
syllogism, in quick succession.  He says,  
                                                 
26 I am indebted to Nussbaum for this point, see Fragility, 267 for an account of the link between phantasia 
and human and animal movement.  We shall examine this at length below. 
27 Nussbaum regards the De Motu Animalium as more authoritative than the De Anima, whereas I see them 
as complementary.  See Nussbaum, Fragility, 276. 
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covering, and a cloak is a covering, I need a cloak.  What I 
need I ought to make; I need a cloak, I ought to make a 
cloak. And the conclusion ‘I ought to make a cloak’ is an 
action (kai to sumperasma, to himation poiēteon, praxis 
estin) (DM VII, 701a13-25). 
 
The premises contain two kinds of content, “the good and the possible,” that is, the goal 
and the existent conditions and means to its realization.  In each case, a goal is given in 
the major premise, presumably by some type of orexis, and the minor premise identifies 
either the particular action, agent, or means which realizes the goal.  The conclusion 
follows immediately unless there is some impediment, and this applies both to things 
pursued and things avoided.    In the case of walking, both walking and not walking can 
be choices or actions.  Even though not walking is not something done, the walking is 
something avoided, and it can be avoided by any number of other actions; refraining from 
walking opens up the possibility for other actions in its stead.28
                                                 
28 See Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, p. 343 for a concurring opinion on the status of non-
action, contra Kenny, “The Practical Syllogism and Incontinence,” Phronesis 11 (1966): 176-77 (esp. 163-
84).  According to Nussbaum:  “Apparently Aristotle means us to understand that once the state of rest is 
chosen as a result of the agent’s deliberation (although he may have been at rest before) it is then an action, 
and, qua action, follows directly from two premises.” 
  Aristotle is aware of the 
simplicity of this analogy; it is merely a sketch.  In the examples given, the action results 
from the beginning (ap’ archēs), the goal desired, in a similar fashion to a theoretical 
conclusion resulting from first principles.  Obviously, most actions involve more thinking 
than this brief sketch, and Aristotle observes, “If there is to be a cloak, such and such a 
thing is necessary, if this thing then something else, and one immediately acts 
accordingly.”  We search in each case for the means to realize the ultimate end, 
proceeding to mediate ends along the way, until we finally reach the thing to be done (or 
avoided) in the present, and that action is the conclusion of a particular stretch of 
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practical thinking.  In the Ethics, this is precisely the sketch of deliberation (bouleusis) 
given in Book III, as we shall see. 
 While there are clear parallels between the syllogistic sketch linking thought and 
action and deliberation as it is described in the Ethics, it is clear that Aristotle is not 
limiting the sketch to a description of deliberation: The same sketch applies even to 
action done quickly, with little or no thinking, or begun from epithumia or thumos.  
Furthermore, action or praxis, as it was applied in the previous passage, included poiēsis, 
e.g., the making of the cloak.  In the Ethics, praxis does not, in the stricter sense, include 
the acts or products of poiēsis, since they fall under technē.29
In any case, when the end which is the goal of the action is apprehended, as 
presented either by sensation (aisthēsis), imagination (phantasia) or thought (nous), the 
   This is a sign both of the 
malleability of Aristotle’s technical vocabulary and the wider scope of this particular 
investigation.  However, just as in a dialectical exercise or eristic, when answers are 
garnered through cross-examination and questioning, “. . . so here the mind (hē dianoia) 
does not stop and consider at all one of the two premises, namely, the obvious one, for 
example, if walking is good for a man, one does not waste time over the premise ‘I 
myself am a man.’ Hence such things as we do without calculation (mē logisamenoi) we 
do quickly” (DM VII, 701a25-b1).  We may have immediate knowledge of ourselves or 
our circumstances which does not require reflection to activate, either due to its being 
obvious or, we might suppose, also because we retain such knowledge by habit.  Aristotle 
himself does not consider this last option, but it would be perfectly consistent with his 
theoretical analogy, for the mind retains by habit the conclusions of science, and there 
are, obviously, habits in practical thinking as well.   
                                                 
29 See Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, the translator’s glossary entry for praxis under ‘action’, 315. 
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agent “immediately does what he desires (hou oregetai); the carrying out of his desire 
takes the place of inquiry or thought” (DM VII, 701a30-31).  The example Aristotle gives 
to illustrate quick action makes it clear that it has a wide extension to different types of 
human action and to animal action: “My appetite (epithumia) says, I must drink; this is 
drink, says sensation or imagination or thought, and one immediately drinks” (DM VII, 
701a32-33).  While deliberation (bouleusis) begins with wish (boulēsis) and not desire 
(epithumia), as Aristotle makes clear in the Ethics and the De Anima, epithumia with the 
help of imagination can cause action, and this is precisely the kind of action the 
incontinent performs when he is incontinent.  Moreover, this is the way in which most 
animals move themselves, since they for the most part have only epithumia and thumos.  
Both humans and animals are moved by orexeis; it is, however, characteristic of mature 
human action that it is initiated by boulēsis and mediated by deliberation; animals move 
primarily by epithumia without deliberation but with some imaginative process in the 
more developed (see also DA III 11, 434a1-12).  Thus, the syllogistic analogy 
encompasses all human and animal actions: “And things which desire to act, at one time 
create something, and at another act, by reason of either appetite (epithumia) or of 
passion (thumos), or else through desire (orexis) or wish (boulēsis)” (DM VII, 701a25-
701b1). 
The vehicle for both orexis and nous in practical thinking is the imagination, and 
it plays a crucial element in calculation and deliberation.  Returning to the De Anima, 
Aristotle makes a wide claim when he says: 
sometimes by means of the images or thoughts in the soul, 
just as if it were seeing, it calculates (logizetai) and plans 
(bouleuetai) for the future in view of the present; and when 
it makes a statement, as in sensation it asserts that an object 
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is pleasant or unpleasant, in this case it avoids or pursues; 
and so generally in action (en praxei) (DA III 7, 431b6-10).   
 
The soul can be moved either by images or thoughts, as if it were seeing, and can 
calculate or deliberate (bouleuetai) about the future.  While animals have images, they do 
not have thoughts or reason, and Aristotle claims that “in living creatures other than man 
there is neither thinking nor calculation (ou noēsis oude logismos estin) but only 
imagination” (DA III 10, 433a12-13).  It seems safe to say, however, that although they 
do not have faculties depending on reason or the intellect, it is obvious that many animals 
can exhibit complex, purposive behaviors.  Here, too, praxis or ‘action’ would also seem 
to have a wider signification, not necessarily restricted to virtuous action or even human 
action.  Nevertheless, it appears clear that Aristotle is hinting at a phenomenological 
description of practical thought as an active process, a narrative of complex images made 
present in the mind directed to the future, with sensations functioning like statements or 
assertions.  This is not an abstract mental calculus, with mental propositions or 
propositional attitudes as basic elements, but something as vivid as the images or 
sensations themselves, suggesting pursuit and avoidance, desire and fear.30
                                                 
30 It is important to note here that in my interpretation of Aristotle’s phantasia that I do not claim that its 
functions are limited to the generation of movement or an interaction with desire; it definitely has larger 
roles in the cognitive process which may be substantially different than its role in lower animals or in 
human action.  Likewise, while I rely significantly on Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation, I do realize that it 
is not without its detractors.  Her emphasis on interpretation and ‘seeing-as’ is definitely contemporary and 
contested.  However, I do find that her exegesis allows us to see how we can understand animal movement 
as intentional, much like Alasdair MacIntyre does in his book Dependent Rational Animals : Why human 
beings need the virtues, (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), which we shall examine in the second half of the 
dissertation.    As Alfredo Ferrarin notes in his very perceptive article, “Aristotle on phantasia” the 
different ways Aristotle describes phantasia in works beyond the De Motu Animalium are not systematic 
and, he admits, they may not ultimately be able to cohere in an account of one faculty.  As Klaus 
Brinkmann observes in his commentary on Ferrarin’s article, Victor Caston’s claim that phantasia allows 
Aristotle to explain errors in judgment and cognition is quite persuasive.  See Alfredo Ferrarin, “Aristotle 
on phantasia,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 21, ed. John J. 
Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), 89-112 for a comprehensive survey 
of phantasia which explains it as a “power of presentention and presentification of absence” as opposed to 
interpretation or a positive ‘seeing-as’; see also  Klaus Brinkmann, “Commentary on Ferrarin” in the same 
  Even 
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theoretical thought requires images (DA III 8, 432a11-14).  This must be remembered in 
the case of practical reasoning about things we wish to do or avoid, since it seems to 
involve more substantial, concrete or vivid notions than theoretical thinking.  It is also 
crucial to remember that purposive behavior can result from imagination and desire 
without the intellect, in animals, and against it in humans. 
The ambiguity which surrounds Aristotle’s discussion of imagination and its 
extension to non-human animals cannot be entirely removed; however, he appears to 
make a strong link between imagination and calculation in the case of human beings to 
the extent that calculation can go against reason.  Appetite or orexis entails a capacity for 
self-movement, “but it is not capable of appetite without imagination, and all imagination 
involves either calculation (logistikē) or sensation” (DA III 10 433b28-30).  Non-human 
animals definitely have sensation, and, as Aristotle has already hinted, some of them may 
be capable of a basic form of calculation:  “Imagination in the form of sense is found, as 
we have said, in all animals, but deliberative imagination (bouleutikē) only in the 
calculative.”  It may be that only humans are calculative, but, unlike other passages 
already cited, Aristotle does not explicitly limit this capacity only to humans.  He speaks 
quite broadly when he says, “whether one shall do this or that calls at once for calculation 
(logismou), and one must measure by a single standard, for one pursues the greater good.  
This implies the ability to combine several images into one” (DA III 11, 434a6-10). 31
                                                                                                                                                 
volume, 113-121.  I do not wholly agree with Ferrarin’s presentation, which seems too Heidegerian.  See 
A. O. Rorty, “Structuring Rhetoric,” Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 19, for a catalogue of the functions of phantasia and a 
brief counter argument that animals cannot see as or see hypothetically because they have no thought.  See 
also Victor Caston, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination,” Phronesis 18 (1996): 156-75, for an argument 
about the cognitive role of phantasia. 
  
31 I have omitted the phrase, “for to decide” from the beginning of the citation from Hett’s translation of the 
De Anima because it is an interpolation.  The passage reads: poteron gar praxei tode ē tode, logismou ēdē 
estin ergon. 
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The imagination is intimately involved in human planning and calculation, and has a 
capacity to combine different images into an image of a goal or end.  Furthermore, 
Aristotle says that imagination can be regarded as a kind of thinking (noēsin tina) 
because “men often follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge (para tēn 
epistēmēn) (DA III 10, 433a10-12). 
The conflict between reason and desire raises a puzzle about the exact source of 
movement.  Aristotle first begins by examining movement in human beings.  It seems 
that the mind or intellect (nous) cannot be the source of movement, even though it is 
often referred to as the calculative faculty (to logistikon), because considered in its 
highest form, the speculative intellect (ho theōrētikos), it “thinks of nothing practical, and 
tells us nothing about what is to be avoided or pursued; but movement is characteristic of 
one who is either avoiding or pursuing something” (DA III 9, 432b26-30). Even when the 
intellect contemplates (theōrēi), the act of contemplation does not of itself suggest either 
pursuit or avoidance; we can think of many frightful or pleasant things without feeling 
any fear or desire (DA III 9, 432b30-433a1).  Moreover, we can act according to desire 
(kata tēn epithumian) against nous, as those who are incontinent do (DA III 9 433a1-3).  
At the same time, however, orexis or appetite cannot be the only source of action in 
human beings because the continent act against their desire (epithumia) and in accord 
with intellect (tōi nōi) (DA III 9, 433a6-9).   
Aristotle’s solution to the conundrum posed by these considerations is to specify 
which orexis and which nous are involved in motion.  He begins by identifying which 
kind of nous is involved with movement.  While we might conclude that the speculative 
intellect must be involved in motion because calculation involves the intellect and the 
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intellect is preeminently involved in contemplation, we immediately run up against the 
obvious fact that contemplation or speculation does not necessitate action.  Aristotle 
saves us from this contradiction by reminding us of the existence of the practical intellect 
(praktikos nous), which calculates for the sake of some end.  This end is not knowledge 
but some good to be done or achieved.  Every orexis is directed toward some end, and the 
end is the beginning of practical thinking, the last step of which “is the beginning of 
action (to de eschaton archē tēs praxeōs)” (DA III 10, 433a14-17).  So, there is an order 
to the relationship between orexis and nous; orexis presents an object which produces 
movement mediated by nous (DA III 10, 433a17-20). Nous guarantees the correctness of 
the outcome in human practical thinking; this is distinct from animal thinking (animals 
lack nous) where both orexis and phantasia may be false or wrong.  As a faculty in 
humans who possess orexis, phantasia and nous, nous is always right while orexis and 
phantasia are fallible.  Orexis always begins movement towards a good, “but this may be 
either the real or apparent good.”  Even allowing for the fallibility of orexis and 
phantasia, the practical good is still something changeable (DA III 10, 433a20-31).   
 The second step of Aristotle’s solution to the question of how orexis and nous 
cause motion involves specifying which types of orexis do and do not conflict with nous 
and this begins with the role of imagination.    Imagination can also initiate movement, 
and this is the case in lower animals.  Even so, it never initiates movement without first 
having some object presented by orexis.  The moving cause (to kinoun) is orexis, which 
is, according to Aristotle, one (hen) entity.  Nous produces movement not because it has 
some common form or characteristic (kata koinon . . . eidos) but because orexis has 
presented the object to nous (DA III 10, 433a20-23).  This is even the case with wish or 
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boulēsis, which is closely linked with calculation and deliberation: “But, as things are, 
mind is never seen to produce movement without appetite, for will (boulēsis) is a form of 
appetite (orexis) and when movement accords with calculation (logismon) it accords also 
with will (boulēsin), but appetite (orexis) produces movement contrary to calculation, for 
desire (epithumia) is a form of appetite” (DA III 10, 433a23-26).  As Aristotle says in the 
Ethics, wish is of the end which usually precedes action through the process of 
deliberation.  Even though boulēsis is succeeded by deliberation and the activity of 
practical reason, it is fundamentally a species not of nous but of orexis.   A prohairesis is 
a boulēsis modified by deliberation (bouleusis), which is why Aristotle calls it bouleutikē 
orexis or ‘deliberative desire’ (NE III 3, 1113a10-11).   But there are three kinds of 
orexis, and the other two kinds can overcome calculation and boulēsis; these are 
epithumia and thumos.   
The two types of incontinence (akrasia), “soft” (astheneia)  and “rash” 
(propeteia) described by Aristotle in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, correspond to 
these two species of orexis (see NE VII 7, 1150b20).  The struggle between these orexeis 
also explains the characteristic regret and divided soul of the incontinent person: his 
actions are not in accord with what he wished to do, but he, nonetheless, desired to do 
them when he did them, under the influence of a particular kind of desire.  Aristotle 
himself spells this out when he speaks of the opposition of the different desires:  
Now appetites (orexeis) may conflict, and this happens 
wherever reason (logos) and desire (epithumia) are 
opposed, and this occurs in creatures which have a sense of 
time (for the mind advises us to resist with a view to the 
future, while desire only looks to the present; for what is 
momentarily pleasant seems to be absolutely good 
(agathon haplōs) and absolutely good because desire   
cannot look to the future).  Thus while that which causes 
   47 
movement is specifically one, viz., the faculty of appetite 
(to orektikon) qua appetitive or ultimately the object of 
appetite (for this though unmoved, causes movement by 
being thought or imagined), the things which cause 
movement are numerically many (DA III 10 433b5-12). 
 
Aristotle is again somewhat ambiguous about whether there are other animals that 
experience this conflict.  At least in man, the conflict between epithumia and boulēsis is a 
conflict between a desire chained to the present and one which is free to look forward 
into the future.32
                                                 
32 The conflict between epithumia and boulēsis is primarily temporal: epithumia:present::boulēsis:future.  
In the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics, boulēsis also takes on the distinction of being concerned 
with general ends, to distinguish it from prohairesis.  As we shall see, the continent struggle with the 
conflict between two equally present and particular desires, usually epithumia and prohairesis (though 
sometimes thumos and prohairesis).  In the incontinent, the result is that boulēsis is also overcome and his 
larger goals and projects remain unfulfilled.  
  Thus, an incontinent always does what he ‘desires’ to do, and yet he 
frequently has cause to regret his actions, because his desires are not all of one kind.  
Although every desire is from the appetitive power (to orektikon), this power has very 
distinct moments or realizations, and Aristotle describes at least three.  We must be 
careful here to see the difference between what Aristotle is saying and subsequent 
accounts of the will.  While orexis is one faculty, its three distinct species are all capable 
of generating action.  When Aristotle describes the relationship between boulēsis and 
epithumia, he is not describing the relationship between will and inclination or the spirit 
and the flesh.  The difference between boulēsis and epithumia is not metaphysical; the 
former is not noumenal or spiritual while the other is material.  Whereas in theories of 
action involving a faculty of the will, the will is always the agent within the mind or soul, 
Aristotle is less committed to boulēsis always being the moving orexis; sometimes it is 
overcome, sometimes it is moved or influenced, in the same manner as one heavenly 
sphere moves another (although Aristotle is quick to point out that the heavenly spheres 
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are only moved higher to lower, which is not necessarily the case with orexeis) (DA III 
11, 434a13-15).  There are, therefore, three modes of movement (treis phoras  . . . 
kineisthai), one initiated by boulēsis, one where boulēsis overcome and a different 
species of orexis moves us, and one where boulēsis is moved or altered but not 
completely disabled or overcome (DA III 11, 434a12-16).33
 To conclude our initial investigation of the De Motu Animalium and De Anima, 
we have found that Aristotle’s account of animal motion, which includes human action, 
locates the source of animal motion in desire or orexis and the interaction of desire with 
sensation, imagination (phantasia), and in the case of human beings, calculation.  Orexis 
comes in three species: epithumia, thumos, and boulēsis.  All three species are capable of 
initiating movement in conjunction with imagination or calculation; however, only 
boulēsis is oriented toward objects beyond present satisfaction, only boulēsis shares in 
   
                                                 
33 This section of the De Anima is quite terse and difficult.  The immediate passage, DA III, 11, 434a12-16, 
begins with the explicit claim that there are three ways orexis can initiate movement, and it subsequently 
reads, according to W.S. Hett: “Sometimes it [orexis, referred to in the prior sentence] overcomes the will 
and sways it, as one sphere moves another; or appetite influences appetite, when the subject lacks self-
control.”  The Greek reads: nika d’eniote kai kinei tēn boulēsin hote d’ekeinē tautēn, hōsper sphaira, hē 
orexis tēn orexin, hotan akrasia genētai.  The construction of the sentence seems to lend itself to only two 
modes of movement, as nika and kinei are linked by the conjunction kai and are in the same clause, 
whereas a separate clause gives the motion of orexis on orexis.  If we separate nika and kinei, making them 
the first and second mode of movement respectively, we have a difficulty differentiating the first two 
modes.  It would seem that the overcoming of boulēsis is itself instantiated by the movement or swaying of 
boulēsis by a contrary orexis and is not distinct from that movement.  This is in fact how St. Thomas 
Aquinas seems to read the passage.  In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Robert Pasnau 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) III, Lect. 16, sec. 843, he does not enumerate three distinct 
modes, rather he contrasts only two different kinds of movement: 1) the overcoming of the superior 
appetite (voluntas/boulēsis) by the inferior appetites, and 2) the converse of the first motion, namely, the 
superior appetite governing the inferior appetites, illustrated by the continent man.  Our interpretation here 
makes an effort to remain faithful to Aristotle’s precise enumeration of three ways.  In order to do this, we 
make the assumption that the first of the three modes is implied and not stated, namely, that action can be 
initiated by boulēsis, for instance, in the case of long-term or rational planning.  This assumption allows for 
the sentence to divide naturally into two more options for a total of three.  We also assume that the third 
mode is a movement of epithumia or thumos on boulēsis in a manner which is not necessarily incontinent 
or vicious.  For instance, as Aristotle illustrates in the De Motu Animalium, we may begin practical thought 
from a non-rational desire, such as thirst; however, being thirsty, it is quite possible to deliberate effectively 
about what to drink.  Likewise, we may become angry, and rightfully so, and still deliberate about how to 
deal with the cause of our anger. Aristotle does not subsequently clarify the meaning of this sentence, so 
the difficulties surrounding it cannot be resolved. 
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reason, and only boulēsis is characteristically human.  While boulēsis is characteristically 
human, it is important to see that the other forms of orexis are still present and still 
capable of moving human beings to act.   
 In order to fully understand Aristotle’s account of orexis and action in the 
psychological as well as the ethical works, we will now look to the work of Martha 
Nussbaum to provide a new interpretive paradigm for understanding the relationship 
between orexis and phantasia.  While we have provided a sketch of the relationship 
between Aristotle’s concepts, we have not given a thorough-going account of their 
meaning, especially their meaning in relation to contemporary accounts of intention and 
action.  In the next section, looking to Nussbaum, we will link orexis and phantasia to 
intending and intentional action, and this will provide the basis for our exegesis of the 
account of the voluntary in the ethical works, as well as an understanding of prohairesis. 
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I.3.2: Phantasia, Orexis, and Intending: Nussbaum on Phantasia in the De Motu 
Animalium and De Anima  
 
As we have just seen, despite the conspicuous absence of prohairesis, save for a 
handful of brief references, the De Anima and the De Motu Animalium have a lot to say 
about human action, but the implications of both works for Aristotle’s ethical theory and 
its relevance for contemporary ethical theory are not immediately obvious.  In two works, 
Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium and The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum 
attempts to draw out the ethical implications of these works, mainly focusing on the De 
Motu Animalium.34  In particular, Nussbaum offers a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s 
concept of orexis as well as a new attempt to understand the role of phantasia in action 
and practical thinking.  For Nussbaum, orexis has been misunderstood for some time as 
being a somatic, brute and passive ‘desire’, while phantasia has been rendered as a power 
of reproductive representation, which reproduces items sensed as mental pictures.  
Nussbaum rejects both accounts and instead argues that orexis should be considered as a 
power of intending and phantasia as an interpretive faculty, which does not reproduce a 
“dense” picture of reality so much as represent objects under some aspect, as something.  
Both of these views have implications for understanding Aristotle’s concept of voluntary 
action (to hekousion), since orexis is present in animals as well as humans and it also has 
implications for his accounts of non-deliberate action and akrasia, since both involve 
sensation, imagination, and desires other than boulēsis and its product, prohairesis.35
                                                 
34 Nussbaum regards the De Motu as a more authoritative guide to the sources of motion than the De 
Anima.  See Nussbaum, Fragility, 276. 
 
35 My agreement with Nussbaum is, ultimately, only partial.  I agree with the basic interpretation of orexis 
as intention and phantasia as a more complex faculty which allows objects to be seen as something; 
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The main insight of Aristotle’s work in the De Anima and the De Motu 
Animalium, according to Nussbuam in The Fragility of Goodness, is to see what is 
common between humans and animals.  The account of motion in both of these works is 
meant to apply to all ensouled beings capable of movement.36  Nussbaum offers four 
elements shared by animal movement and human action in Aristotle’s account: 1) both 
are explained by the ascription of “desires and beliefs or perceptions” to the human or 
animal in question; 2) “The factors cited in the explanation are intentional: (a) the desires 
and beliefs (perceptions) are directed towards a goal, and (b) the explanation 
characterizes the goal as it is seen from the animal’s point of view”; 3) these same factors 
have both a logical and causal connection with the goal of the action or movement; 4) in 
each case, Aristotle offers a “physiological explanation” only to explain the ‘how’ of the 
action and not the ‘why’ or purpose for which the action or motion was initiated.37
                                                                                                                                                 
however, I do not agree with her larger project with respect to Aristotle, developed fully in The Fragility of 
Goodness, but nascent in Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium.  While phantasia is interpretive, I do not agree 
with her generalizations from this fact to the conclusion that reality is essentially perspectival and relative 
to our particular linguistic community, nor do I think this is the basis for Aristotle’s philosophical method.  
See Wians, “Saving Aristotle from Nussbaum’s Phainomena,” in J.P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.) Essays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy V: Aristotle’s Ontology (Albany: 1992), 133-149.  I wholeheartedly agree with 
William Wians’ criticisms of Nussbaum’s rendering of ‘setting down the appearances’ as being 
inaccurately rendered in Wittgensteinian terms as a self-consciously culturally relative linguistic 
phenomena.  I do not think her analyses of orexis and phantasia must necessarily lead one to accept her 
larger project. 
  In the 
first place, when we explain human or animal motion, we almost always say that he/she/it 
wanted something, and the attainment or acquisition of that object caused the human or 
animal to move from one place to another.  Second, the ascription of desire or belief is 
causal only to the extent that the human or animal possesses it, and sees the object to 
36 Nussbaum, Fragility, 264-65.  I begin with the later of the two works by Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness, because of the priority of orexis in Aristotle’s account of action.  The changes in Nussbaum’s 
view of Aristotle’s account of orexis and phantasia, especially as they appear in the De Motu Animalium, 
do not affect my argument; in fact, they strengthen it, as Nussbaum came to see the account as being both 
explanatory and descriptive, rather than merely descriptive, as she had held in her earlier work.  See 
Nussbaum,  Fragility, 277-280. 
37 Ibid., 267-68 
   52 
which they move as the object desired.  Third, the beliefs and desires have a logical 
connection “because we cannot give an account of what the desire (belief) is without 
mentioning the goal on which it is focused,” and they are causal because we believe that 
they are in fact the cause of the motion.  Finally, the body of the human or animal does 
not provide the purpose but rather the means or mechanism for the attainment of the 
purpose.38
 Aristotle’s predecessors had been divided on the causes of action and motion.  
Materialists like Democritus, according to Nussbaum, offered a causal account which did 
not include desires or beliefs, and reduced the psychological to the physiological.  The 
consequence of this is that they would have to be “prepared to do away altogether with 
the more common explanatory framework,” that is, they would do away with choice 
(prohairesis) and thinking, as Aristotle objected in the De Anima 406b24-25.
 
39  In 
opposition to the materialists, Plato offers a choice between physiology and “explanation 
by reason or intellect”; he rejects the former, but he seems to leave us only the latter and 
three significant problems.  First, we would have to radically distinguish humans from all 
other animals, which seems to make our own embodied animality an intractable problem.  
Second, we would have to make a firm and seemingly artificial distinction between 
“those human actions that are motivated by intellect or rational choice, and all other 
human actions.” Finally, would lose the ability to distinguish the movements of animals 
which we usually attribute to desires and beliefs from somatic processes, “such as the 
movements of the digestive system and reflex responses.”40
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
  For Nussbaum, this leads the 
39 Ibid., 269-71. 
40 Ibid., 272. 
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Platonist to reject our animality and to reorder moral training in the style of the 
Republic.41
 Aristotle’s concept of orexis is an attempt to mediate between the demands that 
we see human beings as part of the natural, animal world and still retain the priority of 
purpose and intention in explanations of action.  According to Nussbaum, the term orexis 
has received relatively little attention in comparison to the etymological literature on 
other of Aristotle’s terms, and therefore, people have missed “the extent to which this 
word is an item of [Aristotle’s] own creation.”  Prior to Aristotle, orexis appears in only 
one place, “the dubious ethical fragments of Democritus.”   It does not appear at all in the 
canonical Platonic works.  What orexis supplies for Aristotle is a generic word for 
‘wanting’ that is not already linked to bodily appetites or intellectual reasoning, e.g., 
epithumia and boulēsis.
   
42  The verb oregō is common and goes back to the earliest Greek 
writings and “from Homer onwards, seems to mean ‘stretch out’, ‘reach out’; it is 
transitive, and the context is usually one of extending one’s hand to somebody or handing 
an object to somebody.”  In the middle voice, it has very much the same meaning and 
use, but also appears in various instances having the sense of ‘aim at’ or ‘hit at’.  In 
Euripides and Thucydides, Nussbaum notes, it acquires a psychological connotation, and 
is used to express yearning or longing.  In Aristotle’s case, Nussbaum argues, “there is no 
reason why we could not also continue to translate it in the original way and think of it as 
a metaphorical transferal from the external to the internal realm.”43
                                                 
41 Ibid., 273. 
  The verb “strongly 
implies directedness towards an object (the verb only occurs with some sort of object)” 
and “It is active more than passive: it is a going for, a reaching after (whether bodily or 
42 Ibid., 273-74. 
43 Ibid., 274. 
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psychic), as opposed to a being-overwhelmed, or an empty being-in-need.”44  Translating 
oregō and orexis poses a definite problem because one needs to capture the directedness 
and the activity suggested by the word.  In English, ‘inclination’ seems like a good 
choice, but it is still too passive; ‘need’ and ‘want’ suggest an empty gap or lack.  The 
most commonly chosen translation, ‘desire’ is closer to the meaning of the Greek, it is 
“clearly object-linked” but it is “overused” and “weak”, which Aristotle’s term is not.45  
Be that as it may, for Nussbaum, once we “recover a sense of the philosophical newness 
and strangeness of this word,” we can see why it is that Aristotle groups the seemingly 
disparate psychic forces of boulēsis, epithumia and thumos: “He is saying, apparently, 
that they are all forms of object-directed, active inner reaching-out; and that this sort of 
reaching-out is common to the movements of both human and other animals.”46
 The ‘reaching-out’ that characterizes orexis does not depend entirely on a 
particular antecedent object nor does it depend on the “attainment” or “realization” of 
that object.   In this way, orexis is distinct from the external, material causes in the world.  
We may possess an orexis for something and then seek it out, and we also possess an 
orexis for something we may not be able to get.  In order for orexis to cause movement it 
has to “be combined in the right way with perception”; likewise, the cognitive faculties 
must come up with a possible and available route to the goal, or else motion will not 
follow.”  Moreover, the orexis that causes movement must be an ‘authoritative’ (kurios) 
one, and not simply one we possess passively.  Even so, desire might be frustrated by 
  
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 275.  A candidate for the translation of orexis which Nussbaum does not consider is ‘appetite’, 
which is often the preferred translation of the Latin appetitio, which is used in Scholastic texts to translate 
orexis.  Looking up ‘appetite’ in the Oxford English Dictionary online – accessed through the Boston 
College Library – we find a number of different senses of the term in English usage.  Prior to the nineteenth 
century, the word’s usage is much closer to the sense we are seeking; however, more recently, it has come 
to be used to denote “craving” or “inclination” rather than purposiveness or intention. 
46 Ibid. 
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some external impediment.47  Ultimately, however, it is only because orexis has a 
connection to an object that it is capable of being a cause of motion: “It is because what 
this orexis is, is an orexis for object O, and because what the creature sees before it is this 
same O, that the movement towards O can be caused in the way it is by the orexis and the 
seeing.”  Nussbaum gives the example of a dog who must see something ‘as meat’ in 
order to go after it.  It is only when an object is intended as an object of pursuit under 
some species of orexis that motion will ensue.  Thus, when Aristotle refers elsewhere to 
the premises of the practical syllogism as being “productive of action”, it is because “he 
insists that objects of desire cause motion precisely by being seen as the sort of thing that 
is desired”, and the ‘premises’ “mention the goal both as desired and available”, or as 
Aristotle literally says, “good” and “possible.”48
The treatment of orexis in the De Anima and the De Motu Animalium has great 
significance for the Nicomachean Ethics: they offer an account of hekousios or 
‘voluntary’ movement.
  
49
                                                 
47 Ibid., 279. 
  Once we have understood the role of orexis in the production 
of movement in humans and animals, the extension of the term hekousios or ‘voluntary’ 
to the movements of animals and children no longer seems mysterious: “The hekousioi 
motions of animals are just those movements which are caused by their own orexis and 
cognitive activities, their own reachings-out towards objects and their own views of those 
objects.”  Thus, Nussbaum argues, the ascription of this type of agency is “entirely 
consistent.”  Even though children and animals lack deliberation and higher cognitive 
capacities, “they do have in common with human adults that their own view of the world 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 282. 
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and their own orexeis, rather than physical necessity, are the causes of their actions.”50  
Thus, the De Motu Animalium establishes, with greater precision and detail than the 
Nicomachean Ethics, the idea that an agent is a cause (aition) of action by being its 
“origin” (archē) because it enumerates the potential origins for all movement within an 
agent.51
The active role orexis plays in human and animal motion goes hand in hand with 
a more active notion of phantasia or imagination, which Nussbaum had proposed in one 
of her earliest works, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium.  The most common view of the 
product of phantasia is “that phantasmata in Aristotle are always mental images that 
resemble the things they represent and are to be contemplated as internal pictures by the 
living being.”
 
52  This “pictorial image” is taken to be the counterpart of every thought 
and perception.53  This view of phantasia involves two main claims: 1) “Imagination in 
all cases involves images that represent in virtue of some similarity”; and 2) imagination 
involves two moments or “processes”: a) “having an image” which is either “produced” 
or “impressed” and b) contemplating or inspecting the image.54
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
  The quality of the image 
and the process of its formation are generally taken to be passive, almost photographic 
processes which do not contain any active elements of selection or discernment.  The 
process of discernment or interpretation seems to arrive after the image has been 
composed, when we view it with the mind’s eye.  For Nussbaum, this implies that we can 
get more information from mental images or phantasmata than was put there in their 
51 Ibid. 
52 Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 222. 
53 Ibid., 223. 
54 Ibid., 224. 
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production; the contemplation is necessary as a second step to unpack and interpret the 
images.55
To these assumptions, Nussbaum objects that: 1) “Representation and 
resemblance are logically and in all ways distinct”; and 2)  “The image-theory is 
defective . . . both because it wrongly assimilates all imagining to seeing pictures and 
because it does not even provide an adequate account of pictorial representation.”
   
56  First, 
there are obvious disjunctions between resemblance and representation, of which 
Nussbaum gives two examples: a reflection in a mirror and the Christian fish symbol.  A 
person’s reflection obviously resembles the person reflected in the mirror but it does not 
obviously represent that same person.  Likewise, the fish symbol used in Christian 
iconography in no way resembles Christ, but it does represent him.  While resemblance 
requires some empirical similarity between the two things related, “Representation is a 
type of reference or denotation,” that is, a symbol or object can be used to point to 
something which it in no way resembles without any loss of meaning.57  The standard 
interpretation of imagination assumes, moreover, “that there is one way of seeing (and 
painting) the object as it is – an “innocent” view, for fidelity to which all copies or 
images are to be assessed.”  This seems to entail that, with respect to the imagination, a 
mental picture “represents to the extent that it embodies this real, or pure, view,” thus, 
imaginings can be epistemologically sorted by the accuracy of their approximation of the 
one real or true view.58
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
   
56 Ibid., 225; 230. 
57 Ibid., 225-26. 
58 Ibid., 226.   It seems that Aristotle would probably agree with the proposition Nussbaum here implicitly 
rejects, that imaginings can be ranked and sorted by their epistemological accuracy.  Plato, for example, 
seems to suggest just this sort of thing with his analogy of the painter in the soul in the Philebus 38b-39d, 
trans. Dorothea Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), where the painter is analogous to the imagination’s 
   58 
The idea that there is one real or true image of an object assumes that there is also 
an unproblematic way for this image to be seen and copied; however, “We can never 
copy an object in all the ways it is; we are always representing it as something.”59  The 
“copy view of pictorial representation” and the “image view of imagination,” as 
Nussbaum calls them, rely “on an oddly passive picture of what it is to see.”  Moreover, 
they cannot accommodate the place that non-visual sensations, like smell and taste, have 
in our ordinary imaginings and dreams or in Aristotle’s psychology.60  The content of the 
mental image is problematic not only because it seems possible that it contains non-visual 
images, but also because it seems that a mental image must be “informationally dense,” 
like a picture to which we can return again and again for a new view.  If that is the case, a 
mental image “can never be exhaustively described” and it is simply “there” such that 
“without adding anything more to it I can always get more out.” As we have seen, there is 
no necessary connection between resemblance and representation, such that there are 
definitely some pictures which are not ‘dense’.61  In the case of mental ‘picturing’, “there 
is not always anything that corresponds to stepping back and looking at the picture, hence 
not always the possibility of getting further information.”62
                                                                                                                                                 
role in the cognitive process of judgment: the painter’s paintings can be more or less accurate and can 
either facilitate or impede right judgment.  The context of the argument in the Philebus is especially fitting, 
since Plato is examining judgments about true and false pleasures.  Likewise, Aristotle states that the 
imaginations of the virtuous are qualitatively different from those of the non-virtuous in the Eudemian 
Ethics II 1, 1219b24-25.  However, for Aristotle, any image, being sensible, would still fall short of the 
knowledge of the form or essence, which is immaterial and intellectual.  Imaginings may, however, be 
more or less adequate for particular modes of thinking, especially in practical thought which is non-
demonstrative. 
  Imagining is not always or 
usually accompanied by detached contemplation of the imagining as an imagining or 
detached from what is being imagined.  A mental image may still have “unintended” or 
59 Ibid., 227. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 228.  
62 Ibid., 229. 
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“passive elements”, and there are obvious cases of imaginative contemplation.  However, 
the usual account of imagination assumes that in assembling the mental image, all that is 
being done is a passive copying, and it confuses this with the act of “interpretation” 
which is involved in the assembly of mental images.  However, as Nussbaum argues, any 
picture or image is, essentially, a ‘seeing as’ or ‘seeing an aspect’.63  A painter orders his 
composition to show action, emotion, character, light, or any number of things.  Though 
he may have a subject sitting before him, there is no one picture of that subject which 
exists prior to the painter’s decision to depict it in a certain way, for a certain purpose.  
Likewise, the imagination differs from sense precisely in the way that it does not merely 
reproduce what was received, but produces an image with a new element – imaginings 
involve the intentions of the imaginer.64  In Aristotle, imagination is often spoken of 
passively as picturing or seeing, yet at the same time, imagination is spurred by nous and 
orexis, both active capacities not wholly bound to sensation.  Orexis always tinges the 
phantasmata with a particular directedness, either pursuit or avoidance.  This suggests 
that Aristotle’s account goes beyond the simple ‘copy/image’ view.65
  In Aristotle’s account of movement in the De Motu Animalium, phantasia endows 
an object with ‘formal content’ because it is “through phantasia that a perceptible object 
is seen as an object under a certain formal description.”  It is only through the activity of 
the imagination that a particular thing becomes an object of pursuit or avoidance.
 
66
                                                 
63 Ibid., 229-30. 
  For 
Aristotle, whether the mind is directed toward theoretical or practical purposes, there is 
no purely and simply abstract thought, “I cannot think of a pure proposition.”  As we 
64 Ibid., 230. 
65 Ibid., 264-65. 
66 Ibid,. 265. 
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have already seen, every thought is accompanied by some imagining, which “provides a 
concrete vehicle for the thought.”67 For Aristotle, this is simply an empirical claim and 
not a transcendental one, since the unmoved mover thinks without imagination.68  
According to Nussbaum, the Aristotelian account of imagination, therefore, realizes that 
there is a necessary connection between ‘reception’ and ‘interpretation’.  That is to say, 
any animal’s perception of any thing as a “distinct feature of his environment” must also 
refer to “the activity in virtue of which the scene appears a certain way to him,” which is 
phantasia.69  Motion is initiated, Aristotle says, by orexis, but it must have an external 
object, something marked off or selected, and this is, according to Nussbaum, what it is 
“to see it” – to see it as something.  Perception or awareness, as opposed to mere 
sensation, like thought, requires and presupposes phantasia, which necessarily involves 
an ‘interpretative’, or, we might say, an intentional element.70
The active quality of phantasia which Nussbaum’s analysis brings out has 
important implications for the ‘practical syllogism’, which is discussed most extensively 
in the De Motu Animalium.  The practical syllogism, according to Nussbaum, “is a 
schema for the teleological explanation of animal activity, designed to show us 
perspicuously what factors we must mention, what states we must ascribe to the animal, 
in order to give an adequate explanation of action.”
 
71
                                                 
67 Ibid., 266. 
  The account is not limited to 
human beings or to the explicit verbalization of premises in propositional form; for 
Aristotle, an agent might conduct his practical thinking verbally, even expressing his 
68 Ibid., 267. 
69 Ibid., 268. 
70 Ibid., 269. 
71 Ibid., 174.  I take it that what Nussbaum here calls a “schema for the teleological explanation of animal 
activity” can be understood as an explanation by way of analogy.  Since, as she is at pains to point out, the 
practical syllogism is used to help explain the movement of brutes, it cannot literally be a syllogism, which 
requires language.   
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conclusion or resolution, but “this will not in any important respect alter our account of 
his behavior.”  The syllogism proper, and the theory which Aristotle elaborates in the 
Analytics, is “essentially linguistic” but language is “of minor importance” to the account 
of the practical syllogism.72  What is expressed by the practical syllogism is the agent 
“‘setting himself’ to do the action”, taking the steps to realize the goal presented by 
orexis and phantasia.  The movement towards the goal, the action, is what is crucial 
about the conclusion of this kind of thinking, and not a propositional conclusion.  This is 
so even in cases, such as Aristotle’s example of cloak-making, where further deliberative 
steps are required.73  One view of the structure of the syllogism, expressed notably by 
D.J. Allan, is that the syllogism’s structure is that of a rule in the major premise with a 
case in the minor premise.  This has an unmistakably deontological ring to it; however, 
given the extension of the practical syllogism to cover animal action, it is unlikely that 
this is the case.74  While Aristotle does speak of habits and rules of thumb or maxims in 
various places, he does not commit himself to such a rigid kind of reasoning.  What is 
important, according to Nussbaum, is not the mention of a rule, but mention of some 
desire in the major premise.75  The practical syllogism explains motion generally in the 
case of animals, but it also, in the case of humans, serves to provide a justification of 
action, not, however, on the basis of rules, but on the basis of the connection between the 
end and the things chosen to realize the end.76
                                                 
72 Ibid., 186. 
 
73 Ibid., 194-95. 
74 See D.J. Allan, “Aristotle’s Account of the Origin of Moral Principles.” Actes du XIe Congrès 
Internationale de Philosophie 12 (1953): 120-27  
75 Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 201. 
76 Ibid., 207. 
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 Aristotle has no difficulty accounting for both human and animal motion with the 
practical syllogism because of the powers of orexis and phantasia.  As Nussbaum argues, 
“Other animals, too, employ the structures revealed in the [De Motu Animalium’s] 
account of the syllogism”; however, only humans have “the phantasian ek sullogismou 
([the imagination] ‘from inference’).”  The orexis and phantasia that move animals do 
not come from deliberation nor do they generate deliberation: “the animal is ruled now by 
one desire (as the result of a particular activity of phantasia), now by another.”77  We 
must qualify this by admitting that it is also possible for orexis to initiate phantasia, as 
Aristotle has said of epithumia.  In any case, reason, as it is applied to ends (i.e., practical 
reason) allows humans to have an overall plan, coherent, forward-looking desires.78  This 
forward-looking desire involved in deliberation is boulēsis, which Aristotle describes as 
both oriented towards the future and as part of the rational soul.  It is possible for humans 
to imaginatively unify the future desired end with the present situation, to consider 
consequences, and to break their options down to discrete considerations, ‘this or that’, 
which ultimately leads to prohairesis.79
Before moving on, we must add a few caveats, both to Aristotle’s account of 
imagination and to Nussbaum’s treatment of it.  While it is clear that phantasia plays a 
  Likewise, as Nussbaum has already pointed out, 
it is possible for animals to unify a desire with a concrete, present object imaginatively, to 
see this or that thing as predatory or prey, etc.  The application of the practical syllogism 
to animals also points to the fact that orexeis other than boulēsis are capable of being 
described as initiating motion and thought with this syllogistic analogy.  We will return to 
this possibility in our account of akrasia below.   
                                                 
77 Ibid., 264. 
78 Ibid., 263. 
79 Ibid., 263-64. 
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definite role in action and movement by relating orexis to an external obect, it is not 
entirely clear how exclusive this role is.  As Nussbaum notes, phantasia is described by 
Aristotle in the De Motu Animalium as a judging (kritikē) faculty, which can act 
autonomously, with or without orexis.  Likewise, Aristotle also says that aisthēsis and 
phantasia hold the same place in thinking directed toward movement as noēsis does in a 
theoretical demonstration (see DM, VII, 701a29-32; see also VI, 700b19-21).  It seems 
possible to say that “the combinations desire+sense perception and desire+thinking 
would be sufficient to ‘move’ the animal, without any involvement of phantasia.”80  At 
the same time, however, at De Motu VIII, 702a18, Aristotle says that phantasia is 
involved with every action and prepares orexis, even in the absence of aisthēsis.81  
Nussbaum concedes that Aristotle may simply be careless in keeping track of the various 
powers of the soul, but “it might also be that aisthēsis alone is insufficient to present the 
object of pursuit or avoidance to the animal in such a way that desire becomes active and 
action follows.”  She notes that aisthēsis is not included in the first list of the movers of 
animals in the De Motu Animalium (at VI, 700b18), although it is listed as a power of 
thought which follows that list.82
The relationship between phantasia and aisthēsis is not the only difficulty with 
Aristotle’s account in the De Motu Animalium.  It is not clear that one can successfully 
unite all of the functions which Aristotle ascribes to phantasia in the De Motu as well as 
the De Anima in just one faculty.  Nussbaum’s account is generally oriented toward 
  We may agree with Nussbaum that the causal role is 
slightly ambiguous; however, Aristotle says that aisthēsis entails phantasia, such that he 
may have also substituted the one for the other. 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 235. 
81 Ibid., 233. 
82 Ibid., 233, footnote 25. 
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action and motion, and thus she identifies the essence of phantasia in connection with 
them.  In particular, she identifies two types of phantasia connected with orexis: “the 
type connected with thinking (the logistikē) and the type connected with aisthēsis.”83  
Nussbaum argues that it is a single faculty with two capacities.  Further, she argues that it 
might be that aisthēsis and phantasia are one and the same power.84  The larger literature 
on phantasia raises difficulties that go beyond the scope of this section, especially about 
the role of phantasia in cognition.85
In conclusion, we have seen how Aristotle’s account of orexis and phantasia, as 
well as the other faculties of the soul, provides the basis for his wide ascription of 
voluntary and intentional behavior to adult humans, children, and many animals.  We 
have also seen how the intentional functions of orexis combined with the representative 
powers of phantasia can generate purposive action which is not wholly rational or 
deliberate.  These insights will allow us to account for the various types of action and 
intention Aristotle describes in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.  We will show 
how Aristotle uses boulēsis through deliberation resulting in prohairesis to account for 
  Nussbaum’s focus on animal motion and action does 
not attempt to account for all the sundry appearances of the term, especially as phantasia 
is involved cognitively with knowledge and error.  It may quite possibly be the case that 
what Aristotle takes to be one faculty is actually several different faculties.  In any case, 
the power that Aristotle calls phantasia, as it is involved with motion and action, shows 
itself to have an active role in the processing of sensation and the presentation of objects 
as desired, both in animals and in humans.   
                                                 
83 Ibid., 236; Nussbaum’s translation of DA 433b26-30 
84 Ibid., 236. 
85 See footnote 29 above. 
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rational, deliberate actions and intentions, but also gives an account of other sorts of 
actions and intentions in his description and explanation of akrasia. 
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I.4 The Ethical works 
 
I.4.1: The Aristotelian Account of the Voluntary:  
 
Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary (to hekousion) has been a frequent topic of 
commentary and debate because of three claims that he makes: 1) that actions receive 
praise and blame insofar as they are voluntary; 2) that animals and children move and act 
voluntarily; 3) that not every action which is voluntary is by choice (prohairesis).  The 
first claim is, generally speaking, common to every account of human action and moral 
evaluation.  The second and third claims, however, raise a number of puzzles.  How can 
animals act voluntarily without a will or a mind?  How can children be morally 
accountable for their actions?  How can something be voluntary, if it is not also chosen?  
The main interpretative strategy which most have taken is to suggest that Aristotle is not 
speaking strictly when he attributes voluntary action to children and animals.  Some then 
argue that for adults every action is chosen; others argue that although not every act is 
chosen, praise or blame attach only to those agents capable of choice.  As I will argue, the 
main strategy adopted by many is contrary to the text of the Ethics as well as Aristotle’s 
psychological theory developed in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium.  Aristotle 
neither equivocally nor analogically attributes voluntary motion to children or animals 
because he clearly specifies the same motive principles present in all animal motion, 
which includes both immature and mature human beings.  Likewise, the derivative 
theories, either that every act is chosen or that moral praise or blame attach only to agents 
capable of choice, also run up against a number of specific and clear claims that Aristotle 
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makes.  Specifically, that there are morally blameworthy states of character, i.e., 
bestiality, vice, and incontinence, which were not initially chosen by the agents who 
possess them, and, furthermore, that agents who possess such characters either are 
incapable of exercising choice at all (the bestial) or in a particular way (the vicious and 
incontinent).  The acquisition of these character types and the actions which follow from 
them are, nonetheless, voluntary for Aristotle.  I will argue that the account Aristotle 
offers is perfectly coherent, provided that one correctly understands the capacities and 
roles of orexis and phantasia in action. 
It is appropriate to begin with the most comprehensive and esteemed interpreter of 
Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, who endorses the view that the attribution of ‘voluntary’ 
to children and animals is analogical and that all human actions exhibit choice.  In his 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas identifies the “one cause of all human 
actions” as “the will”, voluntas in Latin, which is used to translate boulēsis.  Neither 
anger nor sensual desire can cause us to act without the consent of the will (Comm. NE, 
Lect. IV 428, p. 141).86  Thus, Aquinas would seem to identify what in Greek would be 
to hekousion and to boulētikon – that is to say, the voluntary is that which arises from 
boulēsis.  This move is intuitive in Latin and in the Latin translations Aquinas had of 
Aristotle, where boulēsis is translated as voluntas and to hekousion as voluntarium, but it 
is less obvious in the Greek text of Aristotle.87
                                                 
86 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.J. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1993). 
  Aquinas identifies voluntas (boulēsis) and 
electio (prohairesis), which arises through deliberation, as being of the same faculty.  
Absolutely speaking, voluntas (boulēsis) is the act of the will as it regards the end, it is 
87 See Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The transformation of ethics in the late thirteenth century 
(Washington: Catholic University Press, 1995), 172.  I am indebted to Kent for this particular insight into 
Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle as well as Aquinas’ larger approach to action.   
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the intention of the end; electio (prohairesis) is the choice of the means (Summa 
Theologiae, I-II, Q. 12, a. 1; Q. 18, a. 9).    All properly human acts proceed from wish or 
intention through some deliberative process, however truncated, to choice.  Some acts 
that we perform are not through the activity of the will, and they are not properly human 
acts.  These proceed from imagination, and include things we do absent-mindedly, like 
scratching one’s beard.  They are outside of the realm of moral evaluation because they 
do not proceed from the will (De Malo, Q. 2, a. 5, obj. 4; ST, I-II, Q. 18, a. 9).  Animals 
can be said to act voluntarily, according to Aquinas, on the analogy of their internal 
principles of irrational appetite with the human internal principle of voluntas, which they 
lack. Their behavior is neither free nor the subject of praise or blame (ST I-II, Q. 6, a. 2, 
Obj. 2, Reply 2).88
Aquinas’ view of Aristotle’s theory of action has either been adopted or echoed 
by many theorists of action, notably among them, Alan Donagan and Sarah Broadie.  
Donagan, who has also studied Aquinas, holds that Aristotle gives a causal explanation 
distinguishing adult actions from those of children and brutes.  This distinction is 
explained by the fact that “according to Aristotle, behavior is accounted human action if 
   
                                                 
88 Aquinas acknowledges that children and animals act voluntarily because “they operate of their own 
accord by their proper movement in such a way that they are not moved by any external thing,” and so an 
agent need not “operate under the impulse of the will” to be capable of voluntary action (Comm. NE IV, 
427, p. 141).  This seems quite faithful to Aristotle.  However, it seems that Aquinas makes a slight 
modification.  Following this, interpreting the passage where Aristotle compares nonrational feelings to 
rational calculation, Aquinas argues that mistakes or sins which are the result of passion are blameworthy 
because “A man can, by means of this will, resist passion” (Comm. NE IV, 430, p. 141-42).  Aristotle 
himself is less specific when it comes to the assessment of blame or responsibility.  Someone is responsible 
to the extent that he was the cause of the act, i.e., that the act resulted primarily from his character and its 
characteristic appetites and aversions.  He does not give boulēsis the definitive, executive role vis à vis the 
other kinds of orexis.  Most importantly, for Aristotle, even when speaking only of adults, he never says 
that every action is voluntary because it is the result of boulēsis.  See Bonnie Kent, op. cit., and Vernon J. 
Bourke, Will in Western Thought: A historico-critical survey (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964) and St. 
Thomas and the Greek Moralists (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948).  I am indebted to both 
Kent and Bourke for their extended treatments on the development of Aristotle’s ethics by the scholastics 
in general and Aquinas in particular.  Both authors emphasize the incongruity between Aquinas and 
Aristotle on the nature of the voluntary and its relation to wish or voluntas. 
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and only if it is caused by an appetitive act which he called a ‘choice’.”89 Broadie argues, 
without reference to Aquinas, that it is not clear how Aristotle could attribute voluntary 
action to children or animals except in an “analogical sense”, since they lack a mind or an 
autonomous will.90  The fact that Aristotle uses the same syllogistic analogy to explain 
both human and animal action in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium does not mean, 
for Broadie, that he is referring to the active mental states or intentions of animals.  
Rather, Aristotle merely is marking out their “visible behavior” as being triggered by 
certain perceptions and instinctual desires as understood by external, human observers.  
Animal behavior lacks conscious mediation, and, furthermore, the syllogistic references 
in general are merely heuristic devices, which are neither fully descriptive nor 
explanatory.91
 Terence Irwin, noted Aristotle scholar and translator, fundamentally agrees with 
these insights about animal behavior and the relationship between the causality of action 
and moral responsibility; however, he argues that Aristotle has an implicitly ‘complex’ 
theory of action, which has essentially two levels: 1) voluntary action as bare, causal 
responsibility, which includes animals and children; 2) voluntary action as moral 
responsibility, which applies only to mature adults capable of deliberation and choice.
   
92
                                                 
89 Alan Donagan, “Philosophical Progress and the Theory of Action,” Presidential Address of the Western 
American Philosophical Association, 55.1 (Sept. 1981), 28-29. 
  
Irwin finds a ‘simple’ theory of voluntary action offered in the initial formulations of the 
90 Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 125. 
91 Ibid., 231-232; 307. 
92Irwin: “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle”, in A.O. Rorty, ed.  Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 117-155. I borrow here from Nussbaum’s rendering of 
Irwin.  Irwin himself presents his argument in terms of a series of revisions of definitions of the voluntary 
and a contrast primarily between notions of the voluntary in the NE and EE, to which he attributes the 
‘simple’ theory of voluntary action, which I have initially called the first level of the ‘complex’ theory.  
Nussbaum’s rendering allows me to avoid a tedious dialectical digression and focus on the heart of the 
matter.  
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Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.  In both works, one initial condition of the voluntary 
is that an action is ‘up to us’ (eph’hēmin) because the action has an origin with us, an 
internal principle (EE II 7, 1223a23-26; 1223b37-39; NE III 1, 1110a23-26, b3-7).93  This 
is the main criterion for an action being voluntary; however, Irwin objects that plenty of 
somatic functions, sweating, digestion, etc., are voluntary, if only considered in view of 
their origin, yet not voluntary in the sense that we cannot control them nor are we praised 
or blamed for them.94 In the Nicomachean Ethics, unlike the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle 
does not mention the role of orexis in voluntary action.  Irwin hypothesizes that this is 
because, “all and only the actions that count as voluntary by his criteria . . . are actions on 
desire”; yet, even if this is probably the case, Aristotle must still include the role of belief 
or cognizance to distinguish voluntary action from involuntary somatic activities or the 
actions of animals.95  The ‘simple’ view that Irwin elaborates seems to allow the 
ascription of ‘voluntary’ to the actions of children and animals, because they result from 
desire, without being able to distinguish those actions from the actions of adults that 
receive “moral and legal sanctions”.96
 One solution to these problems with the definition of the voluntary might be to 
restrict Aristotle’s definition to mature human beings who are unequivocally the subjects 
of praise and blame; however, without some specific criterion to base this restriction on, 
Irwin argues, it would be completely arbitrary.
  
97
                                                 
93 Irwin, “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle,” 120-21. 
  Irwin argues that Aristotle fails to 
explain the meaning of ‘up to us’ adequately and also why it should not apply with full 
moral force to animals and children.  Aristotle ought to explain the phrase ‘up to us’ 
94 Ibid., 122. 
95 Ibid., 123. 
96 Ibid., 125. 
97 Ibid., 125 
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better and why it does not apply to children and animals.98  The key feature that separates 
the movements and actions of animals and children from those of mature, adult human 
beings is deliberation, which leads to an “effective” decision.   Therefore, moral 
responsibility requires that an action be voluntary on the first, ‘simple’ theory but also 
that it involves deliberation and decision; this is, in essence, Irwin’s ‘complex’ theory.  
This allows a non-arbitrary restriction of the sphere of moral evaluation to the actions of 
adults.99  Irwin distinguishes between responsibility in the wide sense, a simple causal 
attribution, which includes anything from an internal principle, and responsibility in a 
moral sense, on the basis of the capacity to deliberate and effectively act on deliberation 
through a decision.  Desire, of whatever kind, does not compel a person to act; 
responsible agents “can also affect the strength of their desires by further deliberation,” 
whereas animals can only act on their strongest desire.100
It is possible, however, that action can be both voluntary and subject to moral 
evaluation without deliberation or decision.  Maturity is characterized by the capacity for 
deliberation and for “effective decision”, yet many mature agents act without either.  
Nevertheless, “the agent is fully responsible for it if he is capable of effective deliberation 
about it.”
  
101
                                                 
98 St. Thomas does explain this term better, Irwin asserts, because “He insists that voluntariness is 
necessary and sufficient for responsibility . . . and tries to define voluntariness to fit it.  He finds that 
animals act voluntarily only in a reduced way.” For St. Thomas, the will is the source of properly voluntary 
action subject to moral evaluation. Irwin, “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle,” 126. 
 We are evaluated not just on those capacities we exercise but those that we 
possess and can exercise:  “. . . we ought to have certain kinds of emotional and 
appetitive desires; someone can reasonably advise us to acquire them, and we can be 
praised or blamed for having or lacking them ([NE III 1] 1111a27-b3).”    We are morally 
99 Ibid., 129. 
100 Ibid., 131; 129-130. 
101 Ibid., 133.  
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responsible for whatever we can effect by our deliberation, even if we in fact do not 
deliberate about them.102  Irwin admits that although this kind of account is the one 
Aristotle needs, “he does not set it out here.”103
The further admitted difficulty for Irwin’s account is that moral evaluation is 
often applied to an agent who has failed to use his capacity to deliberate, that is, the 
capacity was disused rather than misused.  One might fail to use this capacity because one 
is incapable of “deliberating effectively” about a particular thing or in light of a particular 
circumstance, e.g., the actions of the incontinent person.  Irwin argues that even if an 
agent fails to deliberate, so long as it would be possible to persuade him if a “deliberative 
argument” were presented to him, either by himself or by another person, then he is 
morally responsible.
  
104  This involves one further assumption: “Aristotle must claim that 
most adults have not been so strongly conditioned that no deliberative argument will 
move them; he must argue that adults are still capable of effective deliberation about the 
sorts of people they should be.”105
                                                 
102 Ibid., 135. 
  According to Irwin, character must be assumed to be 
malleable enough to allow the possibility for effective and morally correct deliberation 
about the agent’s own character in order for an agent to be held morally responsible. 
However, this view treats character as being primarily rather than derivatively voluntary; 
that is, character must be as flexible and as rationally corrigible as action.  As we will 
argue in I.4.3.4 below, character is voluntary in a derivative sense because it arises from 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 137-38. 
105 Ibid., 140. 
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actions that are voluntary.106
The interpretations of Aristotle’s conception of the voluntary we have just 
examined all assume that there is a fundamental, even ontological difference between 
every human act and the motion of animals and children, who seem to have only animal 
capacities.  This is not an assumption that Aristotle shares.  As we have seen already with 
Nussbaum’s analysis of orexis in the psychological works, “desire is not something 
altogether brutish: it involves selective focusing upon objects in the world and an equally 
selective set of responses to that focusing.”
  Aristotle’s first concern in his treatment of the voluntary is 
with responsibility for acts.   
107
 
 With this as our starting point, we will be 
able to see how Aristotle’s accounts in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics can 
consistently attribute voluntary action to animals and children, restrict action by choice to 
a subset of the voluntary, and still maintain the connection between voluntary action and 
responsibility. We will begin with the Eudemian Ethics; its account of voluntary action 
places a greater emphasis on the relation of the various kinds of orexis to action than the 
Nicomachean Ethics, where, as Irwin noted, a discussion of orexis is strangely absent.  
This will allow us to see the connection between orexis, prohairesis and voluntary action 
more clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 See I.4.3.4, page 99, below. 
107 Ibid., 289. 
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I.4.2: The Voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics 
 
Like the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics begins with an account of 
character before its account of voluntary action and the former is the spur to the 
discussion of the latter.  The Eudemian Ethics will therefore provide a template for 
relating the De Anima and De Motu Animalium to the Nicomachean Ethics, specifically 
how to relate orexis to the internal causes of action which are central to the Nicomachean 
account of the voluntary. 
Initially, Aristotle attacks the issue of voluntary action in the Eudemian Ethics 
through a question about whether virtues are natural, or, if not natural, contrary to nature.  
Aristotle begins a reply with a reference to his conception of biology, saying, “all 
essences (ousiai) are by nature (kata phusin) first principles of a certain kind, owing to 
which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself, for example a man 
engenders man, and in general an animal animals, and plants plants” (EE II 6, 1222b15-
18).108
                                                 
108 All references from the Eudemian Ethics will be from the Loeb translation: Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 
The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981). 
  Each species of animal has an essence which essence is the cause of its 
propagation, generation, and its characteristic activities.  Human behavior, however, is 
unique among all animals because “in addition to this obviously man alone among 
animals initiates certain conduct (kai praxeōn tinōn); for we should not ascribe conduct to 
any of the others” (EE II 6, 1222b18-21).  So, our human essence is also a principle 
involved in praxis, which is a kind of motion specific to human beings.  Aristotle goes on 
to state that first principles, which are the first beginning or source of motion, are first 
principles in the strict sense (kuriai legontai), although he is quick to point out their 
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analogical usage in mathematics (EE II 6, 1222b22).  Therefore, since “man is a first 
principle of a certain motion; for action is motion (hē gar praxis kinēsis),” then, “the first 
principle is a cause of things that exist or come into existence because of it, we must 
think as we do in the case of demonstrations” (EE II 6, 1222b28-32).   
Human beings are first principles of a kind that involves contingency, and as 
principles of this sort their characteristic motions admit of opposites.  While some human 
actions may be necessitated, and some may come about by forces external to the agent, 
Aristotle argues, “But of things which it depends on him (eph’hautōi) to do or not to do 
he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of depends on himself (EE II 6, 
1222b40-1223a9).   From this analysis, as is similarly the case in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle proceeds to examine how we may consider things to depend on the 
agent, what is up to him (eph’ hautōi), in what ways can we consider a human being a 
principle of his actions.  Aristotle first sets out a puzzle as to what ‘voluntary’ and 
‘involuntary’ might refer to.  This is somewhat different from Nicomachean Ethics III.  
Here, rather than starting with a discussion of the involuntary, which is caused by 
something external, then getting to the voluntary as the opposite, Aristotle has already 
established that praxis is the result of an internal principle.  Therefore, he lays out three 
possible internal principles of which it might be the result: “[the voluntary] would seem 
to refer to one of these things – conformity with appetite (orexis), or with purposive 
choice (prohairesis), or with thought (dianoia).  Voluntary is what conforms with one of 
these and involuntary is what contravenes one of them” (EE II 7, 1223a23-26).  This 
particular trichotomy is crucial for understanding Aristotle’s account of action.  
Aristotle’s solution to the problem of voluntary action hinges on unpacking the ambiguity 
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of the first term, orexis, relating it to prohairesis and concluding that all action involves 
some kind of dianoia, orexis being taken here as a kind of dianoia.   
 Aristotle begins with the first thesis that the voluntary is that which is in accord 
with orexis.  Immediately, he says that we must distinguish three kinds of orexis: wish 
(boulēsis), spirit or passion (thumos), and desire (epithumia) (EE II 7,1223a27-28). Thus, 
Aristotle first considers not orexis itself, but a species of orexis, namely epithumia: “It 
would seem that everything that conforms with desire (kat’epithumian) is voluntary 
(hekousion) (II 7, 1223a28-29).  As in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is 
keen to refute those who argue that passionate desire or pleasure might render a shameful 
act involuntary.  Against this thesis, Aristotle brings up the example of the ‘uncontrolled’ 
or ‘incontinent’ man, the akratēs: 
But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes 
(ouch ha bouletai poiei), for being uncontrolled means 
acting against what one thinks to be best (par’ ho oietai 
beltiston einai) owing to desire (di’ epithumian); hence it 
will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily 
and involuntarily at the same time. But this is impossible . . 
. a man exercises self-control when he acts against his 
desire (para tēn epithumian) in conformity with rational 
calculation (kata ton logismon) (EE II 7, 1223b7-14). 
 
The example of the akratēs is problematic for the proponent of epithumia because, in this 
case, epithumia clashes with boulēsis.  We may imagine someone prone to immoderate 
drinking who, overcome by a desire for drink, goes on a binge which results in missing 
work and losing his job.  The lack of control brought on by epithumia in the immediate 
desire for a drink results in the long-term frustration of the wishes of the akratēs, his job 
security, lifestyle, etc.  This conflict accounts also for the phenomenon of regret in the 
akratēs, as opposed to the truly vicious person, who does not experience regret.  
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Likewise, in the case of the enkratēs, or ‘self-controlled’ or ‘continent person’, epithumia 
again conflicts with rational calculation and wish, but wish and rational calculation 
overcome it.  Since no one accounts the actions of the enkratēs involuntary, we have a 
definite problem.  If we identify the voluntary with epithumia, which is overcome by 
calculation, then it appears that the enkratēs acts involuntarily when he is continent and 
resists desire.  Yet all hold that the enkratēs acts voluntarily when he resists, so one and 
the same action would appear to be both voluntary and involuntary.  Further, Aristotle 
says, “The same argument applies also in the case of passion (peri thumon) . . . And a 
proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire (epithumia) 
(EE II 7, 1223b18-29).  So, we cannot identify the voluntary with either epithumia or 
thumos because they both may conflict with boulēsis, and boulēsis is, at least ostensibly, 
also voluntary. 
 With this initial conflict of the species of orexis sketched out, Aristotle proceeds 
to examine whether “acting as we wish (to boulomenon) and acting voluntarily 
(hekousion) are the same” (EE II 7, 1223b29-30).  This initially seems “impossible” 
(adunaton) because of the apparent behavior of the akratēs, which is blameworthy:  
But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and acting 
voluntarily are the same, the opposite will result; for 
nobody wishes things that he thinks to be bad, yet he does 
them when he has become uncontrolled, so if to do 
injustice is voluntary and the voluntary is what is in 
accordance with one’s wish, then when a man has become 
uncontrolled he will no longer be acting unjustly but will be 
more just than he was before he lost control of himself.  
But this is impossible (EE II 7, 1223b33-37). 
 
Here we have the classic problem of evil in human action.  Nobody wishes to harm 
himself or do something that goes against his own aims and goals and particularly the 
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ultimate goal of being happy.    Yet the akratēs does precisely this when he is overcome.  
If, when overcome by passion against his wish, he does something unjust, he seems to be 
acting involuntarily – that is, on the assumption that boulēsis is the sole source of 
voluntary action.  Yet, it would be odd to call this man blameless for his akrasia, which is 
itself considered a blameworthy condition.  In the act, he would be in a better state than 
he would be considered to be habitually, though the act is the direct result of a 
blameworthy condition.  Therefore, not only can the voluntary not be identified with 
boulēsis, it also cannot be identified with any single species of orexis because action 
which arises from any species of orexis seems, thus far, to be voluntary. 
 From these considerations, it follows that the voluntary cannot be the same as 
acting in accord with choice or prohairesis (EE II 8, 1223b38-39).  First, Aristotle states 
that “It was proved that acting in accordance with one’s wish is not acting involuntarily,” 
as is demonstrated by the enkratēs or self-controlled man, who overcomes his passion or 
epithumia and acts in accord with his wish or boulēsis.  Second, in rejoinder to this, he 
says, “rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary.”  So, all actions which result 
from boulēsis are voluntary; however, “it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without 
wishing.”  So, the voluntary includes actions caused by boulēsis but also other things as 
well – the actions of the akratēs moved by epithumia are also voluntary.  But while 
actions done in accord with prohairesis are also voluntary, since prohairesis follows 
from boulēsis, still “many things we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a 
purposive choice suddenly (proaireitai d’oudeis ouden exaiphnēs) (II 8, 1223b38-
1224a4).  So, some actions deriving from boulēsis are not also the result of prohairesis 
because they are done suddenly, because they are not done in accord with deliberation or 
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bouleusis.  So we are still not out of the woods; nevertheless, several points are clear: the 
voluntary extends beyond prohairesis and includes actions done from boulēsis without 
prohairesis, as well as actions done from the other orexeis. 
Having eliminated two of the possibilities for the voluntary in an unqualified 
sense, action in accord with desire and action in accord with choice, Aristotle concludes, 
rather vaguely, that “it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of 
thought (en tōi dianooumenon pōs)” (EE II 8, 1224a5-7).  He returns to the former 
paradigm of his discussion of motion in terms of principles.  One can distinguish between 
motion which is forced or of necessity (to biaion or to anankaion) and that which follows 
from an internal, natural principle.109
                                                 
109 As Susan Sauvé Meyer points out, in both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, force (biaion) and 
necessity  or compulsion (anankaion) are distinguished from one another as two separate conditions: the 
former is violent, moving external force; the latter is the force of circumstances, as when one’s family is 
held hostage.  There is some significant debate about whether the Eudemian Ethics offers a different 
account of the voluntary and involuntary with respect to actions under some form of necessity.  In the 
Eudemian Ethics, such actions are classified as akōn, or involuntary.  In the Nicomachaen Ethics, such 
actions are classified as hekōn, or voluntary, without qualification, and akōn when qualified with respect to 
the circumstances.  Meyer holds that this shows development in Aristotle’s views and that the two ethical 
works offer a different account of the voluntary and involuntary.  I am not so sure about the development 
thesis, although I would agree that the treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics is more nuanced than the 
Eudemian Ethics.  With respect to moral evaluation, the two works come to the same conclusion: actions 
which result from necessity are usually blameless.  See Susan Sauvé Meyer, Aristotle on Moral 
Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), chapter 4.  For an alternative view of the relationship 
between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, one which argues that the Eudemian account of the 
voluntary is not merely a preliminary analysis or one replaced by the Nicomachean account, see Anthony 
Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978); see also Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), especially Part I, chapters 1-5.  I do not hazard any theses on 
the development or the temporal relationship between the two accounts.  For the purposes of the 
dissertation, I assume that they are complementary, allowing for some difficulties interpreting Aristotle’s 
terse prose; see Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of Will, 38-48. 
  Force is contrary both to the natural movement of 
non-living things, such as the downward natural motion of a stone, but it is also contrary 
to the voluntary and that which results by persuasion in human action (EE II 8, 1224a8-
24).  Among natural motions that result from an internal principle, one can divide the 
movements of inanimate things, such as rocks or fire, from those of animate things by the 
number and nature of their principles:  
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In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in 
living things it is multiple, for appetition (orexis) and 
rational principle (logos) are not always in harmony.  
Hence whereas in the case of other animals the factor of 
force is simple, as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for 
animals do not possess rational principle (logos) and 
appetition (orexis) in opposition to it, but live by their 
appetition (orexis), in man both forms are present (EE II 8, 
1224a23-28) 
 
Human action or praxis is unique among the forms of animal motion in that it involves 
two principles, orexis and logos, desire and reason.  It is easy to determine what is forced 
for animals or inanimate objects because the cause of their movements is simple.  
However, in the case of human action, desire and reason are both present and not always 
in agreement; moreover, both are capable of causing movement independently and in 
opposition to the other.  However, this needs to be qualified because reason is not a 
principle in the actions of children; we do not call what they do praxis, and similarly with 
animals; rather praxis is said of the motions only of “a person who has attained action by 
rational calculation (logismos)” (EE II 8, 1224a27-30).  In any case, both principles are 
internal principles, and as such, action driven by either reason or desire is voluntary, even 
when they conflict.  So, as with the Nicomachean Ethics, what is voluntary is identified 
with what arises from an internal principle, though with human beings there is more than 
one (EE II 8, 1224b7-16).   
 The opinions that continence and incontinence are involuntary, though mistaken, 
spring from this conflict of internal principles and feelings: “for calculation and 
appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other” (EE II 8, 
1224b23-25).  From this conflict of particular internal principles “men transfer this to the 
spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit” 
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(EE II 8, 1224b25-26).  In a very circumscribed way, we might say of the case of the 
parts of the soul that there is ‘force’, one principle in conflict with another; however, this 
cannot be said of the whole soul, “for we possess by nature both parts” (EE II 8 1224b26-
29).  Since neither principle is external to the soul, but both are human, we cannot call 
either reason or appetite an external principle.  This is especially the case with reason 
(logos), since it is “a natural property, because it will be present in us if our growth is 
allowed and not stunted” (EE II 8, 1224b30-31).  Likewise, desire is also obviously 
present in every human being from birth, and “these are pretty nearly the two things by 
which we define the natural – it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or 
else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly” (EE II 8, 1224b33-
35)   From this it follows that each acts in accord with his nature, but not from the same 
principle within the soul (EE II 8, 1224b35-1225a1).  Therefore, the final option left to 
us, that the voluntary is that which is in accord with some kind of thought, is ambiguous.   
Aristotle seems to want to argue that reason (logos) or calculation (logistikē) can 
also be a source of motion like orexis.  Orexis, as we have seen in the De Anima and De 
Motu Animalium, involves phantasia, which can be considered a type of thinking.  If we 
limit the voluntary to action caused by orexis, we have a problem with continence and 
some deliberate behavior, because the source of motion there is attributed to reason.  If 
we limit the voluntary to action caused by reason, we have a problem accounting for the 
negative moral assessments given to akrasia and to good or bad actions caused by 
epithumia and thumos in children and adults.  Aristotle’s inclusion of orexis within the 
genus of thought is not problematic when seen in light of his psychological works, and 
the conclusion that the voluntary is in accord with some kind of thought does not restrict 
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it to deliberate actions or agents capable of deliberation; it merely allows the inclusion of 
such actions and agents on the basis of the fact that reason and calculation are the result 
of an internal principle. 
 The account of voluntary action in the Eudemian Ethics has given us several key 
insights to take to our reading of the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) the voluntary includes 
actions from boulēsis and prohairesis, but not every voluntary action is the result of 
prohairesis or boulēsis; 2) voluntary action contrary to boulēsis can occur, as in the case 
of the akratēs; 3) characteristically human action, praxis, is the result of rational 
calculation, boulēsis, and prohairesis, but not every human action is rationally calculated; 
and 4) the internal principle which renders an act voluntary because self-moved is orexis, 
which includes thought directed by some species of orexis.  With these points in mind, 
we will now be able to approach the Nicomachean Ethics and give a full account of 
human action and prohairesis. 
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I.4.3: The Voluntary in the Nicomachean Ethics 
 
We are now in a position to give an account of prohairesis and the voluntary in 
the Nicomachean Ethics and to begin to solve the difficulties associated with it as well as 
those which arise with Aristotle’s account of akrasia.  The account in the Ethics does not 
give, as the Eudemian Ethics does, an exhaustive and orderly treatment of the different 
internal principles in its account of voluntary action.  Rather, it seems to assume that we 
are familiar with them, in particular with the role of orexis.110
The interpreters we have briefly discussed assume the equivalence of certain 
concepts and terms, and this, in turn, affects their analysis of Aristotle’s psychological 
and ethical concepts.  In particular, it is assumed that the voluntary is co-extensive with 
what is chosen and what is intentional.
  Whatever the reason for 
that apparent assumption, we can now account for several things in light of our analysis 
of Aristotle’s other works: 1) the distinction between the voluntary and the chosen (to 
kata prohairesin); 2) the extension of voluntary action to children and animals; 3) the 
voluntariness and intentionality of akrasia. 
111
                                                 
110 Whether or not there is an assumption here is definitely open to debate.  Some, like Kenny, see the 
Eudemian Ethics as the more authoritative of the two texts; others, like Meyer, see the Nicomachean Ethics 
as a mature development of the Eudemian Ethics which approaches the question of voluntary and 
involuntary action from a new and improved vantage point.  I am inclined to see that Aristotle must be 
assuming knowledge with his larger psychology and an account of how the capacities of the soul relate to 
the genesis of action.  While I do not believe that one can say conclusively that the Nicomachean Ethics 
assumes knowledge of the Eudemian Ethics, it does seem to assume knowledge of something like the 
account in the Eudemian Ethics.  See Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, part I, 3-49, for an extended 
and extensive comparison of the two texts which argues for a continuity between the texts.  Cf. Meyer, 
Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, chapter 3, 59-87, for a contrary accont of the same texts. 
  Deliberate choice is taken to characterize the 
111 A number of scholars hold that what Aristotle calls to hekousion is equivalent to what is intentional in 
English; likewise what is akousion is unintentional.  See Meyer, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, 9-15   
Meyer herself argues that there is no clear translation of Aristotle’s terms into the English terms 
voluntary/involuntary, intentional/unintentional, or willing/unwilling, but that Aristotle’s concepts straddle 
those distinctions.  Meyer takes this point from Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, 27 (cited in Meyer, 
15, footnote 16).  David Charles, while acknowledging certain difficulties with such a translation, argues 
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actions of most adults and all actions open to moral praise and blame.  The fact that many 
actions do not come from a deliberate choice is not taken to weaken the link between the 
voluntary and choice; the adult agent is responsible for having failed to choose to 
deliberate or to acquire the character necessary to deliberate.  For thinkers like Aquinas, 
this implies a prior ability to choose not to deliberate or to abide by deliberation, which is 
itself a choice.  Desires are generally held to be somatic urges, brute and immediate; the 
imagination, a simple faculty which represents through likeness.  As we have seen with 
our examination of the De Anima, the De Motu Animalium, and Martha Nussbaum’s 
works, these assumptions are open to question on two fronts: 1) as a description of the 
terms used and the entities they designate; and 2) as an interpretation of Aristotle’s 
concepts.   
It seems to make intuitive sense to say that whatever is voluntary is chosen and 
intentional, since in English and various other languages one is often asked when taking 
wedding vows whether the choice to enter into matrimony is made willingly or 
voluntarily, being of one’s own free will.  But such customs and expressions immediately 
raise a prima facie concern: if a choice can be voluntary, can a choice also be 
involuntary?  Why ask the question if it cannot?  The terms ‘intentional’, ‘voluntary’ and 
‘willing’, as well as their corresponding contraries ‘unintentional’, ‘involuntary’, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
that it largely holds good; see Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1984), 57-62.  Charles seems to make the identification between prohairetic action and intentional action, 
although allowing for a certain range and variation in meaning.  He contrasts the proper deliberate rational 
choice of a virtuous person with the rational choice of an akratic person on the basis of the premises and 
scope of their reasoning.  He counts the latter as rational by arguing that a desire is a reason for action and 
an action derived from such a reason is rational.  This, I think, involves a certain sleight of hand – a desire 
might be a reason for action in the sense of explaining it without at the same time justifying it.  I think that 
in the contrast between virtuous and akratic action Aristotle is saying that the former is caused by the 
agent’s desires, knowledge and perceptions in the right way, which reflects an adequate knowledge of the 
human good and his circumstances; the latter is caused by desires in such a way that the agent fails to 
exercise his rational capacities and his action reflects a distorted or incomplete picture of the human good 
and his circumstances.  Virtuous action is both explicable and justifiable; akratic failure is merely 
explicable.  We explore this more below.  See Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action, 148-160.   
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‘unwilling’ are not necessarily coextensive in standard English usage or in philosophical 
writing.  Saying that an action was willing or unwilling often describes an attitude of an 
agent towards a voluntary action: we may intentionally and voluntarily pay ransom 
without necessarily doing so willingly.  Likewise, we may voluntarily produce a physical 
movement whose outcome was neither intended nor willingly done – as when we cause 
harm because of invincible ignorance.112  As Meyer rightly observes, the same 
ambiguities apply to the Greek terms at Aristotle’s disposal, hekōn and akōn and their 
derivatives, which can respectively be found to display a range of meanings in Greek 
literature and drama covering the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary, 
intentional and unintentional, and willing and unwilling. Both contemporary English 
usage of the terms voluntary, intentional and intending as well as Aristotle’s Greek terms 
hekōn and akōn  display and are often used to designate a “continuum of commitment” 
which ranges from the unencumbered, fully cognizant and deliberate choice of action 
through various degrees of constraint and ignorance all the way to action violently forced.  
Within that range, qualifications will have to be made to specify the degree and types of 
commitment based on the state of the agent and his circumstances.113
From an interpretative standpoint, Aristotle does not seem to limit intentionality, 
broadly construed, to rational faculties or, in the sense of action intentions, to deliberate 
choice (prohairesis); moreover, his descriptions of actions which are hekousios and 
akousios seem to cover a range of actions, only some of which are deliberate. It seems 
clear that Aristotle gives both orexis and phantasia capacities that would be described as 
intentional: They are purposive mental states involved in practical thinking and moving 
   
                                                 
112 Meyer,  9-15; Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, 27. 
113 Meyer, 11-13. 
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an agent to act which require at least some minimal level of cognizance.  This cognizance 
must involve some sort of judgment and belief, even if such judgments and beliefs fall 
short of true intellectual judgments and beliefs, which Aristotle attributes only to humans 
with rational capacity.114
 
  While some subsequent interpreters have assumed that the 
powers Aristotle attributes to these capacities are a function only of reason (logos) and 
that it is only because human beings possess reason that they can have a rational appetite 
and form intentions and execute intentional actions, Aristotle claims that the same 
capacities which generate animal motion are sources of human behavior.  As we shall 
further show below, Aristotle also narrows the range of acts which count as coming from 
a deliberate choice or prohairesis, while many of his interpreters tend to expand the range 
of deliberate choice, both in their interpretations and in their views of action in general.  
This makes it difficult to account for precisely the things that Aristotle calls voluntary but 
not chosen, e.g., quick action, incontinent action, and the acquisition of character. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals; Thomas Tuozzo, “Conceptualized and 
Unconceptualized Desire in Aristotle” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32.4 (Oct. 1994), cited in 
MacIntyre, ibid., 70.  MacIntyre drawing from Tuozzo argues that animals and young children have 
unconceptualized desires and intentions with corresponding indefinite states of belief.  Giving examples of 
animal behavior, MacIntyre argues that animals have some unconceptualized beliefs and make similar 
judgments which move them to act.  We will examine MacIntyre’s claims further in Part II of the 
dissertation. 
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I.4.3.1: Voluntary Action, Responsibility, and the Foundations of Choice 
 
The keystone of Aristotle’s account of voluntary action as well as his account of 
moral responsibility is the idea that human agents are self-movers who themselves 
possess the principle of their actions within them.  The Nicomachean Ethics follows the 
Eudemian Ethics, De Anima and De Motu Animalium in making the explanation and 
evaluation of action hinge on a description of the causes of human action.  In examining 
the Nicomachean Ethics’ account of voluntary action and moral assessment, we shall pay 
particular attention to the way in which Aristotle distinguishes the various principles of 
action, internal and external, and how those principles affect action description and 
assessment.  In this section, we will follow Aristotle’s account of voluntary action from 
his initial discussion of the involuntary and mixed types of action, to his definition of the 
voluntary in terms of an internal principle, which will lead us to discuss the responsibility 
agents have for states of character as well as to defend Aristotle’s attribution of voluntary 
behavior to children and animals.  In examining cases of force or compulsion in which an 
agent has some choice to act, i.e., mixed actions, we shall argue that Aristotle 
conditionally allows intentional instrumental harm; that is to say, under certain 
circumstances and for certain purposes one may intend an otherwise bad or harmful 
action and such an action may even be praiseworthy.  The significance of this point will 
not be immediately evident, but will be brought out in the second part of the dissertation.   
Aristotle’s account of prohairesis begins in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics; 
however Book III does not begin with an account of prohairesis.  The second book of the 
Ethics gives an account of virtue and its relation to character (ēthos) and action (praxis): 
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virtue is a good state of character acquired through habituation which affects or results in 
prohairesis (NE II 6, 1107a1-3). Having discussed character, Aristotle now turns his 
attention to action (praxis), which results from prohairesis.  Virtue, Aristotle says, 
concerns action and actions are praised or blamed if they are voluntary (hekousios) and 
pardoned or pitied if they are involuntary (akousios).  In the Ethics, the voluntary is prior, 
both in actuality and in the order of presentation, to prohairesis, and the nature of the 
voluntary and the involuntary must be discussed if virtue is to be understood (NE III 1, 
1109b30-34).  The beginning of Book III signals both that prohairesis is grounded in a 
larger account of human action and that such an account of human action will serve as a 
basis for moral assessment.    
Aristotle’s dialectical treatment of the voluntary and the involuntary takes as its 
starting point the relation between moral assessment and an agent’s causal responsibility 
for actions and consequences.  From a causal perspective, involuntary action seems, at 
first glance, easier to identify than voluntary action.  The defining characteristics of 
involuntary action seem to be force and ignorance: 
Now it seems that things coming about by force or because 
of ignorance are involuntary.  What is forced has an 
external principle, the sort of principle in which the agent, 
or [rather] the victim, contributes nothing – if, for instance, 
a wind or people who have him in their control were to 
carry him off (NE III, 1, 1110a1-4). 
 
Aristotle attempts to ground the relationship between praise and blame, as well as pardon, 
with an eye toward the causes of action.  Praise and blame attach to the agent to the 
extent that the agent is the cause of his act.  To the extent that an agent’s causal 
contribution to an act or its consequences is limited by an external cause, the agent’s 
responsibility for the act and its consequences is reduced.   
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The causal approach is central to Aristotle’s discussion of exculpatory 
circumstances.115  There are very few cases of strictly involuntary action, and Aristotle 
does not go into much detail for this class beyond saying, “Perhaps we should say that 
something is forced without qualification whenever its cause is external and the agent 
contributes nothing” (NE III 1, 1110b2-9).  There are, however, more obvious cases of 
“mixed action,” where an external force contributes a substantial amount to reducing the 
options open to human agents; hence the action is a mixture of two causes, one internal 
and one external to the agent. Aristotle gives the example of sailors who have to throw 
cargo overboard to save their ship in a storm.116
                                                 
115 Here and below, I will be disagreeing with Susan Sauvé Meyer on the nature of Aristotle’s account of 
the voluntary in the Nicomachean Ethics, although I do not disagree with everything she says.  Meyer 
argues that the Nicomachean Ethics presents a more developed view of involuntary ignorance because it 
recognizes that exculpatory ignorance is contrary to the agent’s impulse or desire but is not external to him.  
She argues that forced movement is not the paradigm for involuntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics, but 
she thinks it is in the Eudemian Ethics.  As evidence for this development, she cites the pain and regret that 
Aristotle says an agent must feel when his ignorance is corrected and he sees the harm that he has done.  I 
do not find the textual evidence for a shift from the Eudemian to the Nicomachean in terms of the standards 
of responsibility compelling.  Aristotle divides actions caused by ignorance from actions done in ignorance 
by reference to the agent’s relation to the lack of knowledge in question.  If, in the former case, the agent is 
not responsible for his lack of cognizance of his circumstances, if things change on him unnoticed and 
beyond his control, then he is not responsible for the actions or harms which result.  However, if, as in the 
latter case, the agent is the cause of his own ignorance, which causes the actions to result in harm to himself 
or others, he is responsible for the harms which result.  In the former case, the reason the ignorance is 
exculpatory is because it is externally caused; in the latter case the reason it is not is because it is internally 
caused.  See Meyer, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, 76-84. 
 It seems that their actions are voluntary 
because they voluntarily threw the cargo overboard; however, without the storm as a 
source of external compulsion, they would not have done so.  Because of the contribution 
of external factors, in this case nature, an action seems involuntary; however, in relation 
to the options which remain open to the agent, the action is voluntary and can receive 
praise or blame.  Aristotle says that, without qualification, such actions are involuntary; 
116 A similar example occurs in Herodotus: when Xerxes is crossing the Hellespont by ship, a storm 
suddenly appears and the captain is forced to throw soldiers overboard to save the King.  When Xerxes 
reaches the shore, he crowns his captain as a reward for saving his life and then beheads him for killing his 
men.  This example is probably meant to show the perversity of the barbarian invader, and such a case was 
probably familiar to Aristotle’s audience.  See Herodotus, The Histories, 8.118, trans. David Greene 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
   90 
no one would choose to throw the valuable cargo overboard for its own sake.  However, 
when qualified with the circumstances the agent found himself in, they are voluntary; for 
given the choice between death or the destruction of property in such a storm, on such a 
ship, the choice of throwing the cargo overboard is voluntary. As such, mixed actions are 
more like voluntary actions.  The ship might be sinking, but we throw the cargo off first 
rather than the women and children; to do otherwise is blameworthy, although not as 
blameworthy as it would be in the absence of a storm.  The nature of the agent’s causal 
contribution affects the possibility and scope or moral assessment (NE III 1, 1110a6-19).  
Cases of mixed action are not, strictly speaking, caused by violence or force but they are 
necessitated or compelled, which is like force or violence in that the compulsion is 
external to the agent (NE III 1, 1110a27-28).117
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 See Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, “Notes,” 202-203 for the shift from violence or force to compulsion; 
see also Meyer, 93-16, esp. 94-100, for the significance of the same.  
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I.4.3.2: Compulsion, Harm, and Instrumental Intentions 
 
Before moving on to cases of ignorance, we must note some salient features of 
Aristotle’s example of the sailors in the storm that will be significant for the second half 
of the dissertation, when we focus on intentions and responsibility for side-effects or 
other undesired consequences.  Aristotle’s description of the sailors and the storm, and 
likewise his descriptions of the other mixed action scenarios, shows agents choosing 
some harm or other instrumentally to attain some good.  As Aristotle says of mixed 
actions, “For at the actual time when they are done, they are chosen . . . and the end  . . . 
varies with the occasion,”118 and further on he says, “It is sometimes difficult, however, 
to judge what should be chosen at the price of what, and what should be endured as the 
price of what” (NE III 1, 1110a12; 1110a30-31). 119  Aristotle uses the Greek preposition 
anti in phrases such as poion anti poiou and ti anti tinos, and they both translate to “what 
as the price of what” or “what for the sake of what.”120  The latter translation might be 
preferred because Aristotle points out that the qualification which renders mixed actions 
voluntary rather than involuntary is that they involve a choice in light of a goal and that 
the act chosen is choiceworthy on that occasion for that purpose.121
                                                 
118 Here I use Rackham’s translation.  Irwin uses “choiceworthy” for hairetai instead of “chosen.”  Kenny 
translates hairetai as “objects of choice,” which seems motivated by his own interpretation of the passage, 
which we will examine below.  Meyer prefers Rackham’s. See  Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, 30; Kenny, 
ibid.., 31; Meyer, ibid., 112. 
  The harm is not 
desired for itself, but only under the restricted circumstances and only for a substantial 
119 The Greek for the citation reads esti chalepon eniote diakrinai poion anti poiou haireteon kai ti anti 
tinos hupomeneteon.  I have chosen Irwin’s translation of this, but I have omitted Irwin’s interpolations, 
which he himself bracketed, so that the indefinite nature of Aristotle’s description comes through.  Irwin 
inserted “goods” and “evils” to follow his translations of poion and poiou as well as ti and tinos. 
120 See the entry for anti in Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, Greek-English Lexicon,  9th ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1940).  [Accessed through www.perseus.tufts.edu]. 
121 See Meyer, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, 112, for the connection between the goal (telos) and the 
circumstances or occasion. 
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good.  The sailors do not want to destroy the cargo – they are not vandals or pirates – but 
they do choose to destroy it to save themselves, and they desire to do so insofar as it will 
render them safe. 
The fact that Aristotle uses in several places the verb ‘choose’ (haireisthai) and 
the phrase ‘what for the sake of what’ is problematic for many contemporary interpreters 
because it seems to suggest that Aristotle is some sort of consequentialist.  Anthony 
Kenny rejects the view that Aristotle is justifying instrumental harms or evils.  Instead, he 
argues, the emphasis is on what agents ought to endure (hupomenein).  Passing from the 
sailors-in-the-storm example, Kenny emphasizes the hostage and ransom cases to which 
Aristotle briefly alludes in the same passage, which “suggests that he has in mind here 
not the positive performance of evil for good ends, but rather the submission to suffering 
and disgrace.”122  Kenny further argues that when such mixed actions are performed, “the 
most a man can hope for . . . even under threat of inhuman torture, is pardon or 
excuse.”123
 The most salient problem for Kenny’s interpretation is that while Aristotle 
concedes that mixed actions have elements of the involuntary (the external 
circumstances), they do have voluntary elements and such elements are subject to 
evaluation.  While Kenny tries to evade this point, he does acknowledge that throwing the 
cargo overboard is intentional and the act is intended on Aristotle’s account.
  Therefore, according to Kenny, Aristotle is not approving of instrumental 
harm, he is merely excusing it when circumstances call for pardon. 
124
                                                 
122 Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, 33.  Kenny attributes the source of his view to Aspasius. 
  
Therefore, at the very least, Aristotle is saying that it is permissible, under certain 
circumstances, to intend harm (in the case of the sailors, the harm of loss of property to 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., 35. 
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the owners of the cargo) for the sake of some good.  Likewise, such acts may receive 
more positive moral evaluation than pardon.  Kenny misconstrues Aristotle’s statements 
about the evaluation of mixed actions.  Aristotle does not say that all mixed actions only 
receive pardon.  At NE III 1, 1110a20, Aristotle claims that some mixed actions receive 
praise, and he seems to be referring to cases like the sailors in the storm because he says 
“For such actions people are sometimes actually praised” and this appears following his 
analysis of the sailors in the storm.  Later Aristotle concedes that “In some cases there is 
no praise, but there is pardon” (NE III 1, 1110a24-25), but this does not support Kenny’s 
generalization.  
 While it must be admitted that Aristotle’s treatment of mixed action is both short 
and vague, it does seem that it supports the conditional permissibility if not approval of 
intentional, instrumental harm.  While Aristotle also claims that there are some actions 
that we can never be compelled to do, and we should suffer death rather than do them, he 
does not enumerate or specify what acts are always forbidden, except by an allusion to 
Euripides, and he is loath to offer any a priori rule to decide such things (NE III 1, 
1110a27-35).    Be that as it may, there are two features of his account which are rather 
less ambiguous in support of the conditional permissibility of instrumental harm.  The 
first, as we have already mentioned, is that he uses the verb ‘to choose’ and expressions 
like ‘what at the price of what’.  The second is that he does not rely on anything 
resembling the distinction between intention and foresight to exculpate the agents he is 
describing.  It precisely because the agents can foresee the consequences of their actions 
and have a choice in the matter (albeit a limited one) that they are responsible for what 
they do.  When Aristotle does speak of pardon, he does not argue that the agents facing 
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compulsion to do shameful acts ought to be pardoned because they did not, under the 
circumstances, intentionally choose to do the shameful acts as a means to some other end.  
Rather, he argues that the intention or choice of the agent must be seen in light of the 
circumstances and the goal.  The intention or choice of the agent does not stand outside 
of the circumstances and cannot be assessed as fit or unfit, as well as praiseworthy, 
blameworthy, or pardonable, without reference to a full, thick description of the 
circumstances, end, and means.125
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 Meyer, ibid., 112. 
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I.4.3.3: Ignorance, Cognizance, Cause, and Responsibility 
 
The link between responsibility, cognizance, choice, and moral assessment is also 
the key to understanding Aristotle’s account of the kinds of ignorance which can render 
an act nonvoluntary (ouch’ hekousion) or involuntary (akousion) and which can 
exculpate an agent.126
                                                 
126 Rackham in his translator’s notes to the opening of book three notes that: “hekousion and akousion are 
most conveniently rendered ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’; but the word akousion suggests ‘unwilling’ or 
‘against the will,’ and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in 1.13. There he introduces a third 
term, ouch hekousion, ‘not voluntary’ or ‘not willing,’ to describe acts done in ignorance of their full 
circumstances and consequences, and so not willed in the full sense; but such acts when subsequently 
regretted by the agent are included in the class of akousia or unwilling acts, because had the agent not been 
in ignorance he would not have done them.”  Meyer claims that the requirement for regret or pain cannot be 
encompassed by the general requirement of involuntary action, namely one of external causation.  She 
claims that there must be two requirements, either of which is sufficient to render an act involuntary, one is 
external causation, the other is contrarariety to impulse.  She also uses this to argue that the Nicomachean 
Ethics develops and improves the Eudemian Ethics.  I do not think the text bears out the weight Meyer 
places on Aristotle’s account of pain and regret with respect to an agent whose action was caused by 
ignorance and feels remorse when that ignorance is resolved.  Likewise, I do not think, as Meyer does, that 
Aristotle means this requirement to be an addendum to a requirement for external causation.  The type of 
ignorance which is exculpatory is external to the agent in that he was not responsible for causing it; 
therefore, there is really no significant shift either from mixed action or from the Eudemian to the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  See Meyer, 94-116. 
  The account of ignorance follows the account of mixed action 
immediately in NE III 1, and it similarly places an emphasis on the different types of 
causes, internal and external, of action.  There are two types of action affected by 
ignorance corresponding to two different ways one can be ignorant of what one is doing.  
The first type of action is action “caused by ignorance” (di’ agnoian); the second is 
action done “in ignorance” (agnoōn) (NE III 1, 1110b25-30).  The former occurs when an 
agent is ignorant through some external accident beyond his control.  To illustrate this 
type of ignorance, Aristotle gives an example from Euripides’ lost play Cresphontes, 
where Merope kills her son mistaking him for an enemy, as well as other examples of 
actions with tragic consequences resulting from ignorance not caused by the agent (NE 
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III 1, 1111a7-15).127
 Sometimes, however, we are at fault for our ignorance and this fault changes the 
evaluation of actions done because of that ignorance.  Actions done in ignorance, where 
the ignorance results from a prior choice or act of the agent, are attributable to the agent, 
although not in the same way as if they had been done with full cognizance.  This 
category of action is typified by acts of drunkenness or anger, where the prior choice or 
act, getting drunk or allowing oneself to fall into a rage, blinds the agent to what he is 
doing and its consequences.  The agent is blameworthy for the act and bad consequences, 
but not in the same manner as if he had acted with full cognizance.  With drunkenness, as 
Aristotle points out, legislators in his time sometimes punished both the ignorance caused 
by drunkenness and the act which resulted.
  Ignorance such as this can encompass any one or more of the 
following circumstances of action according to Aristotle: the agent, the act itself, the 
instrument, the patient or object, the results or end (heneka tinos) and the manner of 
execution (NE III 1, 1111a4-6).  Aristotle later says that the most important particulars to 
have knowledge of are what the agent is doing and that for which he does it.  The latter 
circumstance seems not simply to refer to the goal of the action, but also the results or 
consequences of the action, since a number of the examples Aristotle gives hinge on an 
action having a different and contrary result from the one intended (NE III 1, 1111a7-18).  
We can be pardoned for an unexpectedly bad result if we were unaware of some salient 
feature of the situation through no fault of our own. 
128
                                                 
127 See Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics., Notes, 204, for the reference to Euripides. 
  In other cases, someone may not take care 
(mē epimelēthēnai), but being careless is the agent’s responsibility, such that the 
128 As Irwin notes, it was not common for legislators in Aristotle’s time to punish both the drunkenness and 
the act done when drunk.  Aristotle apparently makes mention of Pittacus of Mytilene in the Politics 
making such a law.  It seems that Aristotle favors it here in the Ethics; however, as Irwin rightly notes, no 
firm conclusion can be made.  See Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, “Notes,” 209. 
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ignorance and the act which results because of the ignorance are attributable to the agent 
(NE III 1, 1110b25-30; 5, 1113b30-a13).  In contemporary law, similar assessments are 
made with respect to drunk driving and other forms of voluntarily diminished capacity, 
where the agent is held responsible for his diminished capacity and the act which follows, 
although not as harshly as he would have been had the harmful act been premeditated.  
An agent’s cognizance of his actions is a double-edged sword in terms of moral 
assessment: While an agent’s cognizance of himself and his circumstances can limit his 
responsibility for his actions, that same cognizance can also be a source of blame when 
an agent fails to be mindful. 
 Mitigating factors, of whatever sort, must be external to the agent in order for the 
agent to receive pardon or reduced blame for harmful or otherwise bad actions; which is 
why we cannot be compelled by any form of desire.  Aristotle defines voluntary action, 
as in the Eudemian Ethics, by reference to an internal principle: “voluntary action seems 
to be what has its principle in the agent himself, knowing the particulars that constitute 
the action” (NE III 1, 1111a22-24).  The internal principle referred to here is most 
certainly an oblique reference to orexis; the reference to knowledge of particulars need 
not assume anything more than sentience and imagination.  As if to confirm our intution, 
Aristotle attacks common sophistical arguments that feelings of pleasure can render an 
action involuntary (NE III 1, 110b10-16).  He argues that if pleasure could compel us, 
everything would be forced. Moreover, someone who suggests that pleasure compels us 
would seem to do so to excuse his shameful actions while at the same time taking credit 
for painful but noble actions.  Pleasure and pain are not external forces confronting an 
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agent.  Likewise, the experience of pleasure and pain is variable agent to agent and 
alterable by alteration of character.   
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I.4.3.4:  Internal Causation and the Scope of the Voluntary 
 
Aristotle’s account of the factors which do and do not exempt an agent from 
praise and blame centers on the nature of the cause of the act: actions which have a 
predominantly internal cause are subject to evaluation; actions which have a 
predominantly external cause are not.  Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure and pain in this 
context is not merely to refute obscure sophistical opinions  or to exonerate hedonism or 
other kinds of weakness.  What pleasure and pain point to are the forces that give rise to 
action within an agent, to the kinds of orexis which in turn derive from our character: 
For presumably, it is not right to say that action caused by 
spirit or appetite is involuntary.  For, first of all, on this 
view none of the other animals will ever act voluntarily; 
nor will children . . . Indeed, we ought both to be angry at 
some things and to have appetite for some things – for 
health and learning, for instance.  Again, what is 
involuntary seems to be painful, whereas what accords with 
appetite seems to be pleasant (NE III 1, 1111a25-34). 
 
Aristotle’s description of action which is hekousios explicitly includes things done by 
both children and animals.  For Aristotle both children and animals act from internal 
principles.  It is nothing unusual to suggest that both animals and children are motivated 
by pleasure, and pleasure stems from desire, which is an intentional though not wholly 
rational capacity on Aristotle’s description.  An adult human agent does not cease to be 
moved by these desires, nor should he be; these orexeis are still human: “non-rational 
feelings seem to be no less human than rational calculation; and so actions resulting from 
spirit or appetite are also proper to a human being,” and for this reason, “It is absurd to 
regard them as involuntary” (NE III 1, 1111b2-3).  The extension of the voluntary to 
cover action generated by an internal principle of desire, even if that desire is not 
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deliberate, likewise extends to the results of the actions.  Aristotle argues both that virtues 
are voluntary and that they are not voluntary in the same way as actions (NE III 5, 
1114b23-25; 1114b30-31).  States of character are voluntary because the actions which 
gave rise to them are voluntary, even if they were not, and in most cases are not, chosen.  
Virtue and vice are up to us because “when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when 
no is up to us, so is yes” (NE III 5 1113b7-9).   
In this light, it is easier to see how we can respond to the objections of Irwin and 
others about the unequivocal attribution of voluntary behavior to animals and children.129
                                                 
129 See section 1.4.1, page 66, above. 
  
In the wide sense, children have many choices to make; whether to eat their vegetables, 
share their toys, etc.  When children make mistakes they are corrected.  They are not 
corrected or punished because they acted with the cognizance of an adult.  They are 
corrected because they are the agent, they are the cause, and if we wish them to act 
differently, to acquire different habits and learn, we must correct them.   Moreover, our 
correction of a child is also aimed at convincing them that what we want them to do is 
what is best for them.  We do not, of course, try to convince a five-year-old that sharing 
his toys is the best thing to do; however, as a child grows older, we do offer them more 
detailed explanations as to value of our advice and admonition.  The acquisition of 
character traits is voluntary insofar as these traits can be otherwise and as we are the ones 
who possess them.  We may, through deficient or abusive upbringing, acquire bad habits 
or traits of character.  This is voluntary not because as children we were vicious and 
turned away from the good but because we are the agents, and we are the ones whose 
actions and desires become directed towards bad ends.  These traits are not set by nature 
and can be changed, but not overnight.  Aristotle uses the example of a sick person whose 
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illness is a result of his lifestyle.  The sick person does not wish to be sick, but by living 
as he does, his sickness follows from the actions he chooses.  The same goes for the non-
virtuous and vicious people.  An agent, having acquired a state of character through many 
acts, cannot discarded a state of character in one act or in one wish.  However, he is still 
able to correct himself by choosing other actions, and over time of acquiring a new state 
of character (NE III, 5 1114a14-22).  Acts and states of character are both voluntary, but 
the former because of the latter, and the latter because directed by an internal principle 
and not necessarily adult cognizance.   
The crux of the matter, as Martha Nussbaum rightly observes, is that in Irwin and 
others’ view “nothing short of full adult prohairesis ever could justify” the “attitudes and 
practices” which link responsibility and moral assessment.130 This in turn assumes that 
“there is at some point in the development of a child a sudden mysterious shift” where the 
child acquires a capacity which he wholly lacked, the capacity to deliberate.131 However, 
on the Aristotelian view, a child is not merely “a creature simply there to be causally 
affected and manipulated,” rather, it is “a creature that responds selectively to its world 
via cognition and orexis, and whose movements are explained by its own view of things, 
its own reachings-out for things as it views them.”132 Something similar could be said for 
many higher-order animals, especially those that are capable of training or complex 
purposive behavior, like dogs, elephants, and dolphins.133
                                                 
130 Nussbaum, Fragility, 284. 
  We are in a poor position to 
account for the praise and blame which we direct towards children unless this is a form of 
communication “to an intelligent creature who acts in accordance with its own view of 
131 Ibid., 285. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Nussbaum, Fragility, 286; see also Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals for an extended 
defense of animal intelligence and agency, especially in the case of dolphins. 
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the good,” however limited.134   There is, therefore, no two-stage, ‘complex’ theory of the 
voluntary. The Aristotelian account of the voluntary attributes a level of intentional 
awareness and attention to children and animals greater than that which Irwin sees them 
capable of exercising.  This has two advantages: 1) we can account for our actual 
educational practices, which include praise, blame, and other forms of communication 
which require intelligence and intention on the part of the immature recipient; 2) we can 
see how adult capacities and character develop from a “natural animal basis” (a basis 
described in detail in Aristotle’s psychological works), rather than mysteriously and 
spontaneously arriving at a certain age.135
 The accounts of the various types and causes of action in Book III of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, though by no means exhaustive, have allowed us to see the 
connection between the theory of action explanation and moral assessment in the Ethics 
and the psychological works, as well as to defend Aristotle’s account against modern  
objections lodged by Irwin, Broadie, Donagan, and others.  They have also allowed us to 
see Aristotle’s expansive notion of responsibility for one’s actions, even under extreme 
circumstances, which is based on his account of the principles of action.  This 
examination puts us in good position to move on to Aristotle’s more specific account of 
human action “par excellence” in his description of prohairesis.
   
136
 
  
 
 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 286. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, 91.  Kenny calls prohairesis the “archē par excellence” of human 
action. 
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I.4.3.5: Deliberation and Prohairesis 
 
I.4.3.5.1: Boulēsis and Bouleusis 
 
 We are now in a position to give an account of the connection between boulēsis, 
prohairesis, and deliberation (bouleusis) in characteristically mature human action, as 
well as to give an account of other forms of human action.  First, we now have a view of 
orexis as an intentional capacity in all of its several forms.  Second, we have seen how 
phantasia is capable of affecting purposive motion in both animals and humans.  Third, 
we have found that Aristotle’s use of the ‘practical syllogism’ is not restricted to cases of 
genuine deliberation but describes the structure of purposive motion in general, even in 
instances without rational thought.  The significance of these points for an understanding 
of prohairesis is threefold.  First, in the next section, we will be able to give a distinctive 
account of boulēsis, the orectic precursor of prohairesis.  We will argue that boulēsis is a 
temporally forward-looking mode of intending, which is concerned in the first instance 
with ends at a certain level of generality and indefiniteness.  We will also argue that is 
possible to have both ‘dispositional’ and ‘occurrent’ kinds of boulēsis.  Second, in section 
I.4.3.5.3, we will be able to give an account of the content and structure of deliberation.  
We will argue that the ends with which we begin deliberation are such that the means 
chosen cause the ends by constituting them as opposed to merely bringing them about 
instrumentally.  Furthermore, this reveals how the end is a formal cause of the means 
chosen. Third, in sections I.4.3.5.3 and I.4.3.7, we will show how the process of 
deliberation leads to action on the basis of the analogy of the practical syllogism.  We 
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will show that the conclusion of practical thinking can be both a choice (prohairesis) and 
an action, or an action without a prohairesis.  We will also show how it is that 
deliberation entails the prohairesis that results (sec. I.4.3.7).  To support this account, we 
will show how prohairesis like boulēsis can have dispositional and occurrent senses, how 
action can arise from sources other than prohairesis, and how action in the absence of 
prohairesis can still be intentional.  We will also address, in section I.4.3.6, how 
prohairesis is a composite capacity according to Aristotle, against the interpretation of 
Alfred Mele.  This will have significance for our account of the intentionality of desire in 
the second part of the dissertation. 
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I.4.3.5.2: The Place of Prohairesis in Aristotle’s Accounts of the Soul and Action 
 
The first issue with which we must deal, as noted above, is the relationship 
between prohairesis and boulēsis in the Nicomachean Ethics.  Adequately understanding 
this relationship will establish the psychological place of prohairesis in the genesis of 
action, which is important because prohairesis is largely unmentioned in the 
psychological works and Aristotle argues conclusively against identifying it with any of 
the three species of orexis he has already named.  Two possibilities that Aristotle rejects 
at the outset of his account in the Nicomachean Ethics are that prohairesis is the same as 
either appetite (epithumia) or spirit (thumos).  This cannot be the case, he argues, 
principally because both of these capacities are shared with brutes and aim at pleasure 
and pain rather than the good.  Likewise, thumos, which leads to anger, is rarely in 
agreement with what is decided (NE III 2, 1111b11-19).  Having eliminated appetite 
(epithumia) and spirit (thumos) as candidates for prohairesis, Aristotle then tackles 
boulēsis or wish.  Boulēsis, or wish, would be a logical candidate to be identified with 
prohairesis, but Aristotle argues that it cannot be.  In the first place, prohairesis cannot 
be boulēsis because boulēsis concerns both the things that we may do as well as the 
actions of others, while prohairesis concerns only our own actions.  Second, boulēsis 
concerns the ends we act for, whereas prohairesis concerns what we do to achieve those 
ends.  Everyone wants to be healthy, however, not everyone decides on those things that 
make one healthy, good diet, exercise, etc.  Likewise, everyone wishes to be happy, but 
not everyone acts in such a way as to be happy.  Happiness is also more than a state of 
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mind or feeling; as an activity it requires external goods, friends, moderate wealth, and 
good fortune, and these are beyond what we can properly control (NE III 2, 1111b23-31). 
Eliminating the various species of orexis as contenders for the role and identity of 
prohairesis, Aristotle finds that the dependence of prohairesis on deliberation (bouleusis) 
is the first clue to unraveling prohairesis’ nature: “perhaps what is decided is what has 
been previously deliberated.  For decision involves reason and thought, and even the 
name itself would seem to indicate that [what is decided, prohaireton] is chosen 
[haireton] before [pro] other things (NE III 2, 1112a15-18)137
                                                 
137 The bracketed interpolations are Irwin’s as they appear in his translation. 
.  Deliberation concerns a 
narrow field of objects.  One does not deliberate about eternal verities, the nature of the 
universe, mathematics, or necessity, likewise one does not deliberate about things that 
arise completely by chance – we cannot deliberate about winning the lottery for instance.  
Rather, one only deliberates on what is achievable through one’s own agency (NE III 3, 
1112a23-31).  Deliberation, unlike wish or belief, is about the same things that our 
actions are about: “We deliberate about what is up to us, that is to say, about the actions 
we can do; and this is what is left.”  We do not deliberate about all human affairs either, 
as Aristotle says that no Spartan, for instance, deliberates about how the Scythians might 
have the best political system,” but “each group of human beings deliberates about the 
actions they themselves can do (NE III 3, 1112a28-29, 33).  What is in our power to alter 
through our own individual actions or those upon whom we have influence or control is 
what we can deliberate about.  Deliberation is context-dependent and changing, in that on 
one occasion we deliberate, as Aristotle says, about money-making and on another 
occasion about medicine, and each time with different results.  We deliberate about 
   107 
beliefs because we are uncertain and what we believe is up to us.  Neither context-
dependence nor uncertainty applies to the sciences (NE III 3, 1112b1-8).   
Deliberation provides the crucial link between prohairesis and the species of 
orexis Aristotle describes in his psychological works.  Among the things within the 
control of human agency, deliberation focuses on means rather than ends, but the end 
must be present first and the end is the object of boulēsis.  Aristotle gives two examples 
concerned with craft to illustrate deliberation.  A doctor, he says, does not deliberate 
about whether to cure a patient but how; likewise, a politician does not deliberate about 
whether to produce a good political order but through which means.  Ends are related to 
deliberation, but as the starting point: “Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine 
the ways and means to achieve it” (NE III 3, 1112b16-17).138
                                                 
138 See Henry Richardson, Practical Reasoning and Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).  Richardson’s book is an extended defense of how we may deliberate about final ends, more or less 
in the Aristotelian way.  Richardson is not sure, however, if Aristotle would have agreed with his own 
position.  He notes the opposing opinions of a number of commentators.  
  The end is the first thing 
considered in deliberation, the decision, as Aristotle says, is the last.  This allows us to 
see now how Aristotle’s etymology of prohairesis is related to his analysis of 
deliberation.  A decision is not given but emerges from deliberation: “What we deliberate 
about is the same as what we decide to do except that by the time we decide to do it, it is 
definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as a result of 
deliberation”  (NE III 3, 1113a3-6).  The temporal end of deliberation, the last thing we 
come to, is the beginning of action, which Aristotle identifies as a prohairesis  (NE III 3, 
1113a6-7).  Deliberation modifies desire and produces prohairesis, which is why 
Aristotle calls it a bouleutikē orexis or “deliberative desire” (NE III 3, 1113a10-13).  
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Decision (prohairesis) proceeds from deliberation (bouleusis) which in turn proceeds 
from wish (boulēsis).   
Boulēsis is distinguished from the other species of orexis by two qualities: 1) it is 
concerned with ends that must be realized at some temporal remove through rational 
deliberation; and 2) such ends are taken to be good by the agent rather than merely 
pleasant.  The other species of orexis, epithumia and thumos, are concerned with bodily, 
sensual pleasures and anger respectively, the cathartic satisfaction of which seems for 
Aristotle to be analogous to the satisfaction of epithumia.  Their objects are temporally 
immediate – the satisfaction of thirst, hunger, sexual arousal or revenge.  Epithumia is a 
species of orexis present in any animal that has orexis, as Aristotle explicitly identifies it 
as present in brutes, as we have seen (see DA III 10, 433b5-12; DM VII, 701a25-
701b1).139
                                                 
139 That boulēsis is a future-oriented desire as opposed to thumos and epithumia seems implied by the 
following passage: “Now appetites (orexeis) may conflict, and this happens wherever reason (logos) and 
desire (epithumia) are opposed, and this occurs in creatures which have a sense of time (for the mind 
advises us to resist with a view to the future, while desire only looks to the present; for what is momentarily 
pleasant seems to be absolutely good and absolutely good because desire (epithumia) cannot look to the 
future).  Thus while that which causes movement is specifically one, viz., the faculty of appetite qua 
appetitive or ultimately the object of appetite (for this though unmoved, causes movement by being though 
or imagined), the things which cause movement are numerically many” (DA III, 10 433b5-12).  Only 
humans possess boulēsis because it is a desire which shares in the rational part of the soul.  See also Alfred 
Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 22.2 (Apr. 1984), 140, for a discussion of 
the appetites and a detailed list of citations.  Unlike Mele, however, I will be emphasizing the temporal 
element in the contrast between boulēsis and the other kinds of orexis.  Ross also notes the future-oriented 
aspect of boulēsis.  Mele notes this about Ross, but does not emphasize it in his own account.  See Ross, 
Aristotle, 5th ed. (London Methuen, 1953), 145; cited in Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish”, 140. 
  Boulēsis, by contrast to these orexeis, is concerned with the future, and this 
comes out in its conflict with epithumia in the akratēs.    Epithumia directs him to the 
consummation of some present desire, while boulēsis directs him to some longer-term 
goal.  The immediate pleasure, when seen in light of epithumia, seems to be really and 
absolutely good to the akratēs; however, the rational element in him points to a real good, 
as seen by the light of boulēsis.  Boulēsis, as opposed to the other species of orexeis, is 
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tentatively located by Aristotle in the rational part of the soul (although it is not entirely 
clear how orexis can be divided), and it is specifically and characteristically human (DA 
III 10 433b5-12; III 9, 432b5).   
The future ends that boulēsis has in view require the exercise of the rational part 
of the soul through deliberation and prohairesis in order to be realized, and they are ends 
such as health or happiness (eudaimonia).  Health, for instance, is a goal or end rather 
than an action and is not realized in one act or one making.  It is not an object of 
prohairesis, as Aristotle says, since we do not choose to be healthy but to walk or 
exercise for the sake of health; walking and exercising are the things prohairesis is 
concerned with (EE II, 10, 1226a7-17; 1227a19).  The good (to agathon) is the “primary 
object” of boulēsis according to Aristotle, as opposed to pleasure which is the object of 
epithumia; however, one’s perception of the good is affected by one’s character.  The 
vicious can mistake the pleasant for the good and so choose the pleasant thinking it is 
good.  Therefore, Aristotle concludes that everyone wishes for what he takes to be good, 
which will be the apparent good.  In the case of the virtuous, the good that they wish for 
will in fact be the real good (NE III 3, 1113a23-b2).140
 The link between boulēsis and character is important because it suggests that we 
have both active and passive boulēseis, which we will call respectively ‘occurent’ and 
‘dispositional’ boulēseis.  Each type of character has its own corresponding view of what 
is good or pleasant.  As Aristotle says at the beginning of NE III, virtues are about 
feelings and actions, and this suggests to Alfred Mele that “the particular virtues and 
  Thus, boulēsis is the orectic 
beginning of deliberation, although, as we will show, it is not the beginning of all thought 
directed toward action.   
                                                 
140 See Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish,” 140, for the “primary object” of boulēsis. 
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vices are, in part, dispositions to have wishes of certain types.”141 We can therefore 
distinguish between the desires we have presently, initiated by some exigency or 
circumstance and those desires which we are disposed to have and actually do have at 
certain times.  The former are ‘occurrent’ desires, they are active and relate a present 
“internal happening” within us, either as sensual desire, anger, or a wish.  The 
‘dispositional’ desires are passive in the sense that we may not now have be moved by 
them or have them in mind, but they are “dispositions to have occorrent desires for things 
of certain types,” and this covers everything from predilections for certain foods or 
certain types of behavior to long term goals; everything that is from epithumia to 
boulēsis.  If we are now asleep, we do not necessarily have our long-term carreer plans in 
mind, but we have not lost them either.  Likewise, if we are in the thrall of one desire, 
like epithumia, we do not cease to have certain kinds of boulēsis, even in the event that 
the actions prompted by epithumia are contrary to what we wish for.142
                                                 
141 Ibid., 142. 
 The opposing 
desires are contrary but not contradictory because they are not of the same kind; it is quite 
possible to possess an epithumia which sees some object as pleasant and at the same time 
to have a boulēsis which sees the same object as bad.  Moreover, because we can possess 
each dispositionally, we are not under contrary affections simultaneously, and we may 
consider each aspect of an object or a situation sequentially without entirely losing the 
previous state of mind or affection.  In the case of wish, this also applies to higher and 
lower-order boulēseis.  While we may now desire to fulfill some academic requirement to 
142 Ibid., p. 147-48.  Mele introduces the notions of ‘occurrent’ and ‘dispositional’ desires.  He also gives 
the example of a sleeping medical student who wishes to be a physician, but does not thereby cease to wish 
to become a doctor.  Based on the previously cited passage from the De Anima on the conflict between 
epithumia and boulēsis, I have added the example of retaining a boulēsis which is contrary to a present 
epithumia. 
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pursue a degree, we need not have in mind the career which we will pursue with that 
degree, and for which we have pursued the degree.  We do not cease to wish for the 
career although we are presently engaged with coursework.143
 The fact that we may possess wishes dispositionally implicates both a feature of 
the ends with which boulēsis is concerned and the overall structure of practical reasoning 
and deliberation.  The ends Aristotle gives as the object of boulēsis are not discrete 
products but more or less well defined descriptions for or labels of states of affairs.  
These are noticeably different from the products which are instrumentally achieved by 
craftsmen, where a discrete product is made by means of certain instruments, materials, 
and skill.  Yet Aristotle frequently invokes the deliberation and activities of craftsmen as 
an analogy for practical deliberation.  David Wiggins notes this discrepancy, observing 
that “It is a commonplace of Aristotelian exegesis that Aristotle never really paused to 
analyze the distinction between two quite distinct relations.”
 
144  The two relations 
conflated are: “(A) the relation x bears to telos y when x will bring about y, and (B) the 
relation x bears to y when the existence of x will itself help to constitute y.”145
                                                 
143 Here, I agree with Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish” 144, against G.E.M. Anscombe, “Thought and Action in 
Aristotle,” in Renford Bambrough, ed., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1965), 155.  Anscombe seems to argue that for Aristotle, we must have our ultimate goal, i.e., 
eupraxia, or doing well, in mind when we do anything.  This seems implausible, and, ironically, Anscombe 
argues in Intention, 2d. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), Chapter 26, that intentions 
closest to action ‘swallow up’ the ones relating to the ultimate goal.  Intentions build on one another, e.g.,  I 
go to class to get a degree to get a job . . . etc. Anscombe is unwilling to apply this to her interpretation of 
Aristotle, however.   
   The 
former corresponds to the instrumental reasoning of craftsmen; the latter seems more 
characteristic of practical reasoning.  As we have seen with Aristotle’s own example of 
144 David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in A.O. Rorty ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 
224; see also Alfred Mele, “Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 19 (Oct. 1981): 410-411, for the distinction between technical and practical deliberation, 
products and actions.  
145 Ibid.; see also Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 177, for a similar analysis  of ‘constituents-
of-ends pattern’. 
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health, the exercise we undertake to be healthy at the same time constitutes health, the 
well-being and functioning of the body.  It may be that Aristotle’s analogy of practical 
and technical reasoning limps considerably or that he operates with a wider notion of 
causality than modern interpreters, as we shall suggest below.  In any case, it is clear to 
Wiggins that for the ends which Aristotle identifies as the objects of boulēsis, the 
“presence of a constituent of the end is always logically relevant” to it, such that it 
“counts as the attainment of that end.”  Happiness for instance is not some third thing 
apart from the activities which constitute it.146
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Ibid.; see also Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 179 for a discussion of health as a general 
end in reference to Metaphysics VII, 1032b6-9 
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I.4.3.5.3: The Results of Deliberation: Action and Prohairesis 
 
Deliberation begins with some end, which is indefinite, and the result of 
deliberation does not follow of necessity from the thing wished for or desired, which is 
why we often involve others and take their counsel (NE III 3, 1112b9-12).  Paradoxically 
it seems, the ends for which we deliberate are not also themselves objects about which we 
deliberate, for As Aristotle says,  
We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes 
ends.  A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about 
whether he will cure, or an orator about whether he will 
persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce 
good order, or any other [expert] about the end . . . Rather, 
we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and 
means to achieve it (NE III 3, 1112b13-17). 
 
This comment and others like it in the ethical works has caused no shortage of 
controversy.147  However, the obtuse formulation need not imply that we have fixed and 
irrevocable goals that we unquestioningly seek to realize over the course of our lives.  
Rather, as David Wiggins argues, “Such ends need not be intrinsically undeliberable ends 
but simply ends held constant for the situation.”148   The idea that we lay or set down 
ends (themenoi in the passage above; keitai in the Eudemian Ethics II 10, 1226b10) 
suggests not so much that the ends are set for us as that we set them ourselves.  As 
Aquinas rightly argues, something can be an end in one respect and a means in another: 
an end for one level of deliberation can be a means to a further end at a higher level.149
                                                 
147 See Henry Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, chapter 1. 
  
This interpretation is supported by the text of the Ethicss: 
148 Wiggins, 226. 
149 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 14, a. 2. 
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If it appears that any of several [possible] means will reach 
it, we examine which of them will reach it most easily and 
most finely; and if only one [possible] means reaches it, we 
examine how that means will reach it, and how the means 
itself is reached, until we come to the first cause, the last 
thing to be discovered.  For a deliberator would seem to 
inquire and analyze in the way described, as though 
analyzing a diagram . . . apparently, all deliberation is 
inquiry, though not all inquiry – in mathematics, for 
instance – is deliberation.  And the last thing [found] in the 
analysis would seem to be the first that comes into being 
(NE III 3, 1112b18-24). 
 
Deliberation appears to resemble syllogistic demonstration, although it is not 
demonstration.  It proceeds in a chain where the conclusion of one piece of practical 
reasoning features as the premise of another.  The first principle of deliberation is 
happiness, the goal that Aristotle lays out in NE I.  This too, however, is not something 
we unreflectively grasp.  We must deliberate about what will count as happiness, and this 
is precisely what Aristotle himself illustrates in the comparisons of the various views on 
happiness and the three lives, culminating in his definition of happiness in NE I, 7.150
 Since deliberation is always the consideration of the means in light of some end 
held fixed, even if only provisionally, we must get some understanding of what ‘means’ 
means; moreover, such an understanding the content and scope of an intention with 
which an action is performed in Aristotle’s action theory. Aristotle himself uses two 
expressions: ta pros ta telē and to pros ton skopon/to telos (see NE III 3, 1112b13, VI 12, 
1144a25, EE II 10, 1226b16).  Both expressions are noticeably ambiguous; they mean 
simply ‘those things that are towards the ends’ or ‘that which is toward the aim/end’.  
Unlike the English word ‘means’ that seems to connote some discrete third thing between 
the agent and his end, usually an instrument, by which the end is accomplished, 
  
                                                 
150 See Wiggins, 227 
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Aristotle’s Greek expressions leave open the relationship between what is chosen and the 
end.151  As we have already seen, the ends identified by Aristotle are usually such as to 
be realized not instrumentally but by acts which themselves constitute the very 
fulfillment of the end, like health and happiness with exercise and contemplation 
respectively.  In both of the ethical works, the things toward the end are ‘directed’ to it 
(sunteinein) (see NE VI 12, 1144a25; EE II 10, 1226b11).  The Greek word sunteinein, 
like so many Greek words involved with choice and action, originally denoted something 
like ‘to grasp with’, as the root word teinein had an original meaning very similar to 
haireisthai.  This is also very similar to words used in English like ‘comprehend’ or 
‘comprehension’, derived from the Latin comprehensio, which also originally meant to 
seize or ‘lay hold of with the hands’.152
 Aristotle nowhere gives an account of how far the scope of prohairesis or 
boulēsis extends.  As we have seen, in the case of the sailors in the storm, Aristotle views 
the jettisoning of cargo as instrumentally intended, even though the sailors are in some 
way compelled to do it, would regret doing it, and would on any other occasion not do it.  
The jettisoning of the cargo is for all practical purposes its destruction, and Aristotle does 
not make a fine point of distinguishing, as some contemporary ethicists might, the 
throwing-overboard from the destruction of the cargo; the former being intended, the 
latter foreseen.  Moreover, his discussion of the effects of ignorance on action suggests 
that consequences beyond those directly intended are or ought to be taken into account in 
  The senses of the preposition pros and the verb 
sunteinō both indicate that what is chosen is that by which the end is comprehended, both 
as understood in the sense of practical reasoning and as realized in the sense of action. 
                                                 
151 See Nussbaum, Fragility, 297. 
152 Lewis and Short A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1879) accessed at www.perseus.tufts.edu, the 
entry for comprehensio; see also Nussbaum, Fragility, 274. 
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terms an agent’s intention and the moral assessment of that agent and his intent.  The 
consideration of consequences is a part of an agent’s intention insofar that agent acts in a 
fully virtuous, rationally deliberate manner; such consideration ought to be part of an 
agent’s intention insofar as an agent’s behavior is not fully virtuous.  Thus, from these 
rather brief and terse vignettes, we can find no firm distinction between the results of a 
means and the means intended.  The Aristotelian concept of ‘means’ has an indefinite 
extension that must it seems always be parsed out in contextual thick descriptions of acts. 
While some like Wiggins argue that Aristotle confuses instrumental with 
constitutive means, the real conceptual confusion or mistake seems to reside in a too-rigid 
contemporary distinction between the two.  The choice of instrument helps to determine 
the realization of the end aimed at and is in some sense a constituent part of the final 
result.  Aristotle’s account of action generation and assessment is holistic: the particulars 
of an act include the agent, his movements, his manner of execution, his knowledge, his 
instruments, the things acted upon, etc., etc.   Aristotle does not isolate one factor, i.e., the 
agent’s intention or prohairesis, as the sole basis for evaluation, although it is the pre-
eminent one.  Circumstances can and must sometimes intervene.  What follows from an 
action, the desired result as well as the side-effect consequences, must be taken into 
account as part of a complete, thick description of the action.  This is where the analogy 
between praxis and technē is instructive: an act is much like a work of art, and its 
constituent parts, including circumstances and consequences, factor into the constitution 
and excellence of the finished product.  Likewise, as a product shows the skill of the 
craftsmen, an act reveals the character as well as the cognizance of an agent.153
                                                 
153 See Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982), 59.  As Dihle rightly emphasizes, Aristotle, like other Greek philosophers, saw questions of choice 
  While 
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prohairesis is the efficient cause, and boulēsis is the final cause, the particulars of the act 
are its material.154
 Returning to deliberation, we must now confront a prima facie conflict between 
the Nicomachean Ethics and the De Motu Animalium on the results of practical thinking, 
that is: whether the results of practical thinking are action or prohairesis, and whether 
either can include the productions of technē.  Aristotle identifies the conclusion of 
deliberation (bouleusis) as a choice (prohairesis), but this is not without some difficulty: 
in the De Motu Animalium the conclusion of a practical syllogism is said to be an action, 
and prohaireseis and actions are said to be distinct.  To begin, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle identifies what is deliberated with what is chosen (bouleuton de kai 
proaireton to auto), except that, as he says, when we choose it is ‘already definite’ 
(aphōrismenon ēdē).  Moreover, he says, “each of us stops inquiring how to act as soon 
as he traces the principle to himself, and within himself to the guiding part; for this is the 
part which decides” (NE III 3, 113a3-7).  Later, he says that “what we decide to do is 
whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and desire to do.”
  Ultimately, however, whether and to what extent any particular 
circumstance or consequence is part of a prohairesis is left indefinite by Aristotle, which 
is perhaps because he thought that such things are themselves indefinite. 
155
                                                                                                                                                 
and decision largely in terms of cognition and intellect rather than later Christian and modern philosophers 
who see choice and decision in terms of volitional stance or attitude: “The decision . . . cannot be grasped . 
. . as an act of will which is independent of the cognition involved.  The definition of intentionality refers in 
both cases to the cognitive achievement of the acting individuals.”  The intention with which the agent acts 
necessarily includes his cognizance and knowledge on this view. 
  This 
154 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 7 a. 1-4.  Aquinas in his rendering of Aristotle’s causes of 
actions does not consider circumstances to be the material cause of an act, strictly speaking; however, he 
does make an analogy between circumstances and material accidents like the whiteness of Socrates.  I draw 
on his interpretation here, although I believe the larger analogies Aristotle makes between praxis and 
technē  as well as his emphasis on the distinction between prudence and science in NE Book VI, 
distinguishing the former from the latter by reference to its non-demonstrative knowledge and use of 
particulars, indicate that we may take particulars to be the material of action. 
155 I have omitted a bracketed word ‘consequently’ from before the phrase ‘desire to do’ which Irwin 
interpolates in his translation. 
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would seem to identify what is from prohairesis with praxis or action.  However, in 
several places, Aristotle distinguishes between prohairesis and praxis and ergon, saying 
that choice distinguishes characters better than acts (see NE III 2, 1111b5-7; EE II 11, 
1228a12-18).  He also allows the akratēs to possess a “decent” (epieikēs) choice despite 
the fact that his actions are against this choice (see NE VII 9, 1151a33-b4; 10, 1152a7-
14). There is a further complication in the De Motu Animalium, where the conclusion of 
the process of that which leads to motion is identified as an action: “the conclusion drawn 
from the premises [of the practical syllogism] become the action (to sumperasma ginetai 
he praxis)”; “the conclusion . . . is an action (to sumperasma . . . praxis estin)”; and we 
are also said to immediately (eutheōs, euthus) do whatever we conclude (DM VII, 
701a12-25).  We must return to the De Motu Animalium to examine these specific 
difficulties. 
 The illustrations of the practical syllogism in the De Motu Animalium are 
instructive for Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the place of prohairesis; however, 
the illustrations also have a wider application to non-deliberative practical thought, as we 
shall examine later.  In the seventh book of the De Motu Animalium, Aristotle gives 
several illustrations to help answer the question of how thought generates movement.  
The first example of what seems to be a deliberate action is “when you conceive that 
every man ought to walk and you yourself are a man, you immediately (eutheōs) walk” 
(DM VII, 701a13-14).  Here, the major premise seems to illustrate a rule, at least as some 
have interpreted it, but Aristotle himself at 701a24-25 says that the premises of this 
reasoning are of the good and the possible.156
                                                 
156 See D.J. Allan, “Aristotle’s Account of the Origin of Moral Principles.”  The idea that the major premise 
presents a rule is the thrust of Allan’s interpretation of the practical syllogism. 
  The major premise, then, is probably 
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shorthand for something like ‘all men should walk or exercise because it is healthy’.  The 
minor premise then, expresses the possible, that is, that it is possible for the man in 
question because he is a man.  The conclusion is the action of walking.  The second 
example of a syllogism changes the major premise to “on a particular occasion no man 
should walk”, and we might assume that the stipulated occasion might be an injury, 
emergency, or even a meal; in any case, the prohibition is a terse expression that some 
good is to be realized or some evil prevented.  The third example is more straightforward: 
the major premise is “I ought to create a good”; the minor premise is “a house is a good”; 
the conclusion is “I immediately create a house” (DM VII, 701a16-18)   This does seem 
far-fetched: while one may start building a house immediately, one does not build a 
house immediately in the same way that walking can be immediately initiated.  The 
fourth and final example goes some way to clear this up.  Here the form is not a simple 
three part argument: the first part of the argument is “I need a covering, and a cloak is a 
covering, I need a cloak”; the second part of the argument is “What I need I ought to 
make; I need a cloak, I ought to make a cloak.”  Aristotle then specifies that “the 
conclusion ‘I ought to make a cloak’ is an action (kai to sumperasma, to himation 
poiēteon, praxis estin)” (DM VII, 701a18-20).  The making of the cloak which is begun 
constitutes the end of the train of practical thought, it is the conclusion.  The major 
premise in each case, although expressed in the imperative, still expresses a good that 
needs to be realized, and the minor premise expresses a condition which constitutes or 
satisfies that good.    
The account from the De Motu Animalium does not seem to resemble 
deliberation, but it is meant to model both deliberative and non-deliberative practical 
   120 
thinking, as well as technical thinking aimed at production.  The examples Aristotle 
chooses to illustrate the practical syllogism seem rather incongruous: on the one hand we 
have a physical movement, walking; on the other, we have complex tasks like weaving 
and carpentry.  Moreover, he seemingly equates the immediate physical movement with 
actions that take multiple physical movements and multiple instances of practical 
reasoning.  This reading, though plausible, misses the larger points of the illustration.  
The path to action proceeds from a desire until we have realized what we must do, 
initiate, or refrain from doing.  For the most part, we reason with an end to doing 
something in the present.  Most attainable long-term goals can be specified such that we 
can plan, schedule or begin the tasks necessary to realize them in the present or the near 
future.  We are moved by a combination of desire for some good and reasoning, which 
includes the knowledge, know-how, and cognizance of circumstances, etc., which will 
allow us to realize the desire.  The reflective person is aware of what he needs to be doing 
to accomplish his goals, even if what he needs to be doing now is waiting.  The analogy 
between practice and theory expressed in the analogy is imperfect because while the 
theoretical syllogism has a necessary and precise conclusion, the practical syllogism 
cannot match the theoretical syllogism either in its necessity or its precision.157
                                                 
157 Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 191-193. 
  It is clear 
that neither cloak-making nor house-building is a simple action, executed like walking.  
Rather, as Martha Nussbaum argues, the agent concludes his reasoning, ‘setting himself’ 
to his goal and the action required for it, and “from now on, he will take whatever steps 
are in his power towards its realization.  What is important is not the propositional 
conclusion, but that the agent embarks on the activity of cloak-making – an activity that 
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may, of course, include further deliberative steps.”158  Action tends to result from our 
thought; it reflects the psychic causes, desires and beliefs, which caused it, unless there is 
some impediment.159
Another thing to notice about the examples that Aristotle uses in his illustration of 
the practical syllogism in the De Motu Animalium is that the verb prattein, normally 
translated as ‘to do’ or ‘to act’, is also used as the verb in the conclusion of the practical 
syllogism.  This is significant because while praxis is taken to denote the sphere of moral 
action distinct from technē, which encompasses things produced, Aristotle does not use 
the root verb of praxis for the narrow purpose of denoting moral as opposed to productive 
actions.  In both of the main treatments of the practical syllogism, the first for thought 
that takes some time to lead to action and the second for action that results quickly 
without deliberation, prattein and even praxis are used to denote both actions and 
productions with no apparent inconsistency signaled by Aristotle.  In the first passage, 
DM VII, 701a6-25, the conclusion of the practical syllogism is said to be an action or 
praxis, and this includes ‘the making of a cloak’ (to himation poiēteon), which is 
identified as an action (praxis estin).  Likewise, in the latter passage on quick action, DM 
VII, 701a25-b1, that “such things as we do (prattomen) without calculation (me 
logisamenoi) we do (prattomen) quickly.”  The verb poiein, to make, is also used to 
describe the same thing.  Only in the last line of this passage does Aristotle distinguish 
making (poiousi) from doing (prattousin), but he introduces this distinction by locating 
these among the movements of things “which desire to act (prattein)”.   Therefore, it is 
clear that prattein and by extension praxis do not always denote action subject to moral 
   
                                                 
158 Ibid., 194-95. 
159 Ibid., 206. 
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evaluation, although they may strictly.  In a wider sense, they can indicate voluntary 
action, not just deliberate action.  This range of meaning is similar to the range of 
meaning of prohairesis, as we shall show below. 
The puzzle we face in trying to determine whether the conclusion of deliberation 
is a choice (prohairesis) or action (praxis) is not insurmountable, nor are the options 
mutually exclusive: The conclusion of a deliberation can be both a prohairesis and an 
action.  They are intelligibly distinct but one in fact.  If we have deliberated effectively, 
then we have reached the point where we have identified what we must do or refrain from 
doing, what we must ‘set’ ourselves to.    The action or course of action which results is 
done with the cognizance that it is to fulfill some wish or end, and it is done in such a 
way that what the agent does is held by him to efficaciously cause or constitute this end. 
The physical movement is caused by the psychological process, the interaction of belief 
and desire.  If the task is complex, the further actions which will come about through 
further deliberation will have reference to the original end and the history of the agent’s 
acts and beliefs about the end and his actions.  Prohairesis seems similar to what 
Anscombe talks about as the “further intention with which” an action is performed; 
however, it is more specific than that.  As Anscombe discusses the ‘further intention with 
which’ an action is performed, it comprehends the end or goal of the action, the purpose 
the agent gives or would give for his action if asked.160
                                                 
160 Anscombe, Intention, 24; see also Roger Teichman, The Philosophy of G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 43-44. 
  Prohairesis surely does have 
reference to an end, as Aristotle says in numerous places, but prohairesis comprehends 
more than the end.  The ‘choice’ of an action is also that intention which informs the 
performance of the action itself, the awareness and the cognizance, and we might even 
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add the expertise, that is the basis for the execution of the action itself.   It is, as Alfred 
Mele aptly calls it, the “proximate efficient cause of action,” the nearest intention which 
moves the agent.161
The proximity to action is the key feature which differentiates prohairesis from 
boulēsis.   As Aristotle says: “The principle of an action – the source of motion, not the 
goal – is decision; the principle of decision is desire and goal-directed reason” (NE VI 2, 
1139a31-32).  Here we have a precise description of prohairesis in terms from Aristotle’s 
larger philosophical framework.   The ‘source of motion’ is the moving or efficient cause 
in Aristotle’s list of the four causes from the Physics.   This he emphatically distinguishes 
from the goal or ‘the for the sake of which’ (to hou heneka), which is the final cause.  
Thus, boulēsis or wish is the final cause of an act, since it is concerned with the end for 
which we act; prohairesis is the moving cause of the act.  As such, prohairesis is 
intimately and immediately involved in bring an action forth, in its execution and 
performance, while boulēsis is farther removed, mediated by deliberation about the 
particular circumstances an agent finds himself in.  Boulēsis is first in the order of 
thought and also in the order of actuality, since we begin any action thinking about what 
it is that we have to do or achieve and the action is completed in the achievement of the 
end.  Prohairesis is last in the order of our thinking and in the order of actuality because 
it is the last thing we arrive at in our reasoning and it is dependent upon the end; the 
  A prohairesis, in the main sense that Aristotle speaks of it, is the 
result of a stable character, virtues and vices, which comprehends both the purpose and 
the manner of an action.  We must remember that not all deliberations end fruitfully in 
choice and action and not all actions are the result of deliberation and choice (EE II 10, 
1226b14-25; NE III, 2, 1111b8-11).  
                                                 
161 Mele, “Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” 405. 
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action is only decided upon because of the end.  However, prohairesis is prior to the end 
for which we act in the order of its realization, in the order of time, because it is only 
through the action that the end is achieved or realized.  Thought concerned with an end, 
as distinct from thought in general which includes the sciences, is both the principle of 
action and production; thought presents the goal, and human beings are capable through 
thought, through the use of the intellect, to form conceptions of the ends for which they 
act over and above the perceptions of pleasure, which animals are capable of through 
sense, imagination, and desire.  So, Aristotle concludes, “That is why decision is either 
understanding combined with desire (orektikos nous) or desire combined with thought 
(orexis dianoētikē); and this is the sort of principle that a human being is” (NE VI 2, 
1139a35-b6).  Specifically human action proceeds from the essence of humanity, which 
is rational animality.  The efficient cause of a thing follows from its form or essence.  
Human beings are beings with this composite and mixed nature, rational and desiring 
beings.  The principle of our actions will thus also be composite.  As we shall 
demonstrate below, prohairesis is just such a composite cause of human actions.162
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 I conclude that prohairesis is a composite entity, contra Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish,” 151-55, because here, 
as elsewhere, Aristotle describes it as such.  He is quite loath in the De Anima to hypostatize capacities of 
the soul, and even where he tentatively announces divisions, he also allows that different parts of the soul 
are present in one another (see DA III 9, 432b3-7).  We will examine this further below. 
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I.4.3.6: Prohairesis as a Composite Mental State or Capacity163
 
 
Prohairesis’ composite nature is of considerable importance for contemporary 
debates about the roles of and relationship between desire and intention.  As we shall 
examine at greater length in the second part of the dissertation, many contemporary 
philosophers involved in the debate surrounding the Simple View wish to strictly separate 
desire from intention.  Mele, whom we have already cited, has made contributions both to 
Aristotelian exegesis and to the contemporary discussion of desire and intention.  He also 
makes a rather unusual claim that prohairesis is not in fact a composite faculty.  We 
pause here to examine the claim, its merits, and the consequences of its acceptance or 
rejection.  We will argue that prohairesis is in fact a composite of orexis and nous, or 
desire and reason, joined in the process of deliberation. 
At the conclusion of his article “Aristotle’s Wish,” Mele argues that there are 
three possible ways of relating prohairesis to orexis: 1) “Choice is a compound 
phenomenon having wish as a constituent”; 2) “Choices are caused by deliberation 
engaged with a view to a wished for end, but they are not even in part wishes or desires 
of any sort”; and 3) “Choice is, in part, a desire, but the orectic element in a choice is not 
meant to be a desire of any of Aristotle’s three types.”164
                                                 
163 I hesitate to use the phrase ‘mental state’ so common in contemporary philosophy of mind, since for 
Aristotle a state is a hexis or disposition, especially of character.  Aristotle speaks of the kinds of orexis and 
prohairesis in terms of capacities and activities, active powers; whereas state connotes something passive 
and inert.    
  Noting that Aristotle never 
makes a definite statement on the relationship of prohairesis to the types of orexis and 
that there are strong textual considerations – like the ones we have already cited – in 
164 Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish,” 152-54; J. Burnet, Ethics of Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1900), 132; cited in 
Mele, “Aristotle’s Wish,” 152. 
   126 
support of the first thesis, as well as important support among various interpreters of 
Aristotle, especially Burnet, Mele states that he is inclined to choose the second or third 
options over the first.165  Why he is inclined to choose these options is not immediately 
clear, nor does Mele argue for them beyond stating his preference.  However, in light of 
Mele’s other work, which is centered on defending intention and intending as  “non-
compound attitudes” which do not have any other kind of attitude as a part, as well as his 
emphasis in the conclusion of the article on prohairesis as the source of Aristotelian 
autonomy, we can make some hypotheses.166  In his wider work, Mele argues that if 
intention is a composite entity, it is reducible to its component parts.167  Applying this to 
Aristotle, Mele would find the composite nature of prohairesis problematic because, for 
him, that would make it reducible to desire or orexis and thought.  We might further 
surmise that, as many contemporary philosophers do, Mele makes little distinction 
between belief and knowledge, the latter merely being a justified version of the former, 
which would make the rational component of prohairesis the equivalent of justified true 
belief.  Since Mele feels that prohairesis is a type of intention, it seems that we can infer 
that he believes prohairesis cannot be composite since it could not then fulfill its action-
causing role.168
While we will examine Mele’s larger claims more thoroughly in the second part 
of the dissertation, we are at the moment able at least to eliminate the interpretative 
options that he prefers with respect to the psychological place of prohairesis.  First, 
Aristotle explicitly describes prohairesis as a composite entity: it is either a bouleutikē 
 
                                                 
165 Ibid., 154. 
166 Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 138. 
167 Mele, Motivation and Ageny, 135; Springs of Action: Understanding intentional behavior (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 54-56. 
168 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 135. 
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orexis, orexis dianoētikē, or orektikos noûs (NE III 1113a10-13; VI 2 1139b4-5). Second, 
we may eliminate the second interpretative option because, as we have seen in the De 
Anima and De Motu Animalium, desire is the psychological cause of motion; without 
desire, thought moves nothing.  Third, we may eliminate the third interpretative option 
because in no work does Aristotle name another kind of desire than the three he 
specifically names, epithumia, thumos, and boulēsis, and this tripartite division of desire, 
as we have seen, is consistent between the ethical and psychological works.  Ultimately, 
however, there are two more fundamental objections we must make to Mele’s 
interpretative suggestions.  First, we must object to the possibility of action in the absence 
of desire.  Mele’s own theory of intention allows for precisely this possibility, and this 
seems to motivate his interpretation of Aristotle.169
 
  However, in an Aristotelian 
framework, action without desire would be inexplicable.  Second, we must object to the 
notion, expressed not in “Aristotle’s Wish,” but in Mele’s and other contemporary 
philosophers' works, that composition entails reducibility.  Or, more specifically, we must 
reject the notion that conceptual composition entails actual psychological reducibility.  
The single entity, prohairesis, may have orectic as well as rational parts, but it exists as a 
distinct psychological cause in its own right.  Elsewhere, in Book I, chapter 13 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics and Book III, chapter 9 of De Anima, Aristotle feels no  
compunction in allowing different psychological powers to overlap: all talk of distinct 
and separable parts of the soul is in some sense equivocal (NE I 13, 1102a27-30; 
1102b15-25; DA III 9, 432b3-7).  We will take these fundamental issues up again in the 
second part of the dissertation.   
                                                 
169 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 170-71. 
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I.4.3.7:  How Prohairesis Follows from Practical Reasoning 
 
We must return now to the etiology of prohairesis, specifically the manner in 
which it follows from practical reasoning.  The logic by which a prohairesis is entailed 
by the process of deliberation has been a matter of some controversy.  As we have seen, 
the analogy of the practical syllogism is used for both deliberate and non-deliberate 
action, and it applies to animals as well.  Some argue that the practical syllogism is a 
model of psychological causality; others, that is an unsatisfactory account of 
deontological entailment; others still argue that it is both logical and causal.170
                                                 
170 Nussbaum occupies the first and third of these positions: the first position in her older work, Aristotle’s 
De Motu Animalium; the second in her later work, The Fragility of Goodness.  D.J. Allan, “Aristotle’s 
account of the Origin of Moral Principles,” takes a deontological view of the practical syllogism, which has 
spawned numerous criticism (see Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reasoning,” and Mele, “Choice 
and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics”).  Anscombe while not taking a deontological view fails to see how 
the practical syllogism entails any action.  R.D. Milo, in Aristotle on Practical Knowledge and Weakness of 
Will (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), 51, argues that we are “psychologically constrained.” I am indebted to 
Alexander Broadie, “Aristotle on Rational Action”, Phronesis 19 (1974): 73, for this citation. 
  
Aristotle’s illustrations of the analogy in the De Motu Animalium suggest that it does 
have a causal element, since the analogy is used to illustrate motion in the absence of 
rational thought.  However, it seems also to have a logical element because it also mirrors 
the structure of rational deliberation.  Some light may be shed on this by examining the 
nature of the theoretical syllogism itself.  Alexander Broadie in his article “Aristotle on 
Rational Action,” notes that Aristotle explains the relationship between the premises and 
the conclusions of syllogisms in two ways.  In the Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b20-35 and 
II 11, 94a20-24, the premises are said to give rise to and entail the conclusion through the 
essential or formal cause.  In the Physics II 3, 195a15-20, the premises are described as 
‘as that from which’ the conclusion arises, which is the usual descriptive phrase of 
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material causality.171  In one way, that of the Analytics, the premises “provide the 
explanatory principle, namely, the middle term, and the conclusion must be regarded as 
the matter that is structured by the premises.”172 Formal causality figures here because it 
is the essence or form, the definition of which contains and universally distributes the 
middle term and figures as a premise, which allows scientific knowledge to be produced 
by the syllogism.  In a different way, that of the Physics, Aristotle seems to discuss the 
component terms of the syllogisms, for instance ‘mortal’ and ‘man’, as the building 
blocks out of which the conclusion, e.g., ‘Socrates is mortal’, is generated.  The subject 
and predicate terms are “considered not as judgments but as elements in the world” which 
build the conclusion.173 Broadie wishes to draw the larger conclusion that the mode of 
demonstration in the Analytics gives us the order of knowing, the conclusion there stems 
from knowledge of the essence or form, while the description in the Physics gives us the 
order of being, the conclusion stems from the ‘real’ elements out there in the world.174
We do not need to endorse the conclusion that Aristotle is distinguishing between 
the order of knowing and the order of being with these comparisons to affirm the 
importance of the difference in descriptive language in both works.  The primary problem 
with Broadie’s interpretation is that the elements to which he refers in the Physics are not 
ontologically basic.  As Aristotle affirms in the Metaphysics, the most ontologically basic 
elements of reality are substances, ‘substance’ being primarily the essence or form, 
because it is the principle of actuality which causes any individual to be what it is.  
Likewise, the essence is the medium of demonstration such that the demonstration 
   
                                                 
171 A. Broadie, “Aristotle on Rational Action,” 76. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid., 77 
174 Ibid., 77-80. 
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replicates the order of being, the order of actuality.  In Aristotelian science, especially as 
discussed in the first book of the Metaphysics and Book II, chapter 19 of the Posterior 
Analytics, the order of knowing corresponds to the inductive process, the acquisition of 
universals through sensation, experience and intellect.  The order of knowing is not 
exhibited in the demonstration; rather demonstration starts from the first principles, the 
last things grasped in the order of knowing.  The conclusion of a demonstration is usually 
considered to be the first thing in the order of being.  Be that as it may, we can see the 
point in speaking of the premises as the material from which the conclusion is generated.  
The premises are the constituent parts of the linguistic argument used to signify a 
demonstration, and the end of such a demonstration is the knowledge exhibited in the 
conclusion.175
                                                 
175 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, The Loeb Classical Library: Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, vol. 2, 
trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). See also Nussbaum, Aristotle’s 
‘De Motu Animalium’, p. 186, for a description of the syllogism as a linguistic device. 
  The linguistic premises are that from which the conclusion is made; what 
the premises represent, however, are the formal and essential causes of the conclusion.  In 
practical thought, as Broadie rightly argues, the conclusion of a practical syllogism, a 
choice in the case of deliberation, does make the premises with which we began our 
thinking definite in two ways.  First, the action or choice fixes our desires and beliefs in a 
definite relation, it unifies and commits us to them as the end (see also NE III 3,1113a3-
7).  Second, and most importantly, the action or choice is like matter informed by our 
ends, beliefs and desires.  Our ends and desires are non-specific and the choice or act 
individuates them in the moment of action, just as matter is the principle of individuation.  
In this second sense, the act or choice constitutes our ends and desires.  Likewise, the 
causality by which the choice is generated by our desires is analogous to the logical 
entailment of the syllogism.  Assuming we have desires and beliefs of such-and-such a 
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sort, an action of such-and-such a sort follows; Nussbaum calls this “hypothetical 
necessity.”176
In conclusion, we have moved a step closer in our identification and description 
of Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis by analyzing its origin and the process of its 
development, although more work remains.  First, we have shown how boulēsis 
characteristically intends ends of a general sort, whose satisfaction is carried out by 
means which are not wholly instrumental or external but rather constitutive of them.  
Second, we have show how we may have both dispositional and occurrent boulēseis, 
which explains how we may retain a wish that we are not presently acting on.  Third, we 
have shown how the conclusion of a piece of deliberation can be both a prohairesis and 
  We must remember, too, that the practical syllogism is an analogy: 
practical thought does not involve actual scientific or demonstrative syllogisms; the 
conclusions of practical thought are not necessary or certain.  Likewise, as we have 
shown above, Aristotle also uses the practical syllogism to describe the broad range of 
animal behavior, which includes brutes.  As Aristotle says in the Physics, the formal, 
final, and efficient causes usually coincide in fact, although they are intelligibly distinct.  
Like orexis, prohairesis is described as an efficient or moving cause; however, in another 
sense, prohairesis is obviously the end or telos of deliberation as a process, in the sense 
that it is the culmination.   Aristotle is happy with this kind of ambiguity both in Ethics 
and psychology; however, these relationships are obviously not mutually exclusive, and 
we must keep them in mind.  Pace Wiggins, Aristotle does not necessarily conflate two 
types of causality; rather, the means/end formulation of the causality of prohairesis is 
consistent with the senses of ‘cause’ in Aristotle’s philosophy. 
                                                 
176 See Nussbaum, Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium’, 177-79, for a discussion of ‘hypothetical necessity’ 
linked to Metaphysics Δ  4, 1015a20. 
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an action, as prohairesis is the proximate cause or intention by which and with which the 
action is performed. Fourth and finally, we have examined the process and structure of 
deliberation and shown that it is both a causal and logical explanation of how action or 
movement is caused by desire.   
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I.4.3.8 Kinds of Prohairesis and Other Intentions 
 
We have come nearly to the end of our investigation of prohairesis in Aristotle, 
and have given an account of its genesis and relation to action.  However, one key 
relationship remains to be examined, and that is the reciprocal relationship between 
prohairesis and character.  Prohairesis is the imprint of character on action, as Aristotle 
calls virtue of character as a hexis prohairetikē or a “state that decides” (NE II 6, 
1107a1).  We will argue that Aristotle differentiates types of prohairesis by types of 
character, and this differentiation applies not just to its moral evaluation but also to its 
efficacy and relation to action.  Aristotle emphasizes virtue’s role in shaping ends which 
explains virtue’s effect on prohairesis.  Likewise, he distinguishes virtue and true 
deliberation from cleverness and mere calculation, attributing prohairesis to the former 
pair and not to the latter.  We will show that, like boulēsis, prohairesis has both 
dispositional and occurrent modes.  This is illustrated by Aristotle’s account of the 
prohairesis of the akratēs, or incontinent man.  We will show how Aristotle’s account of 
incontinence or akrasia has two parts: one is an account of a particular kind of ignorance, 
the other is an account of action generated by epithumia.  In both cases, deliberation is 
short-circuited by a type of orexis.  In spite of the fact that the incontinent either fails to 
act on his deliberation or fails to deliberate at all, Aristotle says that he possesses a decent 
choice, and this will be where a dispositional sense of prohairesis will be indispensable 
to an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of incontinence. 
 Aristotle’s account of the relationship between prohairesis and character is also of 
wider significance for theories of intention and intentional action.  The differentiation of 
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different types of prohairesis and the influence of other types of orexis upon human 
action illustrate the wide range of intentionality in action.  The relationship between 
intention and intentional action is at once straight-forward and frustratingly complicated.  
From an Aristotelian standpoint, every intentional action is intended; however the manner 
in which it is intended can vary considerably.  Some actions are intended after rational 
deliberation; some are intended impulsively; and still others are premeditated but driven 
more by lower-order, unreflective and unreflected-upon desires than by rational, 
deliberate desires.  The interaction between different types of desire and different levels 
of intentionality produces different types of intentional action.  An Aristotelian account 
describes the indefinite range of human intentions, from the most rational, deliberate, and 
conceptualized to the most basic, impulsive and brute without reducing the latter to the 
former or excluding the latter because they do not resemble the former.  As we shall see 
in the second part of the dissertation, such an account of the range and quality of 
intention will allow us to tackle a number of problems in contemporary action theory. 
Aristotle’s discussion of prudence in Book VI is crucial to understanding the 
relationship between character and action.  Prudence is no mere crass reckoning of any 
means to any end one likes; prudence involves an intelligent grasp of the true human 
good as well as the proper means to achieve it.  This grasp is in some ways ‘universal’ or 
general, as Aristotle’s discussion of the prudent man and comprehension reveals, but it is 
also inescapably linked to the successful choice of particular means, to excellence in 
execution not just design.  This is brought out in his discussion of good deliberation 
(euboulia), which is contrasted with mere calculation (logistikē) as well as the distinction 
between prudence and cleverness.  Good deliberation is not merely calculation in view of 
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achieving and end; it is calculation proceeding from a correct understanding of the 
correct end of human life.  Likewise, while prudence requires a native practical 
intelligence, i.e., cleverness, it is more than cleverness.  Cleverness is an ability to 
achieve an end to which one sets oneself; however, prudence is the acquired knowledge 
of how to achieve the proper human end (NE VI 9, 1142a30-b33; 12, 1144a25-b1).177  
What Aristotle’s treatment also suggests is that other character types, namely the 
continent and incontinent, may possess these skills without having them sufficiently for 
prudence or, as we shall see, for a true prohairesis.  While the virtuous and vicious begin 
their practical thinking from fixed dispositions and conceptions of the good, and choose 
on the basis of a deliberation from those conceptions, the continent and incontinent have 
inconstant dispositions, more or less prone to being overcome by pains or pleasures about 
certain objects.  An incontinent person may be effective in acquiring the object of that 
strong transient desire -- he might be quite clever and calculative and in ordinary English 
we would even say deliberate.  Yet Aristotle wishes to distinguish this kind of calculation 
from the good deliberation of the prudent person.178
Deliberation must be distinguished not only from mere clever calculation but also 
from other forms of thought directed to action, since there are some character types who 
either fail to deliberate or abandon their deliberation.  Following his account of prudence, 
   
                                                 
177 See Daniel T. Devereux, “Particular and Universal in Aristotle’s Conception of Practical Knowledge,” 
Review of Metaphysics, 39:3 (Mar. 1986): 483-504, especially: “Practical wisdom, in Aristotle’s view, is 
not a practical science like medicine or rhetoric; it is more like medical or rhetorical skill: it is an instance 
of practical knowledge,” 497. 
178 The fact that some character types are not capable of true prohairesis is explicitly stated in the 
Eudemian Ethics: “Therefore the faculty of purposive choice is not present in the other animals, nor in man 
at every age nor in every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation, nor yet the concept of cause.”  
Many men, Aristotle argues, are capable of forming opinions about action, even their own prospective 
actions, whether to do this or that, but they have this doxastic ability “without also having the power of 
forming this opinion by process of reasoning” (EE II 10, 1226b14-25).   
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Aristotle examines the deviations from virtue, and spends the most time on akrasia or 
incontinence, which presents several important problems to an account of human action 
that must be overcome. In contrast to the virtuous and continent, the incontinent person 
seems to abandon his rational calculation because of feeling (NE VII 1, 11145b9-14).  
This observation, however, must meet an immediate challenge: Socrates denied that there 
was any such thing as incontinence “for no one . . . supposes while he acts that his action 
conflicts with what is best; our action only conflicts with what is best because we are 
ignorant” (NE VII 2, 1145b21-27).  Aristotle conclusively rejects Socrates’ denial of the 
existence of incontinence, but he does not reject the premise that the incontinent person 
must be ignorant, in a certain way (NE VII, 2, 1145b28-31).  The clarification of akratic 
ignorance will serve to answer Socrates’ objection and give a clear account of akrasia, 
and in so doing it will also serve to delineate the various types and levels of intentionality 
in human action apart from fully rational, deliberate desires and actions. 
 Following a dialectical digression into opinions about continence and 
incontinence, Aristotle’s first constructive remarks about incontinence immediately relate 
his discussion of deliberation and prohairesis to an account of knowledge and ignorance. 
Incontinence and intemperance concern the same range of actions, but they differ in that 
“the intemperate person acts on decision when he is led on, since he thinks it is right in 
every case to pursue the pleasant thing at hand; the incontinent person, however, thinks it 
is wrong to pursue the pleasant thing, yet still pursues it” (NE VII 3, 1146b19-24).  The 
intemperate person’s actions in the pursuit of pleasure spring from his decision and 
ultimately from the set disposition of his character, while the incontinent person acts in 
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spite of or without his decision, against what he considers to be good.  So how is it that 
the incontinent person knows what is good? 
 The paradox here seems to result from the ambiguity surrounding the knowledge 
that the incontinent person has.  As we have already seen, Aristotle claims that someone 
may be said to know something in at least two ways.  In the first way, one possesses 
knowledge which one is also using or uses at the appropriate time; in the second way, one 
possesses knowledge which one is not using or does not use at the appropriate time.  To 
possess (echein) knowledge does not require us to use (chrēsthai) it or to attend 
(theōrein) to it (NE VII 3, 1146b32-33).179
 Aristotle seems to be relying here on a distinction he makes in many places, that 
is, the distinction between act and potency, in this case, with respect to knowledge. In the 
Metaphysics Book Θ, chapter 3, Aristotle argues against the Megarians who insist that a 
  Among those who possess but do not use 
their knowledge Aristotle includes those who are insane, drunk, asleep or who are 
affected by strong passions (NE VII 3, 1147a10-19).  In these cases, one may be said to 
have knowledge but also, in some way, not to have it (echein kai pōs mē echein) (NE VII 
3, 1147a14).  Incontinence falls within this class of ignorance because it results from the 
effects of strong feelings: “For spirited reactions, sexual appetites, and some conditions 
of this sort clearly disturb the body as well, and even produce fits of madness in some 
people.  Clearly, then, we should say that they have knowledge in a way similar to these 
people” (NE VII 3, 1147a10-18). 
                                                 
179 I will be offering an account of akrasia that suggests the akratic is overcome by non-rational desires.  
This is in line with Aristotle’s comparison of akrasia to epilepsy as well as most interpreters, from Aquinas 
to the present.  For alternative views which argue for “clear-headed” incontinence, see S. Broadie, Ethics 
with Aristotle, 292-297; Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action, 117-32.  For a discussion of the 
importance of the verbs theorein and chrēsthai in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, see S. Broadie, ibid., 295; 
footnote 24, 310.  In my opinion, clear-headed incontinence would simply be vice. 
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potency only exists when it is in act.  Thus, according to the Megarians, “he who is not 
building is not able to build, but he can build only when he is building and similarly with 
others” (Meta. Θ 3, 1046b31-32).180  The refutation of this position, according to 
Aristotle, is obvious.  Under the Megarian theory, learning or forgetting would be 
impossible, and if the builder ceased building he would never be able to build again, he 
being unable to learn the necessary art; likewise it would be impossible to acquire the art 
in the first place, and therefore he could never build.  This applies to any potency, and not 
just knowledge and art: no thing would be able to change from the state it is currently in 
because it would only have the potency to be what it is now (Meta. Θ 3, 1047a2-7).  In 
the case of knowledge or art, Aristotle observes that we may lose what we have learned 
“either through forgetfulness or through some affection or through lapse of time” (Meta. 
Θ 3, 1046b35-1047a2).181
                                                 
180 I use Apostle’s translation for the citations from Metaphysics Θ 3 for its clarity.  See Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, trans. H. G. Apostle, (Grinnell, Iowa: Peripatetic Press, 1979). 
  Since the incontinent suffers from inordinate passions, it 
seems safe to say that he has whatever ethical knowledge he has relevant to his present 
predicament in a potential way.  Even granting that one possesses knowledge, of 
whatever sort, it does not follow that knowledge is actualized at every moment or even 
the right moment.  With respect to ethical knowledge, it seems quite possible to have a 
potential grasp of what is good, without that knowledge being actual or, in other words, 
without attending to that knowledge in the moment of action.  Aristotle’s account runs 
contrary to what we might call a behaviorist account of ethical knowledge, where 
knowledge is not only exhibited in an ethical performance but is nothing other than the 
tendency to perform acts at certain times in a certain way.  While ethical knowledge, like 
any kind of knowledge, is exhibited in one’s actions or performances, it does not follow 
181 I have here used the Apostle translation for the English and the Loeb for the Greek. 
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that it is nothing other than those acts or tendencies to act; cognizance and skill are 
involved.   Passion seems to disable the incontinent agent’s weak dispositional ethical 
potentials and the commitments he has in the absence of pleasure. 
 The distinction between actual and potential kinds of knowing is complemented 
by a distinction between the kinds of things one might be said to know.  This is similar to 
Aristotle’s treatment of knowledge in many places.  Even supposing that we have the 
knowledge relevant to a particular situation, it does not follow that we recognize the 
particular individual or case as falling under that knowledge.182
Perhaps, for instance, someone knows that dry things 
benefit every human being, and that he himself is a human 
being, or that this sort of thing is dry; but he either does not 
have or does not activate the knowledge that this particular 
thing is of this sort.  These ways [of knowing and not 
knowing], then, make such a remarkable difference that it 
seems quite intelligible to have the one sort of knowledge, 
but astounding if he has the other sort (NE VII 3, 1147a1-
9). 
 In demonstration and, by 
analogy, practical thinking, there are two kinds of premises: universal and particular.  
One’s actions might conflict with knowledge of a particular premise, e.g., that some item 
of food is in fact of an unhealthy type, but be in line with knowledge of a universal 
premise. This type of mistake is not trivial because “it is particulars that are achievable in 
action”, and the particular is the object of prohairesis, since prohairesis, as we have seen, 
is always a choice of a this.  Aristotle gives an example from Greek dietary prescriptions: 
 
If we reconstruct this passage in terms of a syllogism, we see that the universal premise 
would be something like ‘All dry foods are good for human beings’ and the agent already 
knows that he is a human being.  Further unstated premises seem to be that the agent is 
                                                 
182 See Post. An. I 1, 71a12-28, for precisely this example.  There Aristotle contrasts knowledge of the 
properties of a triangle with the recognition of a particular instance of a triangle.   
   140 
also hungry and also in an appropriate situation to eat, having the appropriate time and 
means to do so.  The particular premise of this syllogism would state ‘This thing here is a 
dry food’.  It does not seem problematic that the agent might know all dry foods are good 
and not know that this particular food is dry.  His abstention from eating this particular 
food would be entirely explicable in terms of this kind of ignorance.  However, it would 
be fairly astounding, all things being equal, for the agent both to know dry foods are good 
and that this is a dry food and then not eat it, given an appropriate desire to eat and the 
means to do so. 
   The argument above seems only to make epistemological room for what is 
Aristotle’s main psychological account of incontinence, which involves the disabling of 
the major, universal premise.  So he returns to his first distinction between actual and 
potential kinds of knowing, and speaks of cases of “having without using.”  As we have 
seen, this type of ignorance includes insanity, sleep, and drunkenness because people in 
these conditions have potential knowledge without using it.  Incontinence is most similar 
to these kinds of ignorance because incontinence results from the effects of strong 
feelings (NE VII 3, 1147a10-18).  Merely reciting ethical prescriptions is no sign of the 
possession of real ethical knowledge, which is virtue.  Aristotle’s example is that of 
people who can recite mathematical, geometrical or scientific demonstrations, verses of 
poetry or philosophy when affected by madness, drunkenness, or even, perhaps, in their 
sleep.  Likewise, students just learning a subject may successfully parrot their teachers, 
especially in the use of words, but this is not the same as possessing the full disposition 
which true knowledge entails “for it must grow into them, and this takes time.”  
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Therefore, “we must suppose that those who are acting incontinently also say the words 
in the way that actors do” (NE VII 3, 1147a19-23). 
 The effect of the passionate desires, particularly epithumia, can be more insidious 
but less crippling on one’s practical reasoning than madness or drunkenness: We can 
attend to a universal but have it replaced. Knowledge which was in act can be lowered to 
mere potency by the power of the irrational passions.  Aristotle describes this happening 
in the following way: 
Suppose, then, that someone has the universal belief 
hindering him from tasting; he has the second belief, that 
everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and this 
belief is active; but it turns out that appetite is present in 
him.  The belief, then [that is formed from the previous two 
beliefs] tells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, 
since it is capable of moving each of the bodily parts (NE 
VII 3, 1147a32-35). 
 
Appetite, by itself, as in the case of animals or children, is capable of being a motive 
force.  The person under the influence of appetite does not conclude via rational 
deliberation that he should eat sweets; rather, he acts on the basis of appetite.  The 
appetite does not alter the original belief he may hold prior to its influence; it replaces it.  
Although the sweet thing involved in this particular choice may be harmful, its sweetness 
is still pleasant, and under that description it seems good.  Appetite forces the original 
belief about the goodness or badness of sweets out, and makes the pleasure of the sweet 
thing the guiding light of the agent.  Thus, the interaction of reason and belief can explain 
incontinence.   
The two beliefs about the sweet thing are not in themselves contrary: one makes 
an assertion about its badness in a deliberate, rational sense; the other, about its 
pleasantness.  The second belief, therefore, as Aristotle concludes, is contrary to reason 
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only when it also coincides with an appetite contrary to boulēsis or reason.  It is the 
appetite which is contrary to the original, correct belief in its own right.  And this is why 
Aristotle argues that beasts cannot be incontinent, because there is no conflict between 
appetite and a universal supposition, like a rational belief.  Animals only have the 
appearance of things and memory of particulars, especially pleasure and pain; whereas 
human beings have the ability to make rational judgments about the goodness or badness 
of things in relation to their ultimate end and not simply on the basis of pleasure and pain 
(NE VII 3, 1147b1-5).  Ultimately, since the incontinent person does not seem to know 
the relevant particulars or see them in light of the correct supposition on the basis of a 
strong appetite, Socrates’ position about error arising from ignorance seems to be true in 
a qualified sense, “For the knowledge that is present when someone is affected by 
incontinence, and that is dragged about because he is affected, is not the sort that seems 
to be fully knowledge, but it is only perceptual knowledge” (NE VII 3, 1147b14-18). 
We need to note here that Aristotle’s main account of incontinence does not 
resolve simply into an ignorance of particulars.  Although the structure of his argument is 
rather confusing, he speaks of the influence of epithumia replacing the major premise of a 
practical syllogism as well as its effect on our perception of the particulars under that 
major premise.  This is distinct from his earlier argument about universal and particular 
knowledge and ignorance because here the particular premise is neither changed by 
desire nor simply unknown to the agent.  The incontinent has his original major premise 
knocked out and replaced by a new one which re-characterizes the same minor premise 
and the particular information represented by it.  As such, the action proceeds not from 
boulēsis, which is represented by the original major premise hindering the incontinent 
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from tasting the sweet thing, but from epithumia.  The action is not deliberate, yet it 
obviously has a purposive causal structure, which would seem to be provided by 
imagination under the influence of epithumia, as we have seen plausibly described in the 
De Motu Animalium in the case of a quick action in response to thirst.  The incontinent 
person represented by the example seems to have either begun to deliberate or to have 
deliberated prospectively prior to the onset of epithumia.  As such, he either does not 
have a prohairesis or the action which follows from epithumia is against the prohairesis 
which resulted from his prior deliberation. 
There are a number of different interpretations about this particular passage.  
Aquinas argues, as we have seen, that the “concupiscible appetite” (epithumia) moves the 
incontinent’s voluntas (boulēsis) to accept the new major premise.183  Sarah Broadie, in 
Ethics with Aristotle, argues that we cannot read this account as explanatory and that 
what we are meant to see is that the entire deliberative and intentional framework of 
human action is kicked out by epithumia.  The incontinent person, therefore, does not 
deliberate at all.184  Others see Aristotle’s description of particular ignorance as allowing 
the typical incontinent in each instance to utilize the proper principle but fail to recognize 
that the particular situation falls under the general rule.185
                                                 
183 See Aquinas, De Malo Q. 2, a. 9. 
  These interpretations seem 
wrong for several reasons.  In the first case because Aristotle does not describe the 
incontinent’s action as arising from boulēsis.  In the Eudemian Ethics, on the contrary, he 
describes the incontinent’s action as contrary to his boulēsis.  He also does not say that 
184 S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 297-307.  
185 Kent represents this as the typical position, which she notes is opposed by N. Dahl’s argument that the 
incontinent both utilizes the correct general insight and recognizes that or how the particular situation falls 
under the general rule, but is led astray by passion.  See Kent, Virtues of the Will., 152, and N. Dahl, 
Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 
139-224. 
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the incontinent’s boulēsis is changed; rather, it seems implied that action can result 
without the agency of boulēsis through epithumia.  In the second case because the 
incontinent Aristotle describes seems to have already come to some general provisional 
conclusion about the sweet things prior to the influence of epithumia, which shows the 
possibility of deliberation.  Moreover, if the incontinent had previously deliberated, this 
would explain how the incontinent could act against his choice – without previous 
deliberation there would be no choice to oppose.  We should also expect that Aristotle is 
offering an explanatory account of incontinence because his explanation here differs in 
no way from the explanatory accounts he has offered of animal motion in the De Anima 
and the De Motu Animalium.  Finally, in the third case because Aristotle does not 
describe the minor premise itself being changed at all.  The minor premise is the 
particular premise, and since that premise is the same in both the healthy and deformed 
syllogistic examples, it cannot explain the incontinent’s deviation from the virtuous 
norm. 
The idea that epithumia is capable of generating purposive action on its own, 
particularly incontinent action, is an interpretive option which seems difficult to accept.  
It would seem, in English, that every action must be chosen and furthermore that what is 
chosen is coextensive with what is intentional.  Without reference to Aristotle’s technical 
vocabulary, it seems that the akratic chooses, in the English sense, the present pleasure in 
contrast to the merits of restraint or abstention.  However, we must distinguish between 
the connotations of English words and the specific meaning of Aristotle’s Greek terms, 
since, strictly speaking, not every action is deliberately chosen according to Aristotle 
because not every action is the result of prohairesis.  If we do not make this distinction, 
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our reading of Aristotle will be mired in contradiction.  For if we suppose that an 
incontinent chooses his action in the sense of Aristotle’s use of prohaireisthai and 
prohairesis, it would seem that his action involves boulēsis because prohairesis 
originates with boulēsis modified through deliberation.  This would lead us to equate 
boulēsis with the intention per se as the prime mover of the akratic’s action as well as 
action in general because of its relation to choice (prohairesis).  Such an equation would 
entail two contradictory conclusions with respect to Aristotle’s account of akrasia: 1) that 
akratic action is unintentional and the result of an incapacitating fit of violent desire, 
which hardly seems either voluntary or blameworthy, because it is either against choice 
or without choice (prohairesis); and 2) akratic action is the result of boulēsis and 
prohairesis because it is intentional.  There is a contradiction only so long as one assumes 
that in order for an action to be intentional in Aristotle’s terms it must be the result of 
boulēsis and prohairesis. 
The way out of this apparent contradiction is to remember that, as we have seen, 
epithumia is a species of orexis, which is a particular way in which objects can be desired 
and intended, and that purposive, intentional action can result from epithumia.  Moreover, 
we have seen how prohairesis or choice designates deliberate choices strictly speaking 
and not necessarily everything that might be called a choice in English.  Therefore, 
incontinence can be intentional and purposive, and therefore subject to moral evaluation 
in the absence of boulēsis and prohairesis.  Action does not cease to be voluntary because 
it ceases to be deliberate.  Moreover, since the major premise corresponds to the end, the 
end replaced by epithumia is that of boulēsis.  Therefore, as we have argued, it is possible 
to have dispositional boulēseis which are not occurrent.  In the case of the incontinent, 
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their dispositional boulēsis either does not become occurrent because of an occurrent 
epithumia or it ceases to be occurrent because of an occurrent epithumia. 
 The relationship between epithumia and boulēsis in the example of the 
incontinent sweet-eater has implications for the meaning of prohairesis.  Aristotle says 
several seemingly conflicting things about the incontinent, although his remarks about the 
vicious or intemperate are uniform.  To contrast incontinence and intemperance, Aristotle 
remarks that although they are about the same things, pleasant and painful things, they 
are not about them in the same way: whereas the vicious person deliberately decides upon 
his actions, and thus his actions result from prohairesis, the incontinent are said to act 
“against their decision” (para tēn prohairesin) or to act without decision (prohairountai 
d’ou) (NE VII 4,1148a6-10; 1148a17-18; 8, 1151a5-10; also 7, 1150a25-27).  Aristotle 
clarifies the basis for this distinction in discussing the principal kinds of incontinence.  
One type of incontinence, arising from epithumia, Aristotle calls weakness, the other, 
arising from thumos, he calls impetuous or rash.  A weak incontinent deliberates but 
abandons his deliberation under the influence of desire; a rash incontinent is “led on by 
his feelings because he has not deliberated,” and these people are usually called ‘quick 
tempered’ (NE VII 7, 1150b20-29).  Incontinence is episodic and transient, and in the 
absence of passion, the incontinent person is quite capable of recognizing his failings 
retrospectively, as well as resolving (more or less effectively) to refrain from those 
actions in the future.  Aristotle compares incontinence to epilepsy, which strikes suddenly 
and violently but passes quickly; whereas vice is like dropsy or consumption, chronic 
conditions which are all consuming.  The incontinent person is corrigible; the vicious 
person is not. The incontinent recovers his senses, while the vicious person never does 
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(NE VII 8, 1150b30-1151a5).  The incontinent person ends up performing vicious actions 
though they lack a vicious disposition because their actions are against their choice (NE 
VII 8, 1151a5-10).  This Aristotle explains by saying that they are not persuaded that 
what they do is correct, whereas the vicious person is persuaded that what he does and 
pursues is correct (NE VII 8, 1151a11-14). 
The differing types and degrees of incontinence explain why Aristotle uses two 
expressions to describe their behavior; 1) the incontinent acts without choice or does not 
choose or 2) he acts against his choice.  An incontinent may have deliberated and possess 
a choice in the sense of it being a ‘setting himself to’ some course of action or restraint.  
We might imagine here a smoker or an alcoholic who sets themselves to quitting or 
sobriety and even takes steps to that effect.  Yet this ‘setting to’ may be undone by the 
emergence of a strong desire on a particular occasion.  Simply having the deliberate or 
rational intention to do something does not change one’s character, and so the same 
desires will be activated on the same occasions one used to smoke or drink.  However, at 
the same time, the aforementioned smoker or drinker may not wholly abandon the 
deliberate intention they formerly had; they may try again.  Likewise, we may have 
weaker desires and relatively stronger deliberate intentions that vie with each other, and 
this seems to be close to what Aristotle describes as continence: where, more often than 
not, we do what we decide in the face of desire.   Thus, just as we may possess 
dispositional and occurrent wishes we may also possess dispositional and occurrent 
prohaireseis to the extent that we have deliberated about the specific situation we are 
facing and to the extent that that deliberation is effectively realized in action at that time. 
 One objection to the suggestion that prohairesis has dispositional and occurrent 
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senses could be that it would make prohairesis indistinguishable from boulēsis.186
The term ‘dispositional’ in respect of prohairesis is, therefore, somewhat 
ambiguous.  It applies not just to the specific prohaireseis that the agent has, the 
particular goals and content, but also to their characteristic level of efficacy as well as the 
stability of its retention by the agent.  Each character type intends the goods of human life 
differently on the level of boulēsis, especially such things as the ends which constitute 
  If 
prohairesis and boulēsis can both represent long-term plans and general patterns of 
action, how are they then different?  The prohairesis that the incontinent person has with 
respect to the things about which he is incontinent seems indistinguishable from his 
boulēsis, and this is supported by the fact that in the Eudemian Ethics he is said primarily 
to act against his boulēsis.  The incontinent person, unlike the other character types, is 
marked by his inability to turn his rational plans into actions.  Thus, he effectively does 
not have an occurrent prohairesis when he is incontinent, that is, in the sense of having a 
rational and deliberate proximate efficient cause of his incontinent actions, although he 
must have some capacity to prospectively deliberate about the same things as he is 
incontinent about.  Thus, he can prospectively form a specific rational intention on the 
level of a prohairesis, but one that does not lead to consistent action.  However, as 
Aristotle allows, the incontinent does act in accord with prohairesis when he deliberates 
and acts with respect to things he is not incontinent about and, in some cases, even about 
the things he is incontinent about.  This is why an incontinent person is corrigible unlike 
a vicious person.   
                                                 
186 Although A. Mele suggests that boulēsis has occurrrent and dispositional senses, Bonnie Kent is the 
only author I have found who suggests this about prohairesis, and it is to her that I am indebted for this 
distinction.  She suggests this as explaining Aquinas’ interpretation of weakness of will.  See Kent, Virtues 
of the Will, p.163-64. 
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happiness.  But each also intends lower-order ends and actions differently, both in terms 
of ends and manner of execution.  Each character type possesses and retains, therefore, a 
characteristic prohairesis related to specific actions.  These are dispositional both in the 
sense of having a characteristic outlook and in the sense of being operative or occurrent 
at certain times.  The incontinent lacks a fully occurrent or operative choice in matters 
pertaining to his specific weakness; the continent man possesses a functional though 
defeasible choice in the same areas; the virtuous and vicious possess a dispositional and 
fully occcurrent choice.187  Virtue and vice, as well as the other types of character, give 
their stamp to the prohairesis of the agent, such that the prohairesis is said to come from 
a stable character.188
Aristotle’s account of the relationship between prohairesis and character in his 
treatment of akrasia is significant for accounts of intention and intentional action for two 
reasons: 1) the account shows that action can be more or less intentional; and 2) that all 
human actions are intended under some description.
  These distinctions explain why Aristotle can conclude that the 
incontinent person acts hekōn, ‘voluntarily’, from an internal principle, and that he is not 
as bad as the truly vicious person: “he is not base (ponēros d’ou), since his decision is 
decent (hē gar prohairesis epieikēs); hence he is half-base” (NE VII, 10, 1152a15-20).   
189
                                                 
187 While I am indebted to Bonnie Kent for the suggestion that the prohairesis has dispositional and 
occurrent senses, I disagree with her that the incontinent’s incontinent acts are initiated by an occurrent 
prohairesis which is contrary to his dispositional one.  With respect to his incontinent actions, I do not 
believe that the incontinent has an occurrent prohairesis, although in English it would be correct to say that 
his act was chosen.  See Kent, Virtues of the Will, p. 163-164. 
  First, it is clear that not every 
action is rational or deliberate; however, every action is motivated by some goal and 
188 See Mele, “Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” 413-418. I agree with Mele that choice must 
come and have reference to character.  I disagree with him when he claims that only the virtuous and 
vicious can choose because of the stability of their characters.  Incontinent and continent agents are not 
incontinent about everything, but usually only with respect to certain things.   
189 I borrow the phrase “more or less intentional” from J.L.A. Garcia “The Intentional and the Intended,” 
Erkenntnis 33 (Sept. 1990): 192-193, which we will use in our analysis of the Simple View in part II of the 
dissertation. 
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something done in pursuit of that goal.  In giving an essentially thick description of 
akratic behavior, Aristotle describes the various ways that agents can intend both the ends 
they pursue and the things they do to achieve those ends.  Likewise, an agent may be 
more or less cognizant of the ways in which his present action conflicts with his larger 
goals and pattern of conduct.  An incontinent agent may only desire the action he 
performs for the satisfaction of a present desire, averting his practical thinking from the 
longer term consequences of his current behavior.  The irrationality of an akratic’s 
behavior pertains not to the explicability of each act but to the pattern of his conduct as a 
whole; each incontinent act is explicable for as far as it goes, but the intentionality behind 
the akratic act is limited to the present and conflicts with the longer term goals of the 
agent.  Second, Aristotle’s account of akrasia shows that all human actions are 
intentional under some description; the key for this account is to specify the exact source.  
Aristotle distinguishes between the sources of an incontinent’s motivation to act 
incontinently.  While an incontinent may possess latent or dispositional deliberate 
intentions, he does not, in the moment he acts, act from them; rather he acts from a 
different type of intention, one limited to immediate, usually bodily satisfaction.  This 
differentiates him from the other types of character, whose behavior is more or less 
deliberate and consistent.  This fact is also central to Aristotle’s account of responsibility.  
The incontinent is responsible for his acts precisely because they are intentional; they 
arise from a type of orexis.  That the particular orexis an incontinent acts from is not 
rational or deliberate does not detract from its being, from an Aristotelian point of view, 
an intention which can give rise to action. 
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I.5 Conclusion of the First Part 
 
 Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis is at once specific and ambiguous.  On the one 
hand he sets out to define a cause of human action which is the specific rational intention 
with which and by which we choose and execute our actions; on the other hand he often 
uses and refers to it in senses other than this.  Prohairesis seems to have at least three 
senses or levels: 1) Primarily, the deliberate intention with which person acts, an 
‘occurrent’ choice; 2) The habitual or ‘dispositional’ choice or resolve of ‘decent’ people; 
and 3) General purposes that men have which may encompass voluntary action as a 
whole.   Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion which Aristotle 
sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium, but it is a principle of action peculiar 
to mature human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result 
of deliberation.  It is a desire which is conditioned by reason and it is a term which marks 
out a narrow but important stretch of intentional action.  Prohairesis is set off against 
other types of intention and action which often contend with practical reason, such as 
epithumia and thumos.  Aristotle is, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional 
action, unusually specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention which can 
move human beings to act and with which they act.  Different orexeis differ not only with 
regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail.  Aristotle 
traces responsibility to the presence of these internal principles, and moral assessment is 
linked to the operative internal principle of an act.  This allows for an action to be 
voluntary and intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the 
consequences of an action.  Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis 
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and what results from orexis, i.e., prohairesis, is not reducible to one mode but is 
irreducibly plural.    Furthermore, each person’s capacity for intentional action is shaped 
by his character, and each character has correspondingly different kinds of intention, both 
with respect to the objects of intention and in their relation to action.   
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Part II: Intentions and Intentional Action in the Contemporary Debate about the Simple 
View 
 
II.1: Introduction to the Second Part 
  
 In the first part of the dissertation, we gave an account of Aristotle’s concept of 
prohairesis, or choice, that placed it within the larger context of Aristotle’s theory of 
action.  In particular, we focused on how it derives from orexis or desire, and how 
Aristotle understood desire to be a complex intentional capacity and not merely a somatic 
urge.  Aristotle’s account of choice and desire allows him to explain the broad range of 
human action, from child to adult and from viciousness and akrasia to deliberate, 
virtuous behavior.  The insights we have gleaned from Aristotle about the scope and 
range of intentional behavior and its basis in desire will allow us to tackle contemporary 
issues about intention and intentional action centered on the debate about what Michael 
Bratman calls the “Simple View.”  
 Intentions are essential to explaining human action and to moral assessment.  J.L. 
Mackie, in his book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, argues for a “straight rule of 
responsibility” which states that “an agent is responsible for all and only his intentional 
actions.”190
                                                 
190 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), 208.  I am indebted to 
Peter French’s “Fishing the Red Herrings Out of the Sea of Moral Responsibility,” Actions and Events: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest LePore and Brian P. MacLaughlin (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), 73-87, for this reference and for highlighting some of the subsequent difficulties, 
although I do not ultimately share French’s own conclusions about the cultural construction of ascriptions 
of intention. 
  Although this rule is straightforward, it is also problematic.  People are often 
held accountable for what results from negligence, which by definition is unintentional, 
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and not just for the negligence itself; e.g., a drunk driver is charged with vehicular 
manslaughter for killing a pedestrian and not public intoxication.  It is clear, however, 
that intentions do play a role in the assessment of responsibility.  Donald Davidson sheds 
some light on why this is in his essay, “Agency.”   Davidson argues that there cannot be, 
strictly speaking, a class of unintentional actions as distinguished from a class of 
intentional actions because, for something to count as an action at all, it has to be 
intentional under some description.191  To borrow an example from Searle, for Oedipus to 
unintentionally marry his mother Jocasta he must have intentionally married someone.192  
Ultimately, the relationship between an agent and his acts cannot be understood or 
described without the concept of intention.193
 While some notion of ‘intention’ is indispensable for an account of action and 
moral responsibility, just what that notion is remains unclear.  The word ‘intention’ has a 
range of senses, and it is often defined with respect to some purpose or goal, to a definite 
and deliberate plan, or to a mental state which gives rise to actions guided by goals or 
plans.  Moreover, deliberation and purposiveness do not always go together; actions may 
be purposive (directed by an agent towards an end) without being deliberate.  Purposive 
and non-deliberate behavior can include impulsive actions, quick actions, the actions of 
children, and even the behavior of certain animals.  Many philosophers are loath to 
include children and animals among the class of moral agents.  While they concede that 
their behavior is purposive, they deny that it is deliberate, rational, and intentional.  Such 
thinkers favor limiting the term ‘intention’ to describing the mental state which results 
from rational deliberation and which causes behavior which follows that plan. These 
 
                                                 
191 Donald Davidson, “Agency,” Essays on Action and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 46-47; 61. 
192 John Searle, Intentionality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 181-82. 
193 Davidson, “Agency,” 61. 
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thinkers also tend to use the activity of deliberation to ground normative accounts of 
practical reasoning which place constraints on the beliefs, desires and other premises 
which form the basis of an agent’s intentions.   
 It may seem ironic, then, that thinkers who place great weight on the conceptual 
and mental autonomy of intentions seek to weaken the link between intention and 
intentional actions.  Prime examples of this tendency are Michael Bratman and Gilbert 
Harman.  Bratman rejects what he calls the “simple view” that “For [an agent] to 
intentionally A [the agent] must intend to A; [an agent’s] mental states at the time of the 
action must be such that A is among the things [the agent intends].”194  Likewise, Harman 
rejects what he calls the “Putative Principle That Intentional Acts Are Always Intended,” 
which he formulates as “If one acts intentionally, it follows that one intended to act in 
that way.”195  Against this principle Bratman and Harman argue that some acts that are 
said to be intentional may not be intended by the agent that performs them.  These 
include acts where an agent, prior to acting, is unsure that he will succeed.  Bratman 
further distinguishes between an intention and the “motivational potential” of an 
intention, which can include goals and plans one cannot properly intend due to the 
constraints of his account of practical reasoning.196
 The strategy of narrowing the definition of intention to deliberate planning and 
the mental state which initiates deliberate action adopted by Harman, Bratman and others 
creates more problems than it solves.  First, it weakens the link between intention and 
intentional action without specifying how the two are related.  This undermines efforts to 
   
                                                 
194 Michael Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” Philosophical Review 93 (July 1984): 377. 
195 Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986), 89. 
196 See Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1987), 119-127. 
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link ascriptions of responsibility to intentions.  Second, it fails to account for why 
intentional actions are intentional if they are not intended.  Third, it fails to present a 
unified account of intentional action which can account for an agent’s intentionality of 
and responsibility for non-deliberate actions.  Fourth, the strategy fails to account for the 
moral and legal responsibility agents have for consequences which it describes as 
unintended.   
The source for the problems associated with developing an account of intention is 
the ambiguity surrounding the terms ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’.  In regular usage an 
intention can be more or less deliberate, explicit, or conceptualized by the agent whose 
intention it is.  Likewise, actions may be counted as intentional when they are purposive 
as well as when they are deliberate.  Moreover, identifying single actions is difficult 
because the scope of an action depends largely on the scope of the intention attributed to 
the agent, but not always.  One simple intentional action may have a number of different 
effects, some intended, others not.  In the latter category of effects, it is difficult to 
distinguish between effects of which the agent was ignorant and effects which, though 
known to the agent, were not strictly desired or intended by the agent, e.g., the side-
effects of drugs.  In the former category, many have noted an ‘accordion effect’, whereby 
one simple action, like flipping a switch, can be described in a number of different ways 
depending on how one construes the chain of subsequent consequences.  For example 
someone may flip a switch to turn on a light which alerts a burglar.  The alerting of the 
burglar in most cases is unintentional.  However, there are other scenarios where flipping 
the same switch can trigger a host of consequences which are intended by the agent when 
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he flips the switch.197
Opponents of the Simple View assume that the word intention is univocal and 
picks out one particular mental state characterized by rational deliberation and an 
immediate role in the genesis of action. They do not correspondingly narrow the use of 
the term ‘intentional’. As a result, they find that not all intentional actions are intended – 
the term ‘intentional’ being left ambiguous; the term ‘intended’ being used narrowly and 
univocally. This seems quite paradoxical because the term ‘intentional’ is obviously the 
adjectival form of the noun ‘intention’.  In terms of the language of intention ascription, 
opponents of the Simple View hold that to say ‘X’s A-ing was intentional’ does not entail 
that ‘X intended to A’; whereas we will hold that it does.
  This returns us to the ambiguity of the term ‘intention’ because 
agents may have complex intentions for simple actions or they may have very simple 
intentions for actions which have complex and morally relevant consequences.  The 
nature of an agent’s intentions often makes a significant difference in our assessments of 
agents, e.g., distinguishing between malice aforethought and negligence is a distinction 
between intentions.  However, sometimes, as in the case of negligence, an agent is 
accountable for consequences he did not intend. 
198  To sketch this out a little 
more, we will hold that the verbal locution ‘X intended to A’, the adverbial locution ‘X 
did A intentionally’, the adjectival locution ‘X’s A-ing was intentional’, and the nominal 
locution ‘X’s intention was to A’ are co-extensive.199
                                                 
197 Davidson, “Agency,” 53-55.  Davidson cites Joel Feinberg, “Action and Responsibility,” Philosophy in 
America, ed. M. Black (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 146, as the source for ‘accordion effect’.  
The example of the burglar is Davidson’s. 
 We must immediately qualify this 
198 See Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 394-396.  Bratman does not lay out the claim as schematically 
as this, although he does specify the disconnect between the adjectival and adverbial locutions on the one 
hand and the verbal and nominal locutions on the other. 
199 I am indebted to the comments and advice of Fr. Arthur Madigan for bringing these points to my 
attention as implications to my thesis.  Likewise, I borrow from him the manner of referring to the 
expressions as verbal, adverbial, nominal, and adjectival locutions. 
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by saying that these locutions are not co-extensive in colloquial usage; however, they are 
co-extensive when the entities to which the terms refer are properly understood and the 
reference is made precisely.   In colloquial usage, the intention of an end and the intention 
of a means are not always discriminated.  Moreover, the adjectival and adverbial 
locutions are colloquially used to cover both types of intention while the verbal and 
nominal locutions are colloquially used to cover only the intention of the end.  Thus, in 
colloquial ascriptions of intention, as Knobe extensively documents, the adjectival and 
adverbial locutions are not coextensive with the verbal and nominal locutions.  This 
presents a prima facie case against the Simple View, but as we will show (in sections 
II.3.2 as well as II.4.2.1-3)  in line with the argument above, it is defeasible.   
There is more to the argument about the Simple View than the simple extension 
or definition of terms. Opponents of the Simple View attempt to draw psychological and 
action theoretical implications from the inconsistencies of ordinary language or figures of 
speech: 1) the requirement that in order to intend to A, one must believe that one will A 
(covered in sections II.2.3, II.3.1, and II.5.2); 2) the narrowing of intended consequences, 
and the narrowing of moral responsibility of consequences, only to those consequences 
intended as part of or as the end (covered in sections II.2.4, II.2.5, II.3.2, and II.4.1-.3); 3) 
the privileging of a particular kind of intention, a rational, deliberate intention, as the 
prime mover of human action (covered in section II.5.1-2); 4) the distinction between, or 
rather division of, intention and desire, such that an action can be intended without being 
desired (covered in section II.5.1-2). 
The psychological and action theoretical conclusions drawn lead to the following 
significant issues in action description and moral assessment: 1) Trying becomes 
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intentional but unintended or non-intended, even though trying to A is indistinguishable 
from intending to A (covered in sections II.2.3, II.3.1, and II.5.2); 2) Assessments of 
praise and blame, but especially blame, lose their connection to intention when what is 
intentional is no longer necessarily intended, e.g., side-effect consequences (covered in 
sections II.2.4-5, II.3.2, and II.4.1-3); 3) Intentional behaviors that fall short of intention 
par excellence either become more deliberate than they are or less intelligible because 
unintentional  (covered in sections II.5.1-5.2 ); 4) A number of actions seem to become 
inexplicable because intention divorced from desire removes the motivation for an action 
(covered in sections  II.5.1-5.2). 
Behind the differences in the interpretation of the terminology of intention lies 
conceptual confusion on the part of opponents of the Simple View: they confuse a species 
of intention with the genus of intention. The features of one kind of intention are taken to 
be the essential and necessary features of intention in general. These features are not, 
however, common to all intentions. The approach of the opponents of the Simple View is 
not an Aristotelian-style investigation of intention, beginning with a species and 
proceeding to a discussion of the larger genus. Their discussion begins and ends with 
deliberate intentions, usually intentions of the end, and other types of what we will 
classify as intentions are outside of that genus, as ‘intention surrogates’ or ‘motivational 
potential’, etc.  This obscures both the essential element of all intentions, i.e., 
purposiveness, and the relationship and distinction between the intention of the end and 
the intention of the means.  
Contemporary accounts of intention have difficulty with the ambiguity of the 
English term ‘intention’ because they fail to examine the relationship between the senses 
   160 
of the term beyond noting their differences so that they can select one sense which will 
have exclusive claim to the use of the term; however, Aristotle’s accounts of orexis and 
praxis offer a more successful paradigm for understanding the concept intention, its 
relationship to intentional action, and the ambiguity at the heart of the English usage of 
intention.  For Aristotle, orexis, translated as desire, is an intentional power which can be 
more or less developed depending on the capacities of each biological species or the 
individual habits and capacities of certain individuals.  Orexis is the faculty of 
purposiveness which provides animals (including humans) with the motivation to act.  
Every human action is guided by some kind of orexis, and many human actions are 
guided by a kind of orexis unique to human beings, that is, prohairesis, which is a 
deliberate desire.  Prohairesis is a composite mental state which is, however, not 
reducible to any other mental state.  It is a composite of a rational/deliberative capacity 
and the desiderative/orectic capacity.  As such, prohairesis results from reasoning and is 
guided by and subject to rational constraints that other kinds of orexis or desire are not.  
Not every action results from a deliberate desire and not every human agent is capable of 
a deliberate desire, either because of his character or because of his circumstances.  In 
any case, for Aristotle, we assess moral responsibility based on whether or not an act was 
voluntary, which resolves into whether or not the act resulted from some orexis 
accompanied by the agent’s own cognizance of his acting.  By distinguishing as he does 
between kinds of orexis, Aristotle can distinguish kinds of intentions and levels of 
intentionality in human action.  An act may not be deliberate and yet it may still qualify 
as voluntary and intentional and we may still be held accountable for it.  Likewise, we 
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may have non-deliberate intentions which are not, strictly speaking, rationally based upon 
our other beliefs or desires.   
In this part of the dissertation, I intend to defend the Simple View with the help of 
Aristotle’s insights into human action.  First, we will present the contemporary debate 
about the Simple View, the view that all intentional acts are intended under some 
description, beginning with Bratman’s seminal work and proceeding to Harman’s 
complementary account.  We will examine the three main objections to the Simple View 
as presented by Harman and Bratman, the objection that the Simple View cannot account 
for rational consistency in a hypothetical video game scenario, the objection that the 
Simple View does not accurately describe the intentionality of unexpected success, and 
the objection that the Simple View cannot account for unintended side-effects which 
result from intentional action.   The third objection has recently been supported by the 
empirical research by Joshua Knobe, which raises a fourth objection to the Simple View, 
i.e., that its ascriptions of intention in side-effect cases do not conform to ordinary 
language or the folk concept of intention.  We will answer the first two objections 
together and treat the third and fourth at length, focusing on the problems that the 
intentionality of side-effects poses for defenders of the Simple View like Hugh McCann 
and J. L. A. Garcia.  Likewise, we will deny the conclusions drawn from Knobe’s 
research by questioning the reliability and significance of inferences drawn from his 
surveys.  Answering the third and fourth objections, however, will require further a 
detour into an account of the Doctrine of Double Effect, its history and interpretation, as 
well as the distinction between intention and foresight from which we will be able to 
better defend the Simple View.  We will use insights gleaned from St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
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theory of action (which was influenced by and in significant respects faithful to 
Aristotle’s) to relate intentions and so-called side-effects and to respond to Warren 
Quinn’s revision of the Doctrine of Double Effect based on types of agency.  Finally, we 
will begin a constructive account of the relationship between intention, desire, and 
intentional action capable of answering the opponents of the Simple View. 
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II.2: The Simple View and its Opponents 
 
II.2.1: Introduction to Objections to the Simple View 
 
It is an obvious fact that the words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ are related.  As 
Michael Bratman notes in the opening line of his seminal article, “Two Faces of 
Intention,” “We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things.”200  This suggests 
that expressions containing the adjective ‘intentional’ imply a direct connection to other 
descriptions containing the noun ‘intention’ or the verb ‘to intend’.   To do something 
intentionally seems to imply having an intention at the time of action to do that very 
thing, or as Bratman puts it, “for me intentionally to A I must intend to A; my mental 
states at the time of action must be such that A is among those things I intend”;  Bratman 
calls this initially plausible view the “Simple View.”201 Bratman rejects the Simple View, 
arguing from the premises that intentions are differentiated from other mental states by 
their function in planning and action coordination and, therefore, that they are subject to 
rationality and consistency constraints to which other mental states are not subject.202  
Gilbert Harman, likewise, rejects the Simple View, although he calls it the “Putative 
Principle That Intentional Acts Are Always Intended,” which he formulates as follows: 
“If one acts intentionally, it follows that one intended to act in that way.”203
                                                 
200 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” Philosophical Review 93.3 (July 1984): 375. 
  Harman, like 
Bratman, focuses on the relation of an agent’s intentions to his beliefs and other 
intentions and also places rational constraints on what it is possible for an agent to intend.  
201 Ibid., 377.   
202 Ibid., 378-381, see esp. 381 for “strong consistency” constraints. 
203 Harman, Change in View, 89.  From here on out, we will refer to the position denoted by both 
expressions simply as the “Simple View.”   
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 The objections made against the Simple View by Bratman and Harman tend to 
focus on three issues and related cases where an agent would seem to perform an action 
intentionally without intending to perform that very act.  The first issue involves a case 
where we can confidently say that an agent acted intentionally, but if we conclude from 
that ascription that he intended to do what he did, we will be forced to conclude that he is 
irrational.  This is Bratman’s now famous video game example, of which he concludes 
that an intentional act may be part of an agent’s “motivational potential” rather than his 
intentions.  The second case, which both Bratman and Harman present, is where an agent 
attempts an action of whose success he himself is doubtful.  In that case, while it seems 
that the action was intentional, it seems difficult to say that the agent intended to do what 
he did, that he ‘meant to do that’.  Since it would be irrational for the agent to believe in 
the probability of his success, it therefore seems unlikely that he intended the action.  
However, both Bratman and Harman allow that the agent may intend to try the given 
action without intending the given action.  The third issue, again presented by both 
Bratman and Harman, centers on the difficulty of distinguishing side-effects or undesired 
consequences from intended results.  If an agent undertakes an action for one purpose, 
but knows that the action will also necessarily produce an unwanted side-effect, is the 
side-effect intended as much as the original goal?  Both Bratman and Harman argue that 
it would make the agent irrational if we ascribed to them the intention to produce the 
unwanted side-effect.  This position has received support from recent work by Joshua 
Knobe, leading to what we will call the fourth objection.  In several small surveys of 
random non-professionals, Knobe found that respondents’ ascriptions of intention to 
hypothetical agents did not reflect the primary contention of the Simple View: 
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respondents were willing to describe certain side-effects as intentional or intentionally 
produced without ascribing an intention to the agent who produced them.  Therefore, the 
fourth objection to the Simple View is that it does not accurately mirror our linguistic 
practices of intention ascription. 
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II.2.2: Bratman’s Video Game 
 
In “Two Faces of Intention,” Bratman creates a scenario involving a video game  
to challenge the Simple View.  He asks us to suppose that there are two video games of 
the same kind, 1 and 2, on two different screens, which involve guiding a virtual missile 
to a moving target on the screen.  An ambidextrous gamer plays both games 
simultaneously and the games are “so linked that it is impossible to hit both targets. If 
both targets are about to be hit, the machine just shuts down.”  Both targets remain visible 
unless this eventuality occurs.  The player is rewarded for hitting either target.204 A game 
player knows that he may hit each target but not both; likewise, he increases his chances 
of hitting either target if he plays both games simultaneously.  The risk of shutting down 
both games is less than the chance of hitting either target, so he plays both games.205   
With the scene thus set, Bratman now levels his challenge: If the player hits a target, it 
seems that he does so intentionally; therefore, according to the Simple View, he must 
have had an intention to hit that target.  However, so Bratman argues, if he was also 
intentionally trying to hit the other target, according the Simple View, he must likewise 
have intended to hit the other target, but to intend simultaneously to hit both targets is 
self-contradictory and “a form of criticizable irrationality.”206  Bratman concludes, 
therefore, that the player does not intend to hit either target; rather, what he needs to do is 
“to try to hit each target.”207
                                                 
204 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 382. 
 Hitting the target is in the agent’s “motivational potential,” 
205 Ibid., 383. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 387. 
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but the agent does not intend “flat out” to hit it, as Bratman argues, it is not what the 
agent intends.208
 One potential objection to this conclusion that Bratman envisages is that one 
might say that the player had an intention to hit one of the targets, but not specifically the 
one he hit.  Against this, Bratman argues that it seems that the player intentionally hit the 
target that he did for four reasons: 1) because the player both wanted to hit the target and 
tried to do so; 2) the attempt to hit the target was guided by the perception of that target 
and not the other; 3) the player actually hit the target in the way in which he was trying, 
using his relevant skills; 4) the player’s perception of hitting that specific target and not 
just any target, ends his attempts to hit it.  A proponent of the Simple View, therefore, 
would have a hard time arguing that the player did not intend to hit the target, given that 
he apparently hit the target intentionally; however, this would seem to commit the 
proponent to describing the player as acting irrationally, since the player cannot hit both 
targets.
  We will return to the concept of “motivational potential” below. 
209
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 Ibid., 396. 
209 Ibid., 388. 
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II.2.3: Unexpected Success 
 
 The second major case used against the Simple View involves agents who are 
unsure of the chances of their success or who positively believe that they will not 
succeed.  Bratman uses the example of someone with a log in his driveway blocking his 
car.  The log is large and heavy enough that the person in question does not believe that 
he will move it.  Believing that the effort he intends to make to move the log will fail, he 
forms a plan to call a tree company to remove the log later that day.  Still, he does 
attempt to move the log.  The Simple View would require that the attempt be motivated 
by an intention to move the log.  Yet Bratman argues that if that were the case, the 
intention to move the log would be in conflict with the intention to call the tree company 
– essentially the person would intend to move the log twice.  Therefore, according to 
Bratman, the person cannot intend to move the log; otherwise he would be guilty of 
irrationality.  At most, he intends to try to move the log.210
                                                 
210 Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, 39-40. 
  Harman uses slightly 
different examples to the same effect: a sniper making a difficult shot and an amateur 
golfer attempting a very long, difficult putt.  In both cases, although the agents initiate 
actions with specific goals, they do not subjectively believe that have a reasonable 
expectation of success – success is possible, but not likely.  In the event that the sniper 
makes his shot or the golfer her putt, Harman allows that both agents may be said to try 
to do what they were aiming at; at the same time, he denies that they either intended to do 
what they in fact accomplished or that they aimed at accomplishing what they did.  To 
say that they intended their acts, Harman argues, seems to attribute to them a level of 
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confidence in their success that they do not have.211
By arguing that agents who doubt the success of their attempted acts do not intend 
those acts, both Harman and Bratman reject, as Bratman puts it, “the inference” from 
trying to intending.
  While Bratman emphasizes the 
conflict of the present intention with a future plan, Harman emphasizes the conflict of the 
intention with the present belief in failure.  Both hold that for an agent to intend an act 
requires that the agent believe that he will be successful.  
212 Harman notes that while ‘intention’, in a wide sense, seems to be 
synonymous with ‘aim’, saying that a doubtful agent tries to do a given action attributes 
less confidence or a less certain belief to the agent than saying that the agent intended to 
perform the successful action.213  Thus, Harman concludes that “In the absence of full 
belief it is often easier to say or believe someone acts ‘with the intention’ of doing A than 
to say he or she acts ‘intending’ to do A.”214 To attribute intention to a lucky shot sounds 
like “bragging,” whereas the agent’s actual attitude seems closer to “hope.”215  Although 
the agent may not “flatly” intend the action he successfully performs, if he succeeds, 
Harman argues, he performs the action intentionally.216
                                                 
211 Harman, Change in View, 92-93; see also Reason, Meaning, and Mind (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 47-48. 
  Likewise, Bratman argues that to 
say that an agent ‘acts with the intention of doing A’, where the expression means 
roughly ‘acting with the further intention of’, can have two different readings.  Under a 
“strong reading” it entails that the agent intends his action “as part of a larger plan of 
action.”  Under a “weak reading” it only that the agent acts “in order to” accomplish the 
212 Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning,  40. 
213 Harman, Change in View, 92-93; see also Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 47-48. 
214 Harman, Change in View, 93. 
215 Ibid., 92. 
216 Harman, Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 48. 
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goal, but it neither entails nor precludes that the agent intends to accomplish that goal.217  
For Bratman, we can distinguish a “weak sense” of ‘acting with the intention of’ whereby 
an agent acts “in order to achieve the purpose or goal” but without “strictly speaking” 
intending to act so that he achieves the goal.218
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
217 Bratman, Intentions, Plans and Practial Reasoning, 128-29.  Bratman does not use the expressions ‘acts 
with the intention of doing A’ or ‘acting with the further intention of’.  Rather he uses the sentence, “I open 
the curtains with the intention of getting more light” and parses out the meanings from there.  I have 
substituted these here as paraphrases for the sake of economy in integrating Bratman’s and Harman’s 
accounts, and I have tried to indicate this using single quote marks.  All the material within double quotes, 
including the italics in the double quotes, is Bratman’s. 
218 Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, 129. 
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II.2.4: Intended Consequences and Side-Effects 
 
The third major case used to argue against the Simple View is that of unwanted 
but foreseen consequences or side-effects.  This leads to the third objection: It seems that 
the Simple View fails to distinguish between foreseen and intended consequences and 
that it attributes goals and purposes to agents and their intentions which they do not have 
and which it would be irrational for them to have.  This argument has two sides: one 
relates to agent rationality; the other to agent responsibility and moral assessment.  
Bratman gives the example of a runner who knows that in running he will necessarily 
wear down his sneakers.  In intending to run and running does the runner also intend to 
wear down the soles of his sneakers?  It seems that the runner did wear his sneakers down 
intentionally – he was cognizant of his actions and their results; however, it does not 
seem that the runner intended to wear his sneakers down.  That would not be a sensible 
goal.  According to Bratman, a proponent of the Simple View would be required to say 
that since the runner wore down his sneakers intentionally, he therefore intended to wear 
them down.219    To Bratman, this conclusion seems absurd; the runner has no such 
intention. One sign of this is that the runner is “not at all disposed to engage in further 
reasoning aimed at settling on some means to wearing down [his] sneakers,” which 
contrasts with his goals in running.220  Again Bratman invokes ‘motivational potential’ 
arguing that while the runner’s intention does not include wearing down the sneakers, the 
runner’s motivational potential does.221
                                                 
219 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 399-400; 404. 
  According to Bratman, the runner’s wearing 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., 400. 
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down his sneakers does not play a functional role in the runner’s further plans as an 
intention to wear down the sneakers would.222
For Harman, the importance of attacking the Simple View’s apparent linkage of 
intended and foreseen consequences lies in distinguishing the essential causal efficacy of 
intentions from other states of mind.  An intention is “a conclusion of practical reasoning 
that says that the very conclusion itself guarantees that something will happen.”
  
223  The 
causal relationship between an intention and the event it causes is the hallmark of 
practical reasoning and an intention is caused by a desire in a way that a prediction is not.  
Predicting or foreseeing an event is based on one’s beliefs about a situation and what 
Harman classifies as theoretical reasoning.  Desire is not involved, at least not 
essentially.224  Side-effects and unintended consequences involve beliefs which extend 
beyond our intentions.225
 Harman’s method for distinguishing intended from merely foreseen consequences 
comes from establishing a “simple” paradigm for decision-making that dovetails with his 
accounts of practical and theoretical reasoning.  In most cases of decision making, 
“simple decisions” as Harman calls them, “one finds oneself with a salient end E and one 
  Therefore, foresight or prediction is marked off from intention 
by the kind of reasoning in which one engages.  The distinction between kinds of reasons 
is mirrored in the expectation of causality: one expects an intended event to happen 
because one intends it (and also desires it); whereas side-effects or consequences are 
either outside one’s notice or intention or they are contrary to one’s intention (and 
desire). 
                                                 
222 Ibid., 404. 
223 Harman, Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 65. 
224 Ibid., 63. 
225 Harman, Change in View, 107. 
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recognizes a salient means M that will get one E.”  Most simple decisions lack extensive 
deliberation or the considerations of alternatives or consequences; “one simply forms the 
intention of getting E by doing M.” Harman goes so far as to argue that in most cases, “If 
one happens to notice side-effects or consequences, that does not by itself normally 
influence one’s decision.” 226  While “one’s intentions combine means and ends,” in that 
means and ends form chains, the realization of one end being a means to another, “There 
is no analogous argument for the claim that they must include foreseen side-effects and 
other consequences.”227
 Harman gives his account of simple decisions to counter what he calls the 
“holistic challenge”; i.e., the view that our intentions and decision encompass the whole 
of the action we cause, including side-effects and consequences as well as intended ends 
or outcomes.
   
228  This alternative view develops because we naturally see the complex 
causality of our decision.  On a holistic view, the “whole story” of one’s intended 
decision plays a role in whether or not one should make the decision; the value of one’s 
end needs to be weighed against the disvalue of the “rest of the story.”229 From the 
holistic point of view, side-effects and consequences affect one’s decision making in the 
same way that the comparative value or effectiveness of different ends and means 
does.230  The holistic position implies, according to Harman, “that all foreseen aspects of 
one’s decision, including side-effects and consequences, should be as much a part of 
one’s intention as one’s end and means are.”231
                                                 
226 Ibid., 106. 
 In Harman’s view, the extremity of this 
227 Ibid., 109. 
228 Ibid., 98. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid., 98-99. 
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conclusion contrasts with the plausibility of the consideration of consequences and side-
effects in one’s deliberations.  Harman considers the basis of this plausibility the fact that 
holism appears to be an idealization of normal decision-making practices.232
 A test case that Harman gives for whether or not intentions include side-effects 
and other unintended consequences is the case of a sniper who in shooting his target will 
also alert other enemies to his presence.  If he shoots, hits his target, and alerts the other 
enemy forces, is the alerting of the enemy forces as intentional as hitting his target?  
Harman says no.  First, the sniper shoots on the basis of a conclusion of practical 
reasoning which begins from his intention to hit the target but not from a desire or 
intention to alert the enemy.  Second, the expectation or prediction that he will alert the 
enemy is not derived in the same way from his end.  The shooting of the target is a 
practical conclusion and the alerting of the enemy is a theoretical conclusion, i.e., a 
prediction, based upon facts external to practical reasoning.  To safeguard against 
specious theoretical reasoning, where one reasons in the third person about one’s own 
actions such that one predicts that one will both shoot and alert the enemy, which would 
result in both events being unintended, Harman argues for a general principle of 
reasoning that one not predict one’s own decisions.
 
233
                                                 
232 Ibid., 112. 
  Thus, we can distinguish between 
intended and foreseen consequences by which species of reasoning licenses us to 
conclude that the event will occur.  In practical reasoning, the event, our action or the 
realization of our end, will occur because we intended it, and our intention is formed on 
the basis of some desire through practical reasoning.  In the case of theoretical reasoning, 
we can predict the likelihood of the event we intend as well as other event we do not 
233 Harman, Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 65-68. 
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intend.  The theoretical view does not begin with a desire or an intention and lies outside 
of the genesis of a decision.   
While Harman distinguishes foreseen from intended consequences primarily 
based on the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, Bratman chooses to 
create a class of intentional states outside of intention to cover the intentionality of side-
effects.  First, he proposes “to give up the assumption of tight fit and to distinguish 
between what is intended, and the sorts of intentional activity in which an intention may 
issue.”234 An action is said to be intentional by its relation to some relevant intention – 
according to Bratman an agent must intend “something” although he may not intend the 
intentional action which he performs.  The relationship between intentional action and 
intentions to act is “complex” and not direct, and it is a mistake “to suppose that 
intentional action always involves an intention so to act.”235  In the gap between 
intentional action and intentions to act lies “motivational potential,” which Bratman 
defines: “A is in the motivational potential of my intention to V, given my desires and 
beliefs, just in case it is possible for me intentionally to A in the course of executing my 
intention to B.”236
                                                 
234 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 394. 
  Motivational potential is a “theoretical placeholder” that Bratman uses 
to “mark” that an action is intentional without explaining why it is.  Bratman believes that 
more research and thought are required in the philosophy of action to identify and 
classify volitional states other than intentions and give accounts of their relationships to 
the genesis of action.  At the moment, he argues, we can positively say that intentions are 
235 Ibid., 394-95. 
236 Ibid., 395. 
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essentially characterized by consistency constraints to which these other states are not 
subject.237
Unlike Harman, whose concern with unintended consequences is tied up with the 
present causal efficacy of intentions and practical reasoning, Bratman argues that the 
puzzle surrounding the intentionality of side-effects supports giving “future-directed” 
intentions “methodological priority.”  He concedes that with respect to “present-directed” 
intentions it is difficult to see “a real difference between intending to A and having an 
intention whose role includes the motivation of intentionally A-ing.”
   
238 However, he 
continues, “The response to this worry is that intentions play other important roles.”239  
These other roles are planning and coordinating and sustaining action involved with 
plans.  With this in mind, we can discriminate between two different possible intentions 
that an agent may have, “both of which include A in their motivational potential but only 
one of which is an intention to A.”240 The basic role that future-directed intentions have is 
not, for Bratman, the actual initiation of present action but “as elements in coordinating 
plans.”241
Any defender of the Simple View must explain how it is possible for an agent to 
intend something which is beyond the scope of his immediate agency and which is 
antithetical to the larger horizon of his intended ends.  Likewise, a defender of the Simple 
 If we take future-directed intentions as essentially defining intentions as a 
whole, including present directed intentions, and we examine their features, we can avoid 
the positions that the Simple View takes because of its narrow focus on present-directed 
intentions. 
                                                 
237 Ibid., 396-97. 
238 Ibid.,  398. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
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View must also answer moral claims about responsibility and intention, since moral 
judgments of responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions are arguably based on 
the extent to which such consequences were intended. 
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II.2.5: Knobe’s Empirical Research 
 
 Recently, Joshua Knobe has conducted two small surveys of random people in a 
Manhattan park designed to test the accuracy of the Simple View by focusing on 
consequence and side-effect cases.  These surveys have provided the strongest evidence 
against the Simple View and constitute the fourth objection to the Simple View; namely, 
that the Simple View does not accurately reflect our actual ascriptions of intentionality in 
ordinary language.  Whereas the Simple View would predict that the nominal locution 
(‘X had an intention to A’), the verbal locution (‘X intended to A’), the adjectival locution 
(‘X’s A-ing was intentional’), and the adverbial locution (‘X did A intentionally’) would 
each entail one another, such that to use one would entail the others, Knobe’s surveys 
show a pronounced disjunction between the use of the nominal and verbal locutions on 
the one hand and the adjectival and adverbial locutions on the other.  In each survey, the 
participants described, in one way or another, foreseen side-effects as intentional (the 
adjectival locution) or as having been done intentionally (the adverbial locution) without 
ascribing an intention (the nominal and verbal locutions) to the agent to produce those 
side-effects.  The participants also seem to account negative side-effects to be intentional 
while positive ones are not.  The first survey that Knobe conducted randomly divided 78 
participants into two groups who were each given a slightly different scenario to evaluate.  
The first group was given a “harm condition” and their scenario read as follows: 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of 
the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new 
program.  It will help us increase profits, but it will also 
harm the environment.” 
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The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all 
about harming the environment.  I just want to make as 
much profit as I can.  Let’s start the new program.” 
 
They started the program.  Sure enough, the environment 
was harmed.242
 
 
The second group was given a “help condition”, and the scenario presented to them was 
identical but “help” was substituted in each case for “harm.”  Both groups were asked to 
say whether or not the chairman intentionally harmed or helped the environment (the 
adverbial locution).243  In the harm condition group, 82% of the respondents said that the 
chairman had intentionally harmed the environment; whereas 77% of the respondents in 
the help condition group said that the chairman did not help the environment 
intentionally.244  A second similar survey with a similar example, this time with a 
lieutenant ordering his men to take a hill, was used on another small group of 42 people.  
In the harm condition group, the lieutenant orders his men into the enemy’s line of fire 
while taking the hill; in the help condition group, ordering his men to take the hill takes 
his men out of the enemy’s line of fire.  The results for the assessment of intentionality 
were largely the same: in the harm condition group, 77% of respondents said the harmful 
side-effect was brought about intentionally; whereas in the help condition group, 70% of 
the respondents said that the agent did not bring about the helpful condition 
intentionally.245
 Knobe also asked each survey group to assess the agents in question for praise or 
blame for the side-effects that resulted from their actions, and these results also showed a 
  
                                                 
242 Joshua Knobe, “Intentional Action and Side-effects in Ordinary Language,” Analysis 63.3 (July 2003): 
191. 
243 Ibid., 191-92. 
244 Ibid., 192. 
245 Ibid., 192-93. 
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significant skew.  As Knobe summarizes, “Overall, subjects said that the agent deserved a 
lot of blame in the harm condition . . . but very little praise in the help condition.”246  
Respondents were asked to rate the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agents in 
each case on a scale of one to six.  The average mean score of blameworthiness in the 
harm condition was 4.8; the average mean score of praiseworthiness in the help condition 
was 1.4247 The scores for blameworthiness and praiseworthiness correlated with the 
respondents judgments about whether or not the side-effects were intentionally brought 
about by the agents.248
 After the publication of these results, Knobe conducted another small study in 
response to criticisms of the first.  The first major criticism of Knobe’s results was that 
they were skewed by the pragmatic implications of blame inherent in assessments of 
intentional action.  That is to say, respondents may have been reluctant to classify a 
harmful or helpful effect as intentional because that ascription usually entails moral 
judgments about blame and praise, as well as punishments and rewards.
  These results seem to lend support to objections raised to the 
Simple View like those of Bratman and Harman. 
249
                                                 
246 Ibid., 193. 
  In this study, 
Knobe asked 77 people in a Manhattan public Park two questions in response to the help 
and harm scenarios involving the chairman and the environment used in the first survey.  
The respondents were first asked to say whether or not the sentence “The chairman 
harmed [helped] the environment in order to increase profits” seemed correct to them and 
by what degree, on a scale from -3 (“sounds wrong”) to 3 (“sounds right”), with 0 as “in 
247 Ibid., 191; 193. 
248 Ibid., 193. 
249 Frederick Adams and Anne Steadman, “Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or 
Pragmatic Understanding?” Analysis 64.2 (April 2004): 173-81. This is one of Adams and Steadman’s 
major points to which Knobe takes pains to respond; it is also adopted by Hugh McCann, and we will 
examine this at greater length below. 
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between.”250  Knobe found the following result: “The average rating for subjects in the 
harm condition was +.6; the average for subjects in the help condition was -1.”251  This 
suggests that neither group was inclined to see the side-effects as pursued in order to 
fulfill the chairman’s ultimate goal; although the respondents in the harm condition were 
more likely to see it in an instrumental light.  The assumption that Knobe is working from 
is that “reason explanations,” which provide an explanation of purpose and the relation of 
means to attain that purpose, “are only applicable to intentional actions.”252 He therefore 
uses acceptance of a given reason explanation involving side-effects as a proxy for the 
description of that side-effect as having been intended (i.e., as being equivalent to a 
verbal or nominal locution).  By framing the side-effect in the format of a reason 
explanation, with the operative ‘in order to’ clause, Knobe believes that he has overcome 
the pragmatic implications usually associated with descriptions of intentional action.253
 In addition to this survey, Knobe did another survey using the same harm/help 
scenarios with two further groupings. Within each harm and help scenario respondents 
were further randomly divided into two groups.  The first group was asked whether the 
chairman had helped or harmed the environment intentionally (the adverbial locution); 
the second group was asked whether or not it was the chairman’s intention to help or 
harm the environment (the nominal locution).  Knobe displayed his results in the 
following table: 
 
 
 
                                                 
250 Knobe, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Considerations,” Analysis 64.2 (April 2004): 182-184. 
251 Ibid., 184. 
252 Ibid., 182. 
253 Ibid., 182-83. 
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Knobe Table 1: ‘Intentionally’ vs. ‘Intention’ 
 Harm Help 
‘Intentionally’ 87% 20% 
‘Intention’ 29% 0% 
 
The results indicate that, like the Knobe’s first surveys, harmful side-effects were said to 
be done intentionally by many more respondents than helpful side-effects were; 
moreover, that very few people said that the chairman had an intention to harm the 
environment, while none said that he had an intention to help it.254
The results of this survey are significant because, as Knobe concludes, they seem 
to show that there are actions which are intentional without the agent having had an 
intention to perform them.
   
255
 
  The possible divorce of intention from intentional action is 
the heart of all the objections to the Simple View and to have some sort of confirmation 
of that divorce in the judgments of ordinary English speakers is powerful evidence.  If the 
Simple View is correct, an account must be given as to why the judgments made or the 
expressions used by ordinary English speakers are not theoretically significant, mistaken 
or misleading.  We shall turn our attention to the first two objections first, before tackling 
the third objection and Knobe’s research. 
 
 
                                                 
254 Ibid., 185. 
255 Ibid., 186. 
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II.3: Responses to Bratman, Harman, and Knobe 
 
II.3.1: Trying, Intending, and Intention Surrogates 
  
The first two objections to the Simple View are much more easily handled than 
the third and fourth, and the responses to them by Hugh McCann and J. L. A. Garcia have 
largely neutralized the potency of these objections.  These responses focus on attacking 
what appears to be a merely verbal distinction between intentions to try to A and 
intentions to A.  This leads to an attack on another distinction, that between intentions and 
“intention surrogates,” which also appears to be merely verbal.  First, Harman and 
Bratman assume that “it is possible for a person to intend to try to A without intending to 
A.”256  If it is not possible to try to A without also intending to A, the putative alternatives 
to the Simple View now lack an explanation for one of their most salient cases, the 
“unexpected successful attempt.”257  Second, Harman and Bratman must introduce 
“intention surrogates,” purposive states that guide behavior and practical reasoning but 
which do not fall under the consistency constraints that intentions do.258  The introduction 
of these other purposive states weakens the objections to the Simple View because these 
states seem not to be significantly different from intentions, either in content or function, 
save that they are not subject to certain rules of rational consistency.259
                                                 
256 Hugh McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” American Philosophical Quarterly (Jan. 
1991): 29. 
  Therefore, the 
other states, grouped by Bratman under the concept of motivational potential, provide no 
real alternative to intentions as described in the Simple View.   
257 Ibid., 27. 
258 Ibid., 28. 
259 Ibid., 28-30; 34. 
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 We shall present these responses at length, but, as we shall see, the third case (i.e., 
the distinction between intended and foreseen results) is more recalcitrant.  The 
distinction between intended and foreseen side-effects is not dealt with by cases dealing 
with the conflict between an agent’s direct intentions or goals and his beliefs about those 
same intentions or goals.  The fundamental issue remains to be explained, namely: Either 
foreseen side-effects are in some way intended or they are not intended but are accounted 
to be intentional.  A fuller account of practical reasoning must be given to support the 
first disjunct; otherwise, opponents of the Simple View will have the case they need to 
undermine it.  In pursuing this account, we shall be to re-examine intention surrogates 
and the relation of intention to desire as well as the connection between intention and 
foresight. 
In the examples used by Harman and Bratman agents attempt feats which conflict 
with their beliefs about the efficacy of their attempts.  The conflict can take two forms: 1) 
it can be a conflict between an agent’s goal and his beliefs about the probability of 
succeeding in achieving that goal (e.g., moving the heavy log or attempting the difficult 
putt); or 2) it can be a conflict between two equally attractive options which the agent 
knows cannot both succeed (e.g., playing Bratman’s video game).  In each case, Harman 
and Bratman claim that the agent cannot intend to perform the action which would 
achieve the goal, but they may try to perform that action.   The achievement of the goal is 
beyond the content of the intention. The crucial assumption which makes Bratman’s and 
Harman’s solution to these apparent problems plausible is that it is possible to try to A 
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without intending to A.260  However, the distinction assumed turns out to be merely 
verbal; as J. L. A. Garcia rightly observes, “what I try to do I intend to do.”261  A 
corollary mistake made by both Bratman and Harman is the confusion of process and 
product: an action is often identified by the goal that completes it; many verbs and verbal 
expressions imply success, much like the verb ‘to know’.  However, it can also be 
identified by the subsidiary movements and moments which bring that goal about.262
As Gilbert Ryle perceptively and correctly noted in his essay “The Thinking of 
Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ doing?”, many verbs in English do not denote a specific 
kind of action but behave adverbially; he called these, fittingly enough, “adverbial 
verbs.”  One such verb is the verb ‘to obey’.  One can obey in any number of ways which 
are all dependent on the conditions set by an antecedent command.  The verb often stands 
by itself in certain English expressions, such as when one might simply say, “I obeyed,” 
which suggests that it is a distinct form of action; however, if one were to be asked 
whether one had obeyed a command, the answer would have to be a description of 
another action which constituted the obedience.  One might say, for example, “I obeyed 
by sitting down,” if one had been told to sit after a class presentation by a professor.  The 
  We 
can be engaged in an activity even if we fail to achieve that activity’s goal.   
                                                 
260 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,”  29; J. L. A. Garcia, “The Intentional and the 
Intended,” Erkenntnis 33 (Sept. 1990): 199.  McCann lodges this objection against Bratman; Garcia lodges 
the same objection against Harman. 
261 Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 199. 
262 See McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,”  29 and Garcia, “The Intentional and the 
Intended,” 199.  Neither makes this explicit formulation in terms of process and product, although each 
substantively says this. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Hutchinson’s University 
Library, 1949), 130-31, for an examination of “verbs of success.” 
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verb obey does not express a distinct act but a manner of acting.263  The same can be said 
for the verb ‘to try’: “the fact is that ‘trying’ is not a name for a kind of action.”264
Every intentional action has some goal or purpose; that is what it is to be 
intentional.  However, many goals are not achieved immediately but either through 
processes of longer or shorter duration or through several steps.  Trying, attempting, and 
endeavoring all indicate either a present, incomplete process, but also tend to connote 
difficulty or exertion.
  
265  In any case, “When I try to do A . . . I do some B . . . with the 
intention that doing B constitute, or constitute a part of, my doing A.”266 Expressions like 
“I was trying to A” are often given in response to questions from other people who do not 
see or do not know the purpose or goals of our current movements or activities.  To say 
that a particular “doing B was an attempt to do A is to say what I intended in my doing B 
to be (or be a part of) and therefore to say something of why, with what aim, I did it.”267  
Trying to A is not separate from doing B, and doing B is part of the process of doing A; 
“‘trying’ is a term that signifies the general business of acting in pursuit of some 
objective.”268
If we re-examine the examples used against the Simple View, we can see how 
empty the distinction between trying and intending is.  If agent intends to move the heavy 
log, he must do so by pulling it in some manner or other.  Likewise, if the video gamer 
wishes to hit either target, he must move the game controller and guide the missile.  The 
sniper and amateur golfer must also both aim their respective projectiles, and in each case 
  
                                                 
263 See Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ doing?” Collected Papers, vol. 2 (London, 
Hutchinson, 1971).  See also “Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking,” On Thinking (Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1979) 17-22.  The example of ‘to obey’ is Ryle’s and is exhibited in these works. 
264 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 29. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 199. 
267 Ibid. 
268 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 29. 
   187 
initiate the movement to send either the bullet or the ball on its way.  The question arises: 
In what ways do these actions differ if the agent does not intend to do them, but only 
intends to try to do them?  The answer is: In no way whatsoever.  In each case the agent, 
the movements or subsidiary actions the agent performs will be identical.  Whether we 
describe the agent as, for example, intending to move the log by tugging it or intending to 
try to move the log by tugging it, tugging the log is done “as a means to the end of 
moving it”; that it counts as an attempt at moving the log at all is because the movement 
has that very goal.269  Neither Bratman’s nor Harman’s accounts forbid the agent to 
intend directly subsidiary actions, like tugging on the log; moreover, both allow for such 
actions because both allow that the attempt might be successful.  Of this fact, McCann 
concludes: “As far as planning and execution are concerned, our examples differ not at 
all from standard cases of intentionally A-ing.  All that is missing, supposedly, is the 
intention to A.”270 Moreover, why, if it is irrational to intend to A, is it any more rational 
to intend to try to A?  It seems that it cannot be, if intending to try to A involves the very 
same subsidiary actions and probability for success.271  As Garcia observes, ascribing the 
goal or objective to present action, to say an agent B’s with the intention of A-ing is “to 
ascribe to him the goal or objective, in other words, the intention of doing so.”272
                                                 
269 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 29. 
 
Likewise, McCann argues that “there is no ordinary sense in which terms like ‘goal’ or 
‘purpose’ signify objectives that guide deliberation and behavior, but fall short of being 
270 Ibid.  The paragraph as a whole is a paraphrase of McCann’s argument extended to Harman’s examples 
as well as Bratman’s. 
271 Ibid., 31-32;  see also Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 204.  Both McCann and Garcia ask 
this pertinent question, although McCann goes on at greater length about the inconsistency the question 
highlights.  
272 Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 199. 
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intentions.”273  We might have reason to doubt an agent’s sincerity (or linguistic 
competence) if he were to express only the intention to try rather than a simple intention 
so to act.  This is brought out very clearly in an example from the television show, The 
Simpsons, when Bart tells his sister, Lisa, “I can’t promise I’ll try, but I’ll try to try” in 
response to her request that he try not to frighten a neighbor.274
 If an agent cannot be said to intend the act he performs, what mental state is he in 
as he performs the act?  Bratman and Alfred Mele argue that an agent has a “motivational 
potential” or “motivation encompassing attitudes” respectively; that is, that there is a 
class of mental states that includes intentions but also other states.
 
275  These include such 
things as “guiding desires,” which can guide both “present action” and “planning for the 
future.”276  These “quasi-intentions,” as McCann calls them, are “mental states of having 
a goal or purpose which may guide planning and action, but which unlike intention are 
exempt from demands of rational consistency.”277  An agent finds himself in this mental 
state when being rationally consistent forbids him from intending a goal.278
Against the existence of these quasi-intentions, McCann argues that requirements 
for rational consistency “constrain only the rationality of intentions,” that is to say, they 
qualify intentions but do not rule them out.
     
279
                                                 
273 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,”34. 
 It may be irrational for an agent to attempt 
something the likelihood of which is doubtful; however, it does not seem psychologically 
impossible for him so to intend.  Moreover, as we have seen, it seems odd that these other 
intentional states, which are functionally indistinguishable from intentions, are not also 
274 The Simpsons, “The Canine Mutiny,” episode 173, April 13, 1997. 
275 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 400; Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency, 14. 
276 Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, 167. 
277 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 30. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid., 31. 
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subject to rationality constraints – how is it any more rational to desire the improbable 
than it is to intend it?  The kernel of the objections to the Simple View lies not in an 
objection to intending the improbable or irrational, “but the demand that [the agent] be 
committed unconditionally to a plan that presumes failure.”280  Yet, in the cases cited by 
Bratman, the agent does not need to have an unconditional intention.  In the log-moving 
case, he need only intend to call the tree company if he fails to move the log himself; 
likewise, in the video game example, he need only intend to hit target 2 if he fails to hit 
target 1, and vice versa.  It may be irrational simultaneously to intend to both move the 
log and call the tree company to move it later (or to aim to hit both targets); however, the 
agent need not have those intentions.  Most plans are not so fixed in advance that they 
cannot be modified by the agent in the event of new circumstances; moreover, most plans 
involve conditional premises, assumptions and intentions.281
The case is no different with the hypothetical video game player.  The player 
going into the game is told that he cannot hit both targets; yet, if he is to win his reward, 
it is most rational for him to maximize his chances of success by trying to hit both 
targets.
   
282
                                                 
280 Ibid. 
  We may imagine the player as he plays, tracking the movements of each target 
and firing at the most opportune moments at both.  Now, while it is possible that he may 
fire at both targets simultaneously, by pulling both triggers at the same time, it is not 
likely that he will do so if both targets are moving independently of one another.  If they 
are not stationary and are not moving in the same relative trajectories at the same speeds, 
281 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 30-32; Garcia, “The Intentional and the 
Intended,”203-205.  Both McCann and Garcia make criticisms of Bratman along these lines, emphasizing 
the role and existence of conditional intentions. 
282 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 31.  McCann argues that Bratman’s constraints 
take the most rational option, that of firing at both targets, off the table; therefore, Bratman’s own 
constraints are not practically rational. 
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he will have to perform his targeting sequentially and he will likely be firing sequentially, 
as his attention passes from one target to another.  Therefore, there is a guiding 
conditional intention to hit whichever target is opportune, but to track and fire at both.  
However, as the game is played, conditions change.  At each moment the player makes a 
judgment about each target, and his likelihood of hitting it.  His immediate intention, 
when he fires, is to hit the target he is firing at and not “either one”; however, if he 
misses, or in the time it takes for the first missile to hit the target he aimed at, he is free to 
change his attention to the other target, aim and fire at it.  There is no contradiction in 
having a general conditional guiding intention which leads to an immediate, flat-out 
intention when the condition is perceived to be fulfilled by the agent.  Bratman’s analysis 
artificially truncates both the actions and reasoning involved in the scenario, but, even 
still, there are not likely to be any scenarios where an agent must simultaneously and 
immediately intend or desire two contradictory goals.283
The distinction between intending and desiring a goal or an action as it applies to 
these cases is also suspect because it depends on the agent’s subjective awareness of the 
 
                                                 
283 My analysis was inspired by both McCann and Garcia; however, I have extended their points and 
analysis of the game, emphasizing the distinction between simultaneous and sequential intentions in 
relation to conditional intentions, which is indebted to Frederick Adams’s objection to Bratman that one 
may simultaneously intend to hit both targets without intending to hit both simultaneously.  Adams argues 
that some intentions are time dependent; see Frederick Adams, “Intention and Intentional Action: The 
Simple View,” Mind & Language 1 (1986): 292.  Cf. Ezio Di Nucci, “Simply False,” Analysis 69.1 (Jan. 
2009): 77-78.  Di Nucci does not think that Adams’s objection defeats Bratman’s example: “The problem is 
that the agent can only hit one target, and she knows it.  So to intend to hit both [targets], at whatever time 
is still inconsistent with the agent’s beliefs” (77).  Di Nucci also finds it contradictory to hit each target at 
different time, a suggestion of Adams we develop above.  I cannot see how the latter suggestion is 
contradictory when we combine McCann and Garcia’s insights on conditional intending with Adams’s 
insights on the relation between intention and time.  While Di Nucci argues, contra Garcia, that Bratman’s 
example disallows the conditional intention to hit whichever target is opportune, since the gamer plays both 
games simultaneously (74-75),  I regard this as a kind of category mistake.  Each game is not one discrete 
act but a number of acts, each with its own intentionality.  Likewise, if the targets of each game are moving 
independently, each target will require a non-identical set of actions and planning to hit.  Since the gamer is 
rewarded for hitting either target, and it is possible to hit either target, and hitting one does not entail hitting 
the other, there seems to be no contradiction.  The only way there would be contradiction would be if it 
were not possible to miss both targets or if in hitting one the other was also destroyed.    
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rationality and consistency of his beliefs, desires and intentions.  Some agents would be 
able to have intentions that other agents would not about the very same objects and goals 
solely on the basis of the quality of their reasoning.  A “heedless person,” in McCann’s 
words, would be able to have an intention that a rational and mindful agent would not, 
“simply by failing to address the prospect of failing.”284  As McCann argues, this “makes 
whether I intend depend on what beliefs I do not have,” but if intentions figure in the 
actions of both the prudent and the imprudent, one can have an intention of the sort 
Bratman denies, but it would be irrational.285
 Finally, if we return to Harman’s modest amateur golfer and hesitant sniper, we 
can see that the statements that agents who are unexpectedly or accidentally successful 
make about their intentions (or statements made about them) cited by Harman can be 
understated and misinterpreted.
 Bratman and Harman conflate evaluative 
criteria with ontological or psychological conditions.  It may be the case that, on an all-
things-considered view of a particular matter, it would be irrational for an agent to intend 
to do what he endeavors to do; however, that is an evaluative moral or rational 
qualification of an already existent mental state, not an ontological or psychological 
condition which renders that state possible.   
286
                                                 
284 McCann, “Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,” 33. 
  Harman is right to suggest that when we attempt 
difficult and improbable things, where luck plays some role, it does sound like bragging 
285 Ibid. 
286 In what follows, I am combining insights from the works of McCann and Garcia, although not quite as 
they had presented them.  McCann talks of an agent’s “avowals” in a hypothetical way, that is, what if an 
agent disavowed that he intended to do what he successfully and intentionally accomplished?  This is 
directed at Bratman’s log-moving example and not at Harman.  Likewise, Garcia criticizes Harman’s use of 
understatement to characterize an agent’s intention to try but not in response to the issue of bragging or 
confidence.  I am also linking this to McCann’s response to Knobe in “Intentional Action and Intending: 
Recent Empirical Studies,” Philosophical Psychology 18.6  (Dec. 2005): 737-748, especially 741-44, where 
McCann argues that Knobe’s results and interpretation are inaccurate due to the pragmatic implications 
which statements of intention customarily carry. Cf. McCann “Settled Objectives and Rational 
Constraints,” 33-34; Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 198-99. 
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to say that we intended to do it.  However, we must be careful about how we interpret 
such customary denials of intention.  If someone denies that he intended the difficult shot 
or the difficult putt, it surely cannot be a denial of the goal he had or the purposeful 
manner of his execution.  Such remarks are usually made to deflect what the agent feels 
is undue praise, which is taken to imply a greater level of skill or control than the agent 
has.  Thus, pragmatic considerations give rise to utterances which do not accurately cast 
their meaning semantically.  Moreover, the match between what the agent intended and 
the actual course of events, in the case of the course of the golf ball or the trajectory of 
the bullet, need not be perfect.  As Garcia observes, actions may be “more or less” 
intentional depending upon the match between intention and subsequent action.  This 
match is often affected by the agent’s skills and abilities as well as external factors.  We 
can act more or less the way we intend, and we can be praised or blamed on the basis of 
how much we are responsible for subsequent events.  An act, such as the sniper’s shot, 
can be “intentional enough” to count for praise or blame even if there were intervening 
factors which were in part responsible for him hitting his target.  We might imagine him 
aiming at a target which moved suddenly but was hit nonetheless because the bullet was 
deflected by a strong wind.  Since, in this example, “the points where the actual and 
intended paths match are more important . . . than the points where they diverge, this 
explains why we might justifiably” treat the successful hit as intentional. 287
 As we have shown, the first two objections to the Simple View arise largely from 
either contrived hypothetical scenarios or mistaken interpretations of merely verbal 
distinctions in ordinary English usage.  Different words and expressions do not always 
   
                                                 
287 Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 192-93.  I have created my own version of the sniper 
example; Garcia uses an assassin with a laser beam.   
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denote different entities, and there are often pragmatic implications, such as the 
deflection of praise, signaled by choices in words that do not have significant semantic 
implications.  The arguments centering on the third objection, however, have less to with 
the pragmatics of language than they do with judgments of responsibility, moral 
assessment, and psychology, although we will have recourse to discussing the importance 
of pragmatic context in examining the intentionality of consequences. 
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II.3.2: Intentions and Consequences 
 
 The debate over the Simple View as it applies to agents who doubt their ability to 
succeed or who have competing goals seems to hinge on certain merely verbal 
distinctions; however, the objections that the Simple View cannot adequately distinguish 
between intended and merely foreseen consequences, and that it does not adequately 
describe our judgments about and ascriptions of intention, goes deeper into the theory of 
action and intention as well as the use of language.  They are far more salient problems 
than they first appear to be, and they are related: ascriptions of intention in ordinary 
language form the basis for the major arguments about the plausibility of the Simple 
View.  In this section, we will focus mainly on the fourth objection and Knobe’s work.  
First, we will show the significance of Knobe’s work for action theory by relating it to an 
example from Bratman.  We will then proceed to a response to Knobe’s work by 
McCann, which we will show is unsuccessful.  Finally, we will make our own response 
to Knobe’s surveys which will lead us back to the third objection by seeing the 
connection between linguistic ascriptions of intention, the different intentions of ends and 
means, and the relationship intentions have to practical reasoning.  We will not be able to 
fully answer the third objection until section II.4.2.2, after we have covered the 
relationship between practical reasoning and intention, and given a refutation of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. 
To begin, let us recall Bratman’s runner whose shoes will be worn down as he 
runs.  Bratman frames this example as follows: “Suppose I intend to run the marathon 
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and believe that I will thereby wear down my sneakers.”288  It seems to Bratman that the 
runner does not intend to wear down his sneakers.  A sign of this lack of intention is that 
he does not aim at some further means to wear his sneakers down – for instance, by some 
other means than running or by running more than would be required to practice for the 
marathon.  His attitude toward wearing his sneakers down does not figure in any “further 
means-end reasoning” that an intention so to run them down would.289  Wearing down 
the sneakers does, however, figure in his cognizance of his running; he is aware that he is 
wearing them down as he is running and that his running is the cause of the sneakers 
wearing down.290  We might add, though Bratman does not, that such wearing down does 
figure in the further deliberations of many runners in their practice routines, but not as a 
goal.  Worn down sneakers can cause injuries, so most runners monitor the wear in order 
to be ready to replace their sneakers and to maintain their health and readiness.  Likewise, 
they also choose practice runs that will both aid their training and reduce wear on their 
shoes and body.  Bratman substitutes a hypothetical consideration of the sneakers having 
an independent value as heirlooms.  In any case, according to Bratman, the act of wearing 
down the shoes seems intentional in the sense that it is a component of the agent’s action 
of which he is aware and takes notice.  If one subscribes to the Simple View, Bratman 
argues, we must read back from the fact that the wearing down is intentional that the 
runner intended to wear down his shoes.291
One response to this example and argument, made by Garcia, is to accept the 
premise of Bratman’s argument, i.e., that the wearing down of the sneakers is not a 
  This seems implausible. 
                                                 
288 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 399. 
289 Ibid., 399-400. 
290 Ibid., 400. 
291 Ibid., 400; 404. 
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purpose or goal the runner has and is therefore not intended, but argue that wearing down 
is not intentional either because not intended.  As Garcia says, “What I have argued 
above applies to this case as well.  The runner does not intentionally wear down [his] 
sneakers, for [he] doesn’t do so on purpose.  Wearing them down serves no purpose of 
[the runner’s].”292 The runner pursues his marathon running “in spite of, not because of” 
his awareness that he is wearing down his shoes.293
 Bratman’s claim that the wear of the running shoes is intentional but not intended 
is far from an idiosyncratic view, and it implicates the main issue with the fourth 
objection (we shall return to Bratman’s running shoe example below in Section II.4.2.3).  
As we have seen, Knobe’s surveys revealed that while respondents were more likely to 
say that foreseen harm was intentional than foreseen help, they were extremely reluctant 
to say that either was intended.  When Knobe introduced the “reason explanation” 
questions, which asked respondents whether the hypothetical chairman helped or harmed 
the environment “in order to increase profits,” the average responses hovered indecisively 
at “in between” sounding right or sounding wrong.  Even still, the average respondent 
was significantly less likely to say that help factored into the practical reasoning of the 
  This response, though accurate, has 
significant lacunae: Why does it seem plausible to Bratman to say that the wearing down 
of the sneakers is intentional if it is not intended?  Is it possible for an act to be 
intentional if it is not intended?  We must explain why it is plausible that the wearing 
down of the sneakers by the runner is intentional, whether it is, and whether or not it is 
possible for it to be intentional without being intended.  If it is possible for an action to be 
intentional without being intended, the Simple View is in serious jeopardy. 
                                                 
292 Garcia, “The Intentional and the Intended,” 205 
293 Ibid. 
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agent than harm.294
To respond to the results of Knobe’s work, McCann enlisted Knobe to conduct 
two modified versions of the original surveys.  Unlike Knobe’s original surveys, in 
McCann’s first survey respondents were asked both to say whether the harm caused by 
the chairman was intentional (using adjectival locution) and whether it was his intention 
to do so (using the nominal and verbal locutions).  In Knobe’s surveys, respondents were 
never asked directly to answer both questions, since he substituted the ‘reason 
explanation’ with the ‘in order to’ clause to stand in for the word ‘intention’.  In the 
second of McCann’s surveys, respondents were asked to say whether the harm was 
intentional and whether the chairman intended to harm the environment.  The surveys 
were given to undergraduates at Texas A&M University.  Both surveys also had a control 
group, which was asked just one of the questions.
  Knobe’s survey utilizes the same criterion for intention as both 
Bratman and Garcia suggest: he asks respondents whether or not the proposed 
consequence is a goal of the agent’s practical reasoning.  Yet Knobe’s respondents were 
still likely to account harm intentional (adjectival and adverbial locutions), even when 
they did not think the harm was pursued as means to the end of increasing profits (nomial 
and verbal locutions).   This, therefore, seems to be case of intentional action without 
intention.  Yet the disparity between ascriptions of intention and intentional action in the 
help and harm cases should give us pause.  Why should consequences which both arise 
indirectly from an agent’s actions be classified differently? 
295
 
  The results are as follows: 
 
                                                 
294 Knobe, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Considerations,” 184. 
295 McCann, “Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies,” 739-41. 
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Knobe-McCann Survey 1: ‘Intentional’ vs. ‘Having an Intention’  
 
Knobe-McCann Survey 2: ‘Intentional’ vs. ‘Intended’    
 One Question Both Questions 
Intentional  64% 75% 
Intended 42% 31% 
 
The results are paradoxical and not at all comforting to a proponent of the Simple View.  
While asking both questions had the effect of increasing the responses given which found 
the chairman’s harming the environment intentional (the adjectival locution), it also had 
the effect of decreasing the number of responses given which found either that he had an 
intention (nominal locution) to do so or that he intended (verbal locution) to do so.  
McCann, however, is not deterred by these results.  There is a small but, he finds, 
significant disparity between the results in the two surveys: when asked two questions, 
more people were likely to say that the chairman had intended to harm the environment 
(31%) than that he had an intention to do so (12%).296
                                                 
296 McCann, “Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies,”  741. 
  That is to say, respondents were 
 One Question Both Questions 
Intentional 63% 80% 
Intention 27% 12% 
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more likely to agree that the verbal locution was true than the nominal locution when 
either was presented with the adjectival.   
In response to these and Knobe’s original results, McCann makes two initial 
observations: one semantic, one pragmatic.  McCann’s semantic argument centers on the 
meaning of the words ‘intend’ and ‘intention’.  As McCann concedes, “we tend to reserve 
the terms ‘intend’ and ‘intention’ to describe the agent’s main purpose in acting, i.e., the 
goals or goals that guided his behavior.”297  At the same time, results reveal that “when 
an agent knowingly does wrong, we view the wrongdoing as somehow falling within his 
aims.”298 In other words, the nominal and verbal locutions of intention are used to 
describe the main purpose of an action, its goal, while the adverbial and adjectival 
locutions of intention have a wider extension in use, covering aspects of an action which 
may or may not be intended.  A majority of respondents were willing to classify the 
chairman’s actions in the harm scenario as intentional because of his cognizance of the 
consequences of his actions.  At the same time, most were not willing to suggest that the 
chairman intended the harm, because it would be false “to conclude that the chairman’s 
main purpose in giving the order was to harm the environment.”299
                                                 
297 Ibid., 742 
  However, there are 
also pragmatic considerations involved in the respondents’ ascriptions.  Respondents 
were probably reluctant to deny that the chairman’s action in the harm scenario was 
intentional, McCann argues, because to do so would be to suggest that the harm was not 
blameworthy.  They were caught in a conundrum because, semantically, to affirm that it 
was intentional seems to suggest that the harm was somehow the goal of the chairman’s 
action; yet, pragmatically, they would like to hold the chairman accountable for the harm 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid. 
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he has caused.300
To the semantic and pragmatic issues, McCann also adds a moral dimension to 
help to explain the asymmetry in Knobe’s results between the help and harm scenarios.  
While acts may be right or wrong in themselves, in terms of the harms or benefits 
produced and whether such things, in McCann’s view, are commanded or forbidden by 
morality, agent assessments, made in terms of praise and blame, reward and punishment, 
are made on the basis of the agent’s “attitude in performing the action, and the stance 
toward right and wrong that attitude represents.”
  This parsing out of the language, however, does not resolve the issue in 
favor of the Simple View. 
301  In McCann’s opinion, we are more 
likely to excuse morally forbidden acts done in ignorance than we are to praise morally 
valuable acts done the same way.  A duty to help the environment is, in McCann’s view, 
like a “Kantian imperfect duty": we do not always need to be attentive to helping the 
environment and it is permissible that we “‘not care’ about the environment.”  The 
chairman in the survey question does nothing which is forbidden, but neither is he 
praiseworthy.302  However, things are somewhat different in the harm scenario.  Here, 
McCann argues, we are dealing with a perfect duty: “It is always wrong to harm the 
environment without overriding justification.”303  The act itself is morally forbidden but 
it also shows his disregard of the harm he causes, which “bespeaks a certain malice” and 
bad character.304
                                                 
300 McCann, “Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies,” 743. 
  The asymmetry between the help and harm scenarios is explained for 
McCann by the difference between the weights we assign help and harm in character 
assessment: “Unlike the help situation, where the chairman need attach no special value 
301 Ibid., 744. 
302 Ibid., 744-45. 
303 Ibid. 745. 
304 Ibid., 746. 
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to helping the environment, the harm vignette is one where he does have to value the 
harm.”305  Therefore, agents are more likely to count the chairman’s action intentional in 
the harm scenario because it is morally forbidden and he is cognizant of it being so; 
whereas in the help scenario the chairman violates no perfect duty.  Perfect duties, for 
McCann, cannot be “postponed or set aside” and therefore an act which an agent 
intentionally undertakes which contravenes it is also an intentional violation of the duty; 
in the case of the chairman, “He defies duty for the sake of profit, and he intends to do 
exactly that.”306  Unlike the help scenario, he argues, there is an “additional dimension of 
intending” to the harm scenario because of the existence of a perfect duty.307
McCann believes that these points largely show that respondents, despite the 
prima facie survey evidence, implicitly hold the Simple View.  The fact that the 
respondents do not identify the immediate intention the chairman has as containing either 
the help or the harm condition is explicable by reference to the notion of ‘intention’ as 
encompassing an agent’s goals.  The content of the chairman’s decision is “simply what 
is reflected in his order to the vice-president: to go ahead with the new program.”
 
308  
However, because perfect duties are universally binding, intentional actions which 
contravene them evince a morally impermissible and malicious prior intention which 
accompanies the simple intention in action.309
                                                 
305 Ibid. 
  This is not the case with imperfect duties.  
Therefore, on McCann’s interpretation, respondents were attempting to apply the Simple 
View to these cases and correctly judged that the chairman did not have the simple 
intention to harm the environment but did so intentionally because he violated a perfect 
306 Ibid., 745. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. 
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duty, a duty towards which he must have some intention – McCann calls this “an 
intention with which” he acted.  Likewise, they decided that the chairman did not have 
the simple intention to help the environment, nor did he do so intentionally because 
imperfect duties do not have the same bearing on practical reasoning – in order to be 
contravened, they do not have to be overcome in the way that perfect duties must be.310
Although McCann’s points about the semantic and pragmatic issues surrounding 
the words ‘intention’, ‘intend’, and ‘intentional’ are well-taken, his interpretation of the 
results of the surveys leaves much to be desired and is not adequate to defend the Simple 
View for three reasons: 1) Predictions based upon his explanation do not satisfactorily 
match the data of any of the surveys of colloquial usage; 2) His account essentially makes 
an action intentional because it is blameworthy; and 3) His account necessitates the 
creation of ancillary intentions to violate moral duties which mirror the accounts of trying 
by opponents of the Simple View.  First, Thomas Nadelhoffer points out, the number of 
respondents who said that the chairman intended or had an intention to harm the 
environment decreased when they were asked both questions; precisely the opposite of 
what one would expect if respondents held the Simple View.  Moreover, Nadelhoffer 
objects that McCann’s interpretation of the results is essentially unfalsifiable. The 
respondents are said to have an implicit view, the Simple View, that both explains their 
remarks and is, at the same time, explicitly contradicted by them.
 
311
                                                 
310 Ibid. 
  The results do not 
seem to confirm the Simple View; in fact they seem to disprove it, at least insofar as the 
311 Thomas Nadelhoffer, “On Trying to Save the Simple View,” Mind and Language 21.5 (Nov. 2006): 
575-579. 
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Simple View is a theory or model that “accurately describes the folk concept of 
intentional action.”312
Second, the argument McCann makes about antecedent violations of duty is 
strikingly similar to arguments made by Bratman and Harman against the Simple View.  
As Harman notes in a brief aside, people often account an action intentional because it is 
blameworthy.  Harman goes on to conclude not that this is correct but rather that what 
makes an action praiseworthy or blameworthy is not identical to what makes it 
intentional. 
   
313
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  The salient question is how praise and blame are related to accounts of 
intentional action.  The Simple View seems to suggest that people are praised and blamed 
to the extent that their actions are intentional and, therefore, intended.  McCann’s analysis 
seems to reverse this: some actions are intentional insofar as they are blameworthy.  He 
argues this by trying to implant a blameworthy intention in agents who violate universal 
perfect duties, even though this is not the content of their simple intentions.  Likewise, 
this seems to make the intentionality of an action depend on views that an agent does not 
have, as McCann himself objected to Bratman: whether or not the chairman’s act is 
intentional depends on whether he is not a deontologist.  If the chairman does not believe 
in perfect duties, his harm is just as unintentional as his help would be.  While McCann 
would have to argue that belief in perfect duties is a given, that is begging the question.  
313 Harman, Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 48; see Change in View, 92.  Cf. Garcia, “The Intentional and the 
Intended,” 202.  Garcia says of Harman’s view that it “implies that if one successfully tried to do 
something, whether she did it intentionally will depend in part on whether her doing it was wrong.”  This 
remark is made in reference to a work of Harman’s, “Practical Reasoning” Review of Metaphysics 29 (Mar. 
1976): 431-463, in which the sniper example we have cited in later works appears first.  In the later works 
we have cited, Harman seems to reject this view, but he does not make any conclusive remarks about 
precisely how praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are related to an action’s being intentional.  The 
substantive objection which Garcia makes that “Harman gets backwards the relation between evaluative 
beliefs and ascriptions of intentional action” is the inspiration for what follows and I believe it is a fair 
characterization of McCann’s response to Knobe, which was published in 2005. 
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Third and finally, the intention ‘with which’ the chairman acts is also suspect and 
possibly fatal to the Simple View.  This description of an intention to violate a moral duty 
is similar to an argument made by both Harman and Bratman with respect to trying.  
They use ‘acting with an intention’ to explain how an agent acts intentionally without an 
intention when he is trying in the face of doubt.  McCann uses almost the identical 
expression to add a spectral, blameworthy prior intention to an agent’s action, which is 
not itself the intention which causes the agent to act.    This, ironically, accomplishes the 
same end.  The chairman intentionally does wrong without intending to when he acts.  
With that, the Simple View is defeated.  
Despite the weakness of McCann’s response, Knobe’s results do not falsify the 
Simple View.  First, it is a mistake to assume that the Simple View must accurately map 
or model ordinary, colloquial English or American-English usage.  We may concede that 
a theory which supports the Simple View will not accurately describe “the folk concept 
of intentional action” without thereby conceding the falsity of the Simple View.314
                                                 
314 Nadelhoffer, “On Trying to Save the Simple View,” 578 
  While 
ordinary language and usage are useful for philosophical investigation, their value is not 
absolute.  Ordinary language and usage are often the result of custom and are not often 
the result of reflection or subject to requirements for coherence.  In the second place, 
ordinary language and usage, from which so-called ‘folk concepts’ are derived, would 
have a much stronger claim if, in the instances cited, they were consistent; however, the 
colloquial uses of the terms ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ in Knobe’s surveys, the ‘folk 
concepts’, are not consistent.  What Knobe’s surveys reveal, if they are accurate for 
English speakers (or American English speakers) as a whole, is an inconsistency or 
perhaps even incoherence in the non-technical, extensive use of the terms ‘intention’ and 
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‘intentional’.  The great disparity in the responses between the help and harm scenarios, 
where respondents were much more likely to call harm intentional than they were to call 
help intentional, when neither were understood as the goal of the action nor were classed 
by the respondents as a specific intention of the action, appears somewhat arbitrary.  If 
there was a coherent folk concept of intentional action, there should be no discrepancy 
between the ascriptions in the help and harm scenarios.  Opponents of the Simple View 
focus on the disparity between the uses of ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’, but they overlook 
the significance of the disparity between the responses to the two scenarios.   
McCann’s strategy of interpreting these results is at once intuitive and 
misdirected.  He is intuitive in noting the pragmatic elements in the respondents’ uses of 
‘intention’ and ‘intentional’.  All agree that there is a link between descriptions of 
intentional action and moral assessment, and McCann must therefore explain why 
harmful consequences are intentional.  However, his strategy is misdirected because, on 
our view, he attempts to collapse the two most fundamental senses of intention: 
‘intention’ understood as what is intended instrumentally, which, as we will argue below 
includes the help or harm to the environment, and ‘intention’, understood as ‘intention of 
the end’, the benefit to the company.  In this line, he tries to implant a prior intention, a 
sort of implicit goal, in the agent to violate some sort of deontological requirement rather 
than examining the intentionality of means.  The results of his analysis are ultimately 
unsatisfactory because he makes the actions intentional because blameworthy and not 
vice versa. 
A more substantive problem with Knobe’s survey is methodological, and this is 
brought out by the results of Knobe’s second survey.  In that survey, Knobe attempts to 
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eliminate pragmatic implicature in his results by using what he calls “reason 
explanations” questions with the use of the ‘in order to’ clause.315  When asked if the 
chairman harmed the environment in order to increase his company’s profits, respondents 
were more inclined to say yes than no, but not strongly.  Likewise, in the help scenario of 
the same survey, respondents were more inclined to say that the chairman did not help the 
environment in order to increase profits than that he did help it in order to increase 
profits, but again not strongly.  The question responses indicated that the respondents 
were perplexed by the question.  The respondents were first asked to say whether or not 
the sentence “The chairman harmed [helped] the environment in order to increase profits” 
seemed correct to them and by what degree, on a scale from -3 (“sounds wrong”) to 3 
(“sounds right”), with 0 as “in between.”316  The average score for the harm condition 
was +0.6 and the average score for the harm condition was -1.  317
We must ask ourselves an obvious question which has not been asked:  Why did 
the respondents not feel confident in their responses?  First, we must notice that Knobe 
has left his scenarios intentionally under-determined, using only ‘help’ and ‘harm’ to 
describe what happens as a result of the chairman’s actions.  While this is done to 
minimize the effects of bias in the surveyed and the surveyor, it also has another effect: 
the respondent cannot determine how closely the help or harm the chairman does to the 
environment is related to his act.  This is a very important ambiguity because in 
evaluating the intentionality of an action and the intention of an agent, we must focus on 
  Once again, there is a 
disparity between the two scenarios, but in both cases, respondents seemed to have 
difficulty interpreting the question.   
                                                 
315 Knobe, “Intentional Action and Side-effects in Ordinary Language,” 181-84.   
316 Knobe, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Considerations,” 182-184. 
317 Ibid., 184. 
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more than statements or utterances of intention, but also the knowledge, cognizance, and 
directed action which constitutes the act.  Some helps and harms arise from the very act 
an agent performs in pursuit of his end; others arise only indirectly.  We shall illustrate 
this below. 
Let us focus on two different possible cases of environmental harm by a 
corporation: 
1) The corporation in question is a mining company, and the course of 
action decided upon by the chairman is the strip-mining of a pristine, 
wooded ridge for the substantial mineral wealth beneath it.   
2) The corporation in question provides financial services, and the course 
of action in decided upon by the chairman is the negotiation of a 
contract with its janitors that does not include sorting out recyclables 
from the trash.  Since the company would have to pay more for its 
custodial staff to perform the sorting, and recycling is not required by 
the municipality where it is located, the company saves money and 
increases profits but does not recycle.       
 
In both examples, the corporations could be described as harming the environment.  
However, the harms are not causally related to the agents or their intentions in the same 
way.  In the first example, the harm is in the act itself.  The harm does not follow at some 
later time after the mining is complete; strip-mining the mountain in itself harms the 
environment. In the second example, the harm is indirect and also difficult to quantify.  
The lack of recycling by the financial services company harms the environment, 
presumably, by increasing the amount of landfill space needed for waste disposal and by 
requiring more trees be cut down for paper.  Yet, neither of the presumed harms 
necessarily or immediately results from the policy of not recycling. Perhaps the company 
incinerates its trash in an environmentally friendly way.  Perhaps, as result of the 
contract, the company phases out the use of paper forms for many of its administrative 
functions.  In any event, the mere fact that the company does not recycle does not eo ipso 
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harm the environment any more than any other human action that consumes resources 
and results in waste; intervening agents and events affect whether and what harm results.   
The point of these two examples is this: either could be used as an illustration of 
the harm scenario in Knobe’s survey, and it is likely that the respondents would find the 
first case to be intentional and the second case not (this is not to say that the second 
scenario is not intentional, although it does seem less so).  Likewise, it is our conjecture 
that the number of respondents who would find that the chairman in the first case had the 
intention of harming the environment would also increase.  Moreover, the number and 
strength of responses indicating that the chairman of the mining company harmed the 
environment in order to increase profits would also likely increase.  Yet the chairman of 
the mining company could say, just as Knobe’s chairman did, “I don’t care at all about 
harming the environment.  I just want to make as much profit as I can.  Let’s start the 
new program.”318
Knobe’s surveys are valuable not so much because they conclusively refute the 
Simple View as because they show that the standard defenses of the Simple View with 
respect to consequences and side-effects are inadequate.  Many people -- perhaps most -- 
  The chairman could be completely sincere in his utterance: the harm 
was not the goal of his action. Yet at the same time, it is clear that he undertook it in 
order to realize his goal. It is likely, therefore, that because Knobe’s scenarios were 
ambiguous respondents had a number of different examples in mind when attempting to 
answer questions about the chairman’s actions.  This probably had the effect of 
weakening their confidence when asked whether the chairman harmed the environment in 
order to increase profits, and it likely reduced the correspondence between ascription of 
an intention to harm and the description of the harm as intentional. 
                                                 
318 Knobe, “Intentional Action and Side-effects in Ordinary Language,” 191. 
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are comfortable describing a broad range of actions as intentional but not intended.  A 
defense of the Simple View must be able to explain why this is, and, if possible, 
demonstrate why this is plausible rather than merely mistaken.  In order to get a better 
picture of the relationship between intentions and intentional action, we must return to 
Harman’s account of practical reasoning and the ‘holistic challenge’.  Furthermore, we 
will have to challenge assumptions which are pervasive in many circles of contemporary 
ethics, particularly those surrounding the so-called Doctrine of Double Effect, the 
intention/foresight distinction, and the relationship between intentions and desires.  Once 
we have completed these challenges, we will be able to mount a defense of the Simple 
View which can both explain and withstand Knobe’s surveys and the objections of 
Harman, Bratman, and others. 
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II.4: Practical Reasoning and the Scope of Intention 
 
II.4.1: Practical Reasoning and the “Holistic Challenge” 
 
Practical reasoning or deliberation figures, and must figure, in any account of 
human action, and so the account one gives of practical reasoning will necessarily affect 
one’s account of intentions.  As we seen above, Harman argues that the assimilation of 
foreseen side-effects to the content of intentions is a natural result of the “holistic” model 
of practical reasoning which considers the “whole story” part of what is intended, which 
results from an idealization of normal decision-making practices.  He opposes this model 
with his own “simple” decision model of practical thinking, which holds that most 
decisions are simple and disregard non-instrumental factors such as side-effects.319
                                                 
319 Harman, Change in View, 98-99; 112. 
  This 
model places side-effects and undesirable consequences outside of the realm of 
intentions; whereas Harman argues that the Simple View would have to include them 
within the bounds of intention.  There are several problems with Harman’s alternative 
account of decision-making that are relevant to McCann’s defense of the Simple View.  
First, as Harman allows, while many decisions are simple, perhaps even most mundane 
decisions are, there are many important decisions that require deliberation, and this 
deliberation, especially with grave or important decisions, almost always takes into 
account consequences and side-effects.  Second, while Harman rightly observes that ends 
and means are related in hierarchical chains, he fails to observe that the higher one goes 
in the chain, the more complex the ends become; often-times the ends are not discrete 
objects but complex states of affairs.  Third, he focuses mainly on cases of instrumental 
   211 
means and not constitutive ones.  The distinction between these types of means may be 
best brought out by examples.  In one case, an agent walks to get to a planned meeting; in 
another case, an agent walks to get exercise.  In the former case, the walking is an 
instrumental means to the end of arriving at the location; in the latter case, the walking is 
constitutes the end of exercise.  That is to say, ‘exercise’ is not some thing which happens 
after or apart from the walking.  Failure to consider this type of ends-means relationship 
is problematic because higher-order means cease to be merely instrumental to the ends 
they realize but are more often than not constitutive of them, e.g., the relationship 
between exercise, health, and general well-being.  This is not clearly brought out by 
Harman’s paradigmatic case of simple decisions.   
 The foregoing objections also bring out a fourth point about Harman’s analysis 
that applies equally to McCann and Bratman: while it may be a mistake to view every 
consequence or side-effect as intentional to the same degree as intended means or ends, it 
is surely not mistaken to view some consequences or side-effects that way, even 
consequences that are not the primary goal of an action.  Some side-effects or 
consequences are directly caused by the intended actions we make, while others are only 
probable or indirect.  Moreover, some are themselves constitutive of the means and ends 
we choose.  For example, in practical terms, the pain of surgery is inseparable from it, 
even though the pain is in no way the goal or purpose of the surgery.  This is why surgery 
always involves some form of anesthesia and doctors take pain, its causes and remedies 
into account in their treatments, both in the types of surgery performed and medication 
prescribed.  They are also held accountable for the extent to which they cause and deal 
with pain, over above how well they cure the underlying condition.  Yet this complex 
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consideration of side-effects does not figure in Harman’s paradigm case of practical 
reasoning, his simple decision model.  While even people making simple decisions are 
held accountable for unintended but foreseen results of their actions, Harman sees this as 
a distinct issue from the question of intention in action. As he argues in both Change in 
View and Reasoning, Mind and Meaning, most people confuse the blameworthiness of 
action with its being intentional.  On Harman’s account, the basis for the assessment of 
blame is distinct from the basis of ascriptions of intention to actions.  Both a sniper and a 
target shooter may make lucky shots, but we often account the former to be intentional 
and the latter unintentional, he argues, because we find something morally wrong with 
killing but not with hitting targets. For Harman, the phenomenon of associating intention 
with acts we find blameworthy is not explicable by his theory of intention. 320
Criminal law offers evidence of an alternative view of practical reasoning and 
intention, one that supports the formulation of the Simple View at the same time as it 
challenges the narrow notion of ‘intention’ favored by both the Simple View’s supporters 
and its opponents.  As many fans of the TV series Law and Order can attest, in the New 
York State Penal Law, there is a noteworthy distinction between those consequences for 
which one should have a reasonable concern in deliberation and decision making and 
those for which one cannot be reasonably held accountable for failing to take into 
account.  The New York State Penal Law states that a person can be guilty of assault in 
the first degree when “Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another 
 
                                                 
320 Harman, Reason, Meaning, and Mind, 48; see Change in View, 92. 
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person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person.”321  Likewise, one 
can be guilty of manslaughter in the first and second degrees, aggravated manslaughter, 
as well as murder in the second degree when the death results from recklessness or 
depraved indifference to human life.322
A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a 
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense 
when he is aware of and consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur 
or that such circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such 
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation.
 The term ‘recklessly’ is defined in the law as 
follows: 
323
 
 
Recklessness is, however, a distinct crime from negligence.  Negligence, according to the 
Penal Law, occurs when someone “fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk” 
that an unlawful result would occur as a result of one’s action or that there were such 
substantial risks present when one acted.324  When one is reckless, one is accounted to be 
more blameworthy than when one is negligent, and the reason for this is that, for legal 
purposes, what one foresees as happening as a probable or certain result of one’s actions 
counts as part of what one intends, actually and not merely antecedently, as in McCann’s 
argument.325
                                                 
321 NY Penal Law, § 120.10.  Accessed through State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law: 
  In New York State, the law counts a result or consequence intentional if the 
http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/nycriminallaw.htm. 
322 NY Penal Law, §§ 120.15, 120.21, and 120.25. 
323 NY Penal Law, § 15.05. 
324 NY Penal Law, § 15.05. 
325 There is significant debate over this point.  Some scholars of English Common Law, which is the basis 
for much of New York State’s law, see criminal intent (mens rea) as separate from the mental state of 
intention; some see it as identical with it; others see criminal intent as the same as foresight but not the 
same as desire or purpose.  See Alf Ross, “Intent in English Law,” Scandinavian Studies in Law 23 (1979): 
177-209; see also R. A. Samek, “The Concepts of Act and Intention and Their Treatment in Jurisprudence” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41.2 (Jan. 1963): 193-216.  
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person’s “conscious objective” includes causing that result.326
 The example provided by the law in this case is particularly significant because it 
highlights what is at stake in arguments about the Simple View: moral responsibility and 
assessment.  The philosophical arguments made by Bratman and Harman would 
undermine the basis for our public and legal standards of assessment, which, it is safe to 
assume, are founded to a great degree on our moral standards of assessment.  The views 
expressed by both Harman and Bratman are not consonant with laws that treat 
recklessness or depraved indifference as intentional because intended.  McCann is right 
to see the pragmatic implications behind the responses on the various surveys, where 
respondents were probably reluctant to pardon offenses they felt were morally 
blameworthy and, likely as not, legally punishable.  He is probably wrong to think that 
they had a developed or consistent theory to back up their ascriptions.  They did have 
intuitions, which, though less thought-out, provide the basis for any legal or moral theory.  
Opponents of the Simple View cannot account for either the theoretical or linguistic 
connection between ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’, nor can they adequately explain the 
disparities between the help and harm conditions in the surveys and the moral 
implications behind them.  This is a task which falls to any defender of the Simple View, 
and which we will take up in Sections II.4.2.1-4.2.3. 
 Here, contrary to Harman 
and McCann, we see that there is a general and public standard by which the 
blameworthiness of an action, and its degree of blameworthiness, is dependent on its 
being intended and intentional.  The law, it appears, seems to take the Simple View, but it 
does so by enlarging the content of the intention that an agent has in acting to include 
both the narrow objective of an action and its larger consequences. 
                                                 
326 A. Ross, ibid. 
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 Discussing the intentionality of consequences and its connection to moral 
assessment inevitably leads us to take a stance on the Doctrine of Double Effect, but 
taking such a stance will also be fruitful for our defense of the Simple View.  The issue is 
ultimately about the importance of the intention/foresight distinction to the analysis and 
assessment of action, which is held to be integral to the doctrine.  Since the Doctrine of 
Double Effect has been elaborated as involving this distinction to allow actions whose 
foreseen consequences would be impermissible if intended, and since rejection of the 
doctrine and the application of the distinction has been taken to entail a rejection of the 
moral significance of intentions, it is necessary to address the doctrine with the 
intention/foresight distinction in relation to the intentionality of consequences in defense 
of the Simple View.  We shall not deny that there is an ethically significant distinction 
between intention and foresight; rather we will argue that this distinction has been 
misused and does not apply to a paradigmatic case, and, in general, to the kinds of 
consequences which are held to be fatal to the Simple View.  From our examination of 
the Doctrine of Double Effect we will be able to account for the intentionality of side-
effect cases and to explain ascriptions of intention, i.e., the third and fourth major 
objections to the Simple View. 
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II.4.2: Double Effect and the Intentionality of Consequences 
 
II.4.2.1: Against the Doctrine of Double Effect 
 
As we have seen, opponents of the Simple View argue that the Simple View 
entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight with respect to 
side-effect consequences.  This is unacceptable, they argue, because agents would then be 
said to intend harms or other undesirable consequences that result from their actions but 
that are not, strictly speaking the goal or purpose of the actions.  As a result, such 
descriptions would either be inaccurate or absurd: On the one hand, the descriptions 
would be inaccurate since agents do not intend such harms or undesirable consequences 
as goals; on the other hand, accepting that agents do intend such consequences seems to 
result in absurdity, since agents so intending would be behaving irrationally, intending 
things which, all things considered, they do not want or which do not fit into their plans 
of action.   Opponents of the Simple View, like Bratman and Harman, are correct in 
seeing that the Simple View entails the rejection of the application of the distinction 
between intention and foresight to the cases they cite.  It does not, however, entail a 
complete rejection of such a distinction.  While we will be arguing below that the 
distinction between intention and foresight has been and is misapplied to a number of 
cases, including the paradigmatic case at the heart of the Doctrine of Double Effect, that 
does not mean that the distinction cannot be used at all.  Rather, the cases where it can be 
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used do not resemble most cases of human agency.  They are usually events that follow 
from our action at some great temporal distance and with intervening causal factors such 
as other agents.  While such events can be foreseen, they are not intended.   
The rejection of the application of the distinction between intention and foresight 
to the cases cited by Bratman and Harman (and Knobe, by extension), as well as the 
rejection of the Doctrine of Double Effect, is not without potentially serious pitfalls.  As 
Garcia argues, “Rejection of [the Doctrine of Double Effect] and its apparatus . . . often 
reflects an unwillingness to make features of an agent’s mind morally determinative” 
such that “what matters most centrally are certain mental stances (attitudes) rather than 
physical causal relations.”327  Rejecting Double Effect and the application of the 
distinction between intention and foresight would seem to entail consequentialism.  The 
term ‘consequentialism’, coined by Anscombe, denotes the view that the primary basis 
for moral evaluation of an action is the good or bad that results from it and not the 
intentions or character of the agent performing the action.328
                                                 
327 Garcia, “The Doubling Undone?  Double Effect in Recent Medical Ethics,” Philosophical Papers 36.2 
(July 2007): 246-247. 
  Such a standard of 
evaluation does not require that the agents who bring about those consequences have 
specific intentions vis à vis their ends, means, and other human beings.  That is to say, 
agents need not regard any action as intrinsically evil or regard other human agents as 
328 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 33 (Jan. 1958): 
12.  Anscombe coins the term ‘consequentialism’ during the discussion of the distinction between intention 
and foresight in this article.  She argues that Sidgwick is the first consequentialist, and that his views 
permeate subsequent English moral philosophy.  Anscombe argues that Sidgwick denies any distinction 
between foreseen and intended consequences and that this distinguishes consequentialism from 
utilitarianism.  Subsequently, many writers have used the term consequentialism to denote or include 
utilitarianism.  I will be using ‘consequentialism’ in this latter, broad sense to include utilitarianism.  See 
David McNaughton, “Consequentialism,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London: 
Routledge, 1998). Retrieved June 21, 2009, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L013SECT1 
through the Boston College Library portal.   
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intrinsically valuable; the results are all that matters.329
In this section we will show that the Doctrine of Double Effect, as it is currently 
espoused, is historically based on a misreading of Aquinas’ use of and distinctions 
between different kinds of intentional terminology; specifically with respect to Aquinas’ 
use of the terms intentio, intendere, non intendere, electio, and praeter intentionem.  
Aquinas distinguishes between the intention of the end and the choice (electio) of the 
means, such that the choice is beside the intention of the end (praeter intentionem) 
without being, in contemporary English terms, unintentional.  Therefore, unlike 
contemporary proponents of Double Effect, Aquinas does not prohibit instrumental harm, 
specifically killing, so long as the proximate end of the act is good and the instrumental 
harm intended is proportional to that end under the circumstances in which it the act is 
performed.  We use the word ‘harm’ here to cover such things as physical injury and 
death without giving a moral specification to those harms.  As we will show, Aquinas 
believes that describing an action as a killing does not sufficiently specify it as good or 
  Consequentialism, thus 
described, is contrary to both to the ethical philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas and to 
conventional legal and moral assessments.  Therefore, we must show how the limitation 
of the distinction between intention and foresight as it applies to the consequences of an 
agent’s actions and the rejection of the Doctrine of Double Effect as it is currently 
understood are both philosophically feasible and do not entail consequentialism.  At the 
end of our account, we will be able to provide a detailed model of human action which 
upholds the Simple View from an Aristotelian perspective. 
                                                 
329 As McNaughton, ibid., notes, it is possible to be a consequentialist while also holding that some actions 
are intrinsically good or evil.  This is not a view Anscombe had in mind in her original coining of the term, 
nor is it a view that I believe she would find consistent.  At any rate, I am not familiar with such views, and 
it seems that such views are not what proponents of Double Effect have in mind. 
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evil; such a specification occurs when the conditions of the killing, which include the 
killer’s intention, are added to the description of the action.  Therefore, as we will further 
show, the instrumental intention or choice (electio) to kill can be morally good and licit 
for the sake of self-defense under certain circumstances and does not constitute doing evil 
for the sake of good.   
The question of the appropriate historical understanding of Aquinas’ relation to 
the contemporary Doctrine of Double Effect is of immediate significance to our defense 
of the Simple View for three reasons.  First, Aquinas’ own account shows an alternative 
account of intention, similar to the one we are espousing, which both distinguishes and 
relates the intentionality of the end to the means chosen for that end as well as those 
consequences which attend to the means.  Second, Aquinas’ account does not invoke the 
distinction between intention and foresight to render unintended certain consequences of 
action that opponents of the Simple View hold to be foreseen and not intended.  Third, it 
offers a non-consequentialist account of how to understand the moral importance and 
relationship between intentions and consequences that we can use as a model for our own 
account.   
As we will show in the next section, Aquinas presents intention, extending from 
the intention of the end (intentio) to the intention of the means (electio), as a complex, 
multifaceted whole, whose parts and relations must be must be evaluated in their entirety.  
While the intention of a good end is a necessary condition for a good act, it is not 
sufficient guarantee that an action in pursuit of it is good.  The relation of the intention of 
the means to the intention of the end must be considered, as well as the means to the 
circumstances in which an agent finds himself.  These circumstances include the 
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probability of both beneficial and harmful consequences, and a licit end can be pursued 
by illicit means, if those means entail unacceptable consequences apart from the end.  
The basis for this moral assessment is the connection between means and circumstances.  
Cognizance of both the benefits and harms that result from an agent’s actions ties those 
results to the agent because they are linked in his intentions.  As Aquinas ably shows, 
being outside of the intention of an agent’s end does not entail being outside of the 
intention of the means.  Unlike contemporary proponents of Double Effect, Aquinas does 
not invoke the distinction between intention and foresight to limit an agent’s culpability; 
rather, in line with the usage we discuss in this section, agents are held accountable for 
what they foresee (with qualifications) because it attends to their choice of means rather 
than their intention of the end. 
The Doctrine of Double Effect has long been attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas, 
specifically to his treatment of killing in self-defense in the Secunda Secundae of the  
Summa Theologica, Question 64, article 7, where Aquinas says that one act may have 
two effects (nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus).  In the case of self-defense, the 
act of defending oneself when attacked may have a good effect, the saving of one’s own 
life, and a bad effect, the taking of the life of the attacker.  Aquinas allows that the act of 
self-defense is permissible, even if the death of the attacker results (and was foreseen by 
the agent to result) providing that the death results as something ‘beside the intention’ 
(praeter intentionem) of the defender.  The predominant interpretation of this question 
today derives primarily from the work of the nineteenth century French Jesuit Jean-Pierre 
Gury.330
                                                 
330 The attribution of the canonical understanding of double effect to the work of Gury is argued by Joseph 
T. Mangan, S.J. in “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,” Theological Studies 10 
  According to Gury, in the case of self-defense it is impermissible to intend the 
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death of the attacker, either as an end in itself or as means to save oneself; rather one 
foresees his death but does not intend it.  Likewise, this has been extended to other cases, 
notably cases in medical ethics today, to exclude the intention of any harm as a means to 
a good end.  An act is morally licit so long as the bad side-effect is merely foreseen and 
not intended.331
The moral that Gury derives from the passage in the Summa Theologica has 
several facets.  In his Compendium theologia moralis Gury gives this rendering of what 
we are calling the Doctrine of Double Effect: “It is permitted to posit a good or 
indifferent cause, from which a twofold effect follows, one good, but the other bad, if 
there is present a proportionately grave reason, the end of the agent is honest, and the 
good effect follows from that [good or indifferent] cause, not from the mediating bad 
one.”
   
332
(1) acceptable-end condition: the bad effect must not be 
intended as the end. 
  Subsequent Double-Effect thinkers have distinguished four defining constraints 
on morally licit actions with harmful consequences.  As H. M. Giebel aptly presents these 
constraints:  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1949): 41-61 and Christopher Kazcor, “Double-Effect Reasoning from Jean-Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” 
Theological Studies 59 (1998): 297-316.  Both Mangan and Kazcor see Gury’s work as a development or 
evolution of themes implicit in Aquinas, Mangan definitively so, Kazcor problematically.   
331 For statements to the effect that Double Effect prohibits an agent from intending homicide or any other 
harmful consequences as means, and allows such acts to occur only under the condition that the harmful 
consequences are foreseen and not intended, see G.E.M. Anscombe, “Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention 
and ‘Double Effect’,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982), 21.  See 
also Joseph Boyle “Praeter intentionem in Aquinas,” The Thomist 42 (1978): 649-65; John Finnis, Joseph 
Boyle, and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 
429p. ; Allison McIntyre, “Doing Away with Double Effect,” Ethics 11 (Jan. 2001): 219-255; J. L. A. 
Garcia, “The Doubling Undone? Double Effect in Recent Medical Ethics”; as well as Mangan, ibid., and 
Kazcor, ibid. 
332 Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J., Compendium theologiae moralis, 2 vols. (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1874) 1.5.  
Cited in Christopher Kaczor, 297.  I rely here on Kaczor’s translation, having cross-checked it with the 
only other extant English translation, that of Paul Bert in his Doctrine of the Jesuits (Boston: B.F. Bradbury 
& Co., 1880), 47-48.  Kazcor is more precise, and there is great reason to distrust Bert’s translation since 
the purpose of his work, as stated in the Preface, is an openly polemical attack on Jesuit education.   
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(2) acceptable-act condition: the act must not be bad in 
itself (independently of its causing the bad effect). 
(3) acceptable-means condition: the bad effect must not be 
intended as a means to the good effect. 
(4) proportionate-reason condition: the agent must have a 
proportionately serious moral reason for performing the 
act.333
 
 
While stated neither in Gury or Aquinas, the “central and most controversial element” of 
the Doctrine of Double Effect is the distinction between intention and foresight with 
respect to the bad consequences resulting from the action.334  The harm which results 
from the action cannot be instrumental to the attainment of the good end, nor can it be 
intended either as an end or as a means.  However, the harm is foreseen, as evidenced by 
the requirement for a proportionate reason – only a very good reason could justify the 
production of harm, even if that harm is not intended.335  Whether these constraints and 
the reliance on the distinction between intention and foresight are accurate renderings of 
Aquinas’ teaching on self-defense has been a matter of debate for some time.336
                                                 
333 H.M. Giebel, “Ends, Means, and Character: Recent Critiques of the Intended-Versus-Foreseen 
Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81.3 (Summer 
2007): 447-68. 
  In order 
334 Ibid., 447.  See also Alison McIntyre, “Doing Away with Double Effect,” 219, for the centrality of the 
distinction between intention and foresight to Double Effect claims.  McIntyre places the distinction a the 
heart of the doctrine, prior to the enumeration of constraints and even as part of a number of the constraints.  
While McIntyre cites the traditional Gury-derived formulation of the New Catholic Encyclopedia, she 
ultimately goes on to lists six constraints which do not wholly match those which Giebel enumerates.  This 
is because McIntyre is presenting a response to a wide range of Double Effect views, some of which are 
inspired by Aquinas and the Catholic tradition, others of which are newer.  For instance, one of her 
constraints is on the minimization of harm and another is on the distinction between causing and allowing.  
Both could be said to be implied in Giebel’s enumeration, although there are necessary intermediate 
premises which must be added.   
335 McIntyre, “Doing Away with Double Effect,” 221.  She lists this as the first constraint which actions 
must satisfy to be licit under the Doctrine of Double Effect. 
336 It has been under attack at least since Vincentius M. Alonso, S.J. wrote his dissertation at the Gregorian 
University, El principio del doble efecto en los comentadores de Santo Tomas de Aquino  in 1937.  It was 
this work that Mangan was directed toward refuting in 1949, and it has been a touchstone since.  However, 
Alonso was not alone.  John C. Ford, S.J. in his famous article, “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” 
War and Morality, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1970), 15-41 
[Originally published in Theological Studies 5 (1944): 261-309], which is the ultimate source for various 
thought experiments about terror and strategic bombers, observes, without much fuss, that Aquinas allows 
killing as a means but not as an end in itself. See Ford (1970), p. 27, footnote 27. 
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to evaluate the fidelity of Double Effect to Aquinas’ original teaching, we shall examine 
the question on homicide as well as other passages in Aquinas at length. 
We start, then, with Aquinas’ oft quoted passage on self defense in the Summa 
Theologica.  In response to the question, “Whether it is lawful for a man to kill in self 
defense?”, Aquinas says,  
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one 
of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. 
Now moral acts take their species according to what is 
intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, 
since this is accidental as explained above [43, 3; I-II, 12, 
1]. Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two 
effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the 
slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's 
intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing 
that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as 
far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good 
intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of 
proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, 
uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: 
whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will 
be lawful, because according to the jurists [Cap. 
Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful 
to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the 
limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for 
salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense 
in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound 
to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as 
it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public 
authority acting for the common good, as stated above 
[Article 3], it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man 
in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, 
who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this 
to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting 
against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling 
with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by 
private animosity.337
                                                 
337 Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum sit in 
intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem.  Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod 
intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens, ut ex supradictis patet.   Ex 
actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest, unus quidem conservatio propriae 
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In this passage, Aquinas states that in the case of licit, lethal self defense, the intention of 
the defender is to save his own life and not to kill the attacker.  The defender must also 
use only so much violence as is necessary to defend himself.  Aquinas allows, however, 
that intentional killing is licit by those with public authority for the sake of the common 
good, and this encompasses soldiers and executioners.  It is forbidden to kill on the basis 
of private vengeance in any circumstance, even if the killer is a public official executing a 
lawful sentence or fighting in a just war.  In the case of self defense, the death of the 
attacker is ‘beside the intention’ (praeter intentionem) and comes about apart from the 
intention of the agent.  Nowhere in the body of this article does Aquinas make a 
distinction between intending ends and intending means; likewise he does not speak of 
choice (electio) with respect to killing.   
 If Aquinas means that we cannot licitly intend to kill an attacker, it seems that the 
death is only permissible if it has the character of an “accidental outcome,” which, as 
Gregory Reichberg illustrates, “would be akin to the risky adventure of a mountaineer, 
who, despite all precautions to the contrary, is nevertheless killed by an avalanche: he 
                                                                                                                                                 
vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis.   Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae 
vitae, non habet rationem illiciti, cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest.   
Potest tamen aliquis actus ex bona intentione proveniens illicitus reddi si non sit proportionatus fini.  Et 
ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, erit illicitum.  Si 
vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio, nam secundum iura, vim vi repellere licet cum 
moderamine inculpatae tutelae.  Nec est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae 
praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere quam vitae 
alienae.  Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex 
supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet 
publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum 
bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones.  Quamvis 
et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine moveantur. (ST II-II, Q. 64 a. 7).  All English references to the 
Summa Theologica will be from The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province,  2nd. Rev. Ed., 1920 (Online: www.newadvent.org/summa, online copyright 
Kevin Knight). All Latin references to the Summa Theologica as well as the Summa Contra Gentiles will 
be from the Library of Latin Texts - Series A, accessed through the Brepolis Online Database through 
Boston College. 
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thereby succumbs to an eventuality that he knew to be a distinct possibility from the 
outset, but which he had hoped to avoid.”338  This smacks of negligence more than it does 
deliberate self-defense.  Or it might also be the case that the agent acts with too little time 
to adequately choose non-lethal means.339  This second option seems dubious if Aquinas 
is using the distinction between intention and foresight to support double effect: the agent 
who acts quickly seems to lack foresight.  A larger doubt arises about cases where an 
agent has time to deliberate and act, cases where he clearly foresees the results of his 
chosen course of action.  “Can one,” Reichberg rightly wonders, “deliberately spear the 
heart of an assailant without intending to kill him?”340
 A response to this line of argument might borrow a distinction of Anscombe’s, 
that between what makes an act intentional (its “intentionalness”) and the specific 
intention or purpose of the act.  In this way, a defender of double effect and of the 
standard reading of Aquinas would argue that there is a distinction between a deliberate 
act, which turned out to be lethal, and a deliberately lethal act.  While the stabbing or the 
pulling of the trigger is deliberate and therefore intentional, it does not follow that every 
result or consequence of the act, i.e., the death of the attacker, was intended.  The death 
  The defenders of double effect 
might argue that such a deliberate spearing-in-the-heart would exceed blameless self-
defense, but this will not do.  We can easily come up with other examples of self-defense, 
say with firearms of a certain caliber, where an agent’s only means of defense consists in 
using a weapon of such probable lethality that it seems absurd to suggest that he did not 
intend to kill his attacker.   
                                                 
338 Gregory M. Reichberg, “Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double Effect?” The Thomist 69.3 
(July 2005): 346-347. 
339 Ibid., 347. 
340 Ibid., 347. 
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would be unintended but foreseen, a side-effect.341  Joseph Boyle argues essentially that 
this distinction is at the heart of the meaning of praeter intentionem for Aquinas, i.e., of 
what is beside the intention.  The act of self-defense, whatever it may be, is the object 
chosen for the end of saving one’s life.  Saving one’s life is the end intended.  The death 
of the attacker, according to Boyle, is not the means by which this is brought about, it is a 
possible or probable “foreseen causal consequence” of the act which is the means.  
Therefore, the death is not intended either as a means or as an end.  It results from a 
voluntary or intentional act, but from that fact it does not follow that it is intended.342
 The “crux” of the exegetical issue surrounding Aquinas’ account of killing in self-
defense is what “the proper understanding of what St. Thomas meant by his terms 
intendere and non intendere, ex intentione and praeter intentionem” is.
 
343  There are two 
interpretive options available to us.  Either Aquinas is in ST II-II Q. 64, a.7 using 
intendere in a narrow sense, to refer to the ultimate object of the will, the end, or he is 
using it in a broader sense to include both the intention of the end and the choice of the 
means.344
While ‘intention’ in colloquial English is ambiguous respecting the type of 
intention involved, whether of ends or means, Aquinas’ Latin term intendere and its noun 
form intentio are less ambiguous.  In the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, 
question 12 deals with intendere and its senses. Article 2 asks “Whether intention is only 
  In the former case, we have the standard account of double effect; in the latter 
case, we have a possible permission for instrumental killing, killing chosen as a means to 
a licit end under certain circumstances.    
                                                 
341 Anscombe, “Medalist’s Address,” 21. 
342 Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 656-57; 662-665. 
343 Mangan, 44. 
344 Mangan, 44-45; Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 650-54; Reichberg, 341-42; 363-67. 
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of the last end?” (Videtur quod intentio sit tantum ultimi finis).  Aquinas answers that 
intentions are not only of the last end, namely, happiness, but also of other ends because 
while “intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will,” the term 
terminus is ambiguous because it can mean either the last end or some “middle point” 
(medium) “which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus 
of the other.”  To illustrate, Aquinas gives a geometric example, of a movement between 
points A and C which passes through point B; while C is the last terminus, B is a 
terminus for part of the movement.  He concludes that while the intention of the will 
always concerns the end, it need not be the last or final end. 345
Aquinas deals further with the question of whether ‘intention’ also extends to the 
means in article 4 of Question 12 (Videtur quod non sit unus et idem motus intentio finis, 
et voluntas eius quod est ad finem), and his answer is a qualified ‘yes’ – the qualification 
being most important.   The movement of the will to the end and the movement of the 
will to the means can be considered in two ways:  
  This conclusion is, 
however, ambiguous because the use of a middle point (medium) suggests that intention 
might also be of the means chosen as well. 
First, according as the will is moved to each of the 
aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really 
two movements of the will to them. (Uno modo, secundum 
quod voluntas in utrumque fertur absolute et secundum se. 
Et sic sunt simpliciter duo motus voluntatis in utrumque).  
Secondly, it may be considered accordingly as the will is 
moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the 
movement of the will to the end and its movement to the 
means are one and the same thing. 
 
                                                 
345 This and the following passages from ST I-II, Q. 12 are also cited by Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem” 650-
652.  However, we disagree with Boyle’s interpretation of the passages, as we will elaborate. 
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St. Thomas illustrates the second way of understanding the movement of the will with the 
example of saying that "I wish to take medicine for the sake of health," signifies nothing 
more than one movement of the will, “because the end is the reason for willing the 
means.” Thus, the whole movement is one act by reference to the end, although it can 
have discernible parts, i.e., the choices made in light of or for the end.  For Boyle, this 
passage is the firmest piece of evidence for rejecting any interpretation of ST II-II, Q. 64 
a. 7 which allows for instrumental killing because intentio here covers both the ends and 
the means.346
 A strong argument for the narrower interpretation of intendere and intentio  
comes in the Summa Contra Gentiles.  In part III, chapter 5.2, Aquinas presents 
“Arguments which seem to prove that evil is not apart from intention [praeter 
intentionem].”
   The passage does not end the argument, pace Boyle, because it is still 
open to an interpreter to assert that Thomas is using intendere in the first of the senses 
mentioned in distinction to the choice (electio) or means. 
347
                                                 
346 Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 653-54; cited also in Reichberg,  350. 
  The most potent argument is the second one presented, which contrasts 
what is praeter intentionem with what is fortuitous or by chance, things which rarely 
happen.  The problem with saying that evil can occur praeter intentionem is that “the 
occurrence of evil is not called fortuitous, a matter of chance, nor does it happen rarely, 
but always or in most cases.”  The prevalence of sin in human actions and choices, so the 
argument goes, weighs heavily against evil being apart from or beside intention (SCG, 
III, 5.2).  Likewise, we are also held accountable for the consequences which happen as 
result of our actions, even if they were not the intended goal (SCG III, 5.7).    In response, 
347 All of the English translations of the Summa Contra Gentiles which we will be using are taken from 
Summa Contra Gentiles, vol. 3, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1975). In lieu of page numbers we have given the chapter and section numbers which correspond to the 
Latin edition also cited. 
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Aquinas cites Aristotle’s example of a “mixed” action from the third book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics:  “In the example of the man who throws his merchandise into the 
sea in order to save himself, he does not intend (non intendit) the throwing away of the 
merchandise but his own safety; yet he wills (vult) the throwing not for itself (non 
simpliciter) but for the sake of safety (sed causa salutis)” (SCG III, 6.9).348
 The passage from the Summa Contra Gentiles has drawn significant attention in 
the debate over whether Aquinas is a proponent or forbear of what has become the 
Doctrine of Double Effect.  Boyle discounts the passage on the grounds that the limiting 
of intention to the ultimate end is inconsistent with Aquinas’ other works, especially ST I-
II, Q. 12, a. 2, which we treated above.  Likewise, Aquinas never explicitly says that the 
throwing of the cargo overboard is praeter intentionem, although it is strongly suggested 
  Although 
evil can be praeter intentionem it is, according to Aquinas, voluntary (voluntarium), “For 
intention is directed to an ultimate end which a person wills for its own sake, but the will 
may also be directed to that which a person wills for the sake of something else (vult 
propter aliud), even if he would not will it simply for itself.”  In the Summa Theologica, 
I-II, Q. 8, a. 2, Aquinas says that the proper act of the will is of the end; however, the will 
also wills the means, which are good “not in themselves, but as referred to the end.”   
This suggests that that the act of the will designated here, as well as in ST II-II, Q. 64, a. 
7, is the act of choice (electio), and that what is praeter intentionem in these cases, 
although not always, is the means. 
                                                 
348 Ex quo patet quod, licet malum praeter intentionem sit, est tamen voluntarium, ut secunda ratio 
proponit, licet non per se, sed per accidens.  Intentio enim est ultimi finis, quem quis propter se vult: 
voluntas autem est eius etiam quod quis vult propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter non vellet; sicut qui proiicit 
merces in mari causa salutis, non intendit proiectionem mercium, sed salutem, proiectionem autem vult non 
simpliciter, sed causa salutis.  Similiter propter aliquod bonum sensibile consequendum aliquis vult facere 
inordinatam actionem, non intendens inordinationem, neque volens eam simpliciter, sed propter hoc.  Et 
ideo hoc modo malitia et peccatum dicuntur esse voluntaria, sicut proiectio mercium in mari. SCG, c. 6.9 
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by the context.  Boyle resolves these issues by suggesting that Aquinas is using praeter 
intentionem in a narrower and stricter sense in the Summa Contra Gentiles than he does 
in the Summa Theologica.349  Mangan, writing earlier, noted the same facts and argued 
that Aquinas’ thought was in development between the two works.350  Reichberg, against 
Mangan and Boyle, correctly argues that this interpretation will not do, since praeter 
intentionem is discussed “under the heading of the ‘mixed voluntary’,” whereby “an act 
that one ordinarily finds repulsive, hence ‘nonvoluntary’ in the sense of being antithetical 
to the will, can nevertheless be rationally desired (chosen) under circumstance of 
imminent danger.”351  Thus, if praeter intentionem is being used in the same way in the 
question on homicide, Aquinas can be read as saying that the killing of the attacker is the 
means by which the end of self defense is realized, one necessitated by the circumstances.  
Likewise, the act is, without qualification, voluntary, but with respect to the 
circumstances, involuntary and deserving of pardon.352  We may add that there is no need 
to posit a discrepancy between the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologica on 
the senses of praeter intentionem, intendere, and intentio: it is clear that praeter 
intentionem is ambiguous, and the ambiguity hinges on the two senses of what it is to 
intend (intendere, intentio) identified explicitly in the Summa Theologica.   Aquinas 
overcomes the paradoxes surrounding the evil that occurs praeter intentionem by 
appealing to a narrower sense of intention, which is identified in both works.353
                                                 
349 Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 654-55. 
   
350 Mangan, 47-48.  Mangan makes his argument in response to Alonso.  I have not had access to Alonso’s 
work, which appears to be incredibly insightful, but I do wish to note that I am in substantial agreement 
with Alonso’s argument as presented by Mangan, Boyle, and Reichberg.  
351 Reichberg, 350. 
352 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 1110a20-26; Aquinas, ST I-II, Q. 6, a. 6. 
353 Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” p. 655.  Boyle argues that the Summa Contra Gentiles is inconsistent with 
the Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 12, a. 2 because the limited sense of intention is not used in the latter.  As 
we have clearly shown, it is. 
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 Reichberg’s interpretation is substantially the same as that of the Dominican 
Francisco de Vitoria.354  Vitoria, writing in the first half of the 16th Century, addresses the 
possible interpretations of Aquinas’ treatment of killing in self-defense, and he rejects 
what amounts to the modern understanding of double effect on his understanding of 
intention and will.  According to Vitoria, Aquinas comes to three conclusions about 
killing in self-defense: 1) “it is not unlawful to kill an attacker”; 2) “It is lawful to kill 
another in self-defense” supposing that this is “within the bounds of blameless self-
defense”; 3) even within those bounds, “it is not lawful to intend to kill a man, as in 
revenge while defending oneself.”355  The third conclusion, he notes, raises a number of 
doubts about the nature of the intention that an agent who kills in self-defense may have.  
On the one hand, we may reject Aquinas’ distinction between will or choice and 
intention, and argue that if it is licit to will to kill an attacker it is licit to intend to kill the 
attacker.356   Vitoria rejects this approach.  On the other hand, we might argue that since 
it is unlawful to intend to kill the attacker it is unlawful to will it.  Vitoria rejects this 
approach as well but presents it at greater length.  One might argue, Vitoria says, that it is 
not necessary, in principle, to kill an attacker in order to defend oneself: one may simply 
will to “use my shield and fight” without also willing to kill.  Therefore, “it is not 
necessary to will to kill, but it is enough to will to defend oneself.”357
                                                 
354 Reichberg makes many references to Vitoria, including references to the passage I examine here, but he 
does not go through it at any length, as I do here.  I have done this to make it clear that the position I am 
arguing for is not new. 
  It may be 
necessary that some state of affairs be created, i.e., the death of the attacker; however, it 
355 Francisco de Vitoria, Reflections on Homicide and Commentary on the Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae Q. 
64, trans. John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997), 193.  This is a bilingual edition 
with Vitoria’s Latin text on the page facing the English translation.  All Latin references for this work are 
from the same. The italics are Doyle’s, not mine. 
356 Ibid., 193.  Vitoria gives this as the opinion of several unnamed contemporaries. 
357 Ibid., 193-95. 
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may not be necessary to will that specific state of affairs be brought about, but only to 
will some other action that will bring about the same result, e.g., one may will to strike 
with a weapon but not to kill. Likewise with a case of amputation, where one might argue 
that, “when to save my life the amputation of an arm is necessary, the necessary 
amputation of the arm is lawful, but not the willing of that amputation.”358
 In response to the suggested distinction that we might allow that the killing of the 
attacker is lawful but not the willing of the killing of the attacker, Vitoria says that “God 
has no regard for such sophisms.”  He considers this sophistical because there are some 
means available for self-defense that causally entail the death of the attacker, and there 
are some circumstances in which there are no other means available.  He uses a then 
novel example of an arquebus, a primitive firearm.  If someone has no other weapon than 
an arquebus, “then it is clear that he cannot defend himself except by killing.”
  
359
                                                 
358 Ibid., 195. 
  An 
arguebus is much like a modern shotgun, not very accurate but lethal at close range;  if 
one shoots an attacker with an arquebus at close range, there is little likelihood that 
attacker will survive.  It seems farcical to suppose that in shooting such a weapon that the 
defender can will something other than death to his attacker.  Therefore, it is lawful to 
will to kill; however, Vitoria denies that this entails that it is lawful to intend to kill. 
Vitoria denies that willing to kill in self-defense, when there are no other means 
available, entails intending to kill in self-defense, and he does so on the basis of the 
distinction we have already examined between the senses of intention.  “For there is a 
difference,” Vitoria says, “between choice and an intention, because an intention is of 
359 Ibid. 
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that which is directly intended as an end.”360 One cannot intend the death of another as an 
end in itself, as would be the case of one killing in revenge; however, one can will or 
‘choose’ to kill for the sake of another end, for self-defense for instance.  Likewise, one 
can will to amputate one’s gangrenous arm, but that does not entail that one intends this 
as an end, as some form of self-mutilation.  Vitoria concludes that it is lawful “to will, but 
not to intend, all that is necessary for defense.”361
The interpretation given by Vitoria was by no means novel or unique; it is also the 
interpretation of other noteworthy commentators such as the Jesuits Leonardus Lessius 
and Gabriel Vasquez, the Dominican Dominicus De Soto, and even the Protestant father 
of international law, Hugo Grotius.
   
362  The notable exception to the general consensus on 
Aquinas’ treatment of killing in self-defense prior to the late seventeenth century is 
Cardinal Cajetan, a contemporary of Vitoria.  It is he whom both Mangan and Boyle 
credit with the beginnings of the ‘modern’ teachings on double effect, namely with 
prohibiting the intention of killing as a means to self defense.363  From Cajetan to the 
present, the formal Doctrine of Double Effect as we know it seems to have developed in 
moral theology at Salamanca in the mid to late 16th Century, and became a component of 
Jesuit casuistry, culminating in the widely read Compendium theologiae moralis of Gury 
in 1874.364
                                                 
360 Ibid., 194: “quia differentia est inter electionem et intentionem, quia intentio est ejus quod per se 
intentum est ut finis.”  
   
361 Ibid. 
362 Mangan, 45; Reichberg, 348; 352-53.  Mangan concedes the predominance of this interpretation in the 
Jesuits and Dominicans named; although he curiously misreads or miscites Vitoria on this point (see 
Reichberg, 348, footnote 17).  Reichberg offers an extended discussion of Grotius’ remarks on self-defense 
in reference to Aquinas. 
363 Mangan, 52-56; Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem”, 661; see also Reichberg, 350. 
364 Mangan, 56-60; Kaczor, 300-302. 
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 Our interpretation of Aquinas, following Reichberg and Vitoria, runs into a 
substantial and difficult objection: How does this interpretation square with St. Paul’s 
admonition that we should not do evil that good may come of it in Romans 3:8?  Among 
contemporary proponents of Double Effect, Romans 3:8 is a critical passage supporting 
the use of the distinction between intention and foresight as well as the prohibition of 
intending instrumental harm.  In Romans 3:8 Paul responds to some early Christian 
believers who “opined that wrongdoing (sin) is tolerable or even desirable because it 
affords occasion for God to accomplish his redemptive work.”365  Paul denies what these 
believers say, namely “Let us do evil, that good may come” and says this is slanderously 
attributed to him.  Those who hold such a view are, he says, justly damned.366  John 
Finnis states the principle of this admonition as, “Do not do evil, even for the sake of 
good,” and calls this the “Pauline Principle.”367
 Since Romans 3:8 is given such weight, it is profitable to look for citations of it 
elsewhere in the Summa Theologica.  Given its connection to Double Effect, it is 
surprising that it is not cited in ST II-II, Q. 64 a. 7, the article on self-defense.  It is, 
  It seems that our interpretation 
contradicts this principle, and it would therefore seem that we would be arguing that 
Aquinas’ views on self-defense blatantly contradict a fundamental principle of his 
religious tradition.  Likewise, philosophically, we would seem to be guilty of precisely 
the kind of consequentialism we are trying to avoid.  Therefore, we must answer this 
charge, and in order to do this, we must show how our interpretation of Aquinas, and 
Aquinas himself, avoids these obstacles. 
                                                 
365 Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (London: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 110. 
366 I have chosen the King James translation of the Bible for this quote and have added a paraphrase, as the 
original verse does not lend itself to be quoted out of context. 
367 Finnis, Fundamentals., 111. 
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however, cited in a response to an objection in a prior article in the same question on 
suicide.  In ST II-II, Q. 64 a. 5, “Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?”, the third objection 
argues that it may be lawful to do kill oneself in order to avoid a greater evil, like “an 
unhappy life or the shame of sin.”  Aquinas’ response to the objection comes in two parts.  
First, citing Aristotle, he claims that the greatest evil in this life is death.  To choose death 
to escape other afflictions is therefore to choose the greater evil.  Second, he argues that 
there is no sin without the consent of the will.  Therefore, one need not choose death to 
avoid sin, since there can be no shame unless one consents to the sin.  In support of this 
Aquinas says, “Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should 
consent to sin, because ‘evil must not be done that good may come’ (Romans 3:8)” both 
because the present evil may be of little importance compared to death and one’s future 
consent to sin is not fated, but also because God can deliver man from any temptation.  
The structure of the response suggests that it is always wrong to kill oneself because 
death is worse than anything else one can suffer or choose to suffer in this life.   
Therefore, the means (suicide) and the end (the avoidance of greater evil) are at odds with 
one another because the greater evil is being chosen as a means to avoid the greater 
evil.368
 Another place Aquinas cites Romans 3:8 is in his treatment of “fraternal 
correction” in ST II-II, Q. 33, a. 6, and this citation sheds more light on the relationship 
between ends and means.  The question posed by the sixth article is: “Whether one ought 
  Aquinas wishes to illustrate the contradiction inherent in the position of one 
advocating suicide.  There is no similar logical contradiction in the case of killing in self 
defense: one’s life will be saved with the death of the attacker.   
                                                 
368 I believe that Aquinas is here using evil in the sense of harm.  Death is certainly the greatest harm or 
injury which can befall a person; however, the moral evil comes in the choice of death over some other 
harm.  We will address this issue again below. 
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to forbear from correcting someone through fear lest he become worse?”  The third 
objection argues that one should never forbear correction:  
Further, according to the Apostle [Romans 3:8] we should 
not do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like 
manner, good should not be omitted lest evil befall. Now 
fraternal correction is a good thing. Therefore it should not 
be omitted for fear lest the person corrected become worse 
(ST II-II, Q. 33, a. 6, Obj. 3). 
 
The objection assumes that correction is always good and lack of correction is always an 
evil when someone is in error.  Therefore, even though refraining from correction might 
bring about improvement in another, or at least not make them worse, the Apostolic 
prohibition would seem to forbid leaving our erring brother alone.  In response, Aquinas 
argues that: 
Whatever is directed to the end becomes good through 
being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal 
correction hinders the end, namely the amendment of our 
brother, it is no longer good, so that when such a correction 
is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil should befall (ST II-
II, Q. 33, a. 6, resp. 3).  
 
Failing to correct someone in error is sometimes but not always an evil; the act of 
correction is good or bad by reference to the end and whether the act will produce the 
good end.  This is in line with Aquinas’ statements in ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 6, that human 
actions derive their moral species from the ends for which they are performed. 
 There is some ambiguity, however, about which end properly specifies a human 
action, e.g., as theft or adultery: Is it the proximate or remote end?  Aquinas uses a 
number of terms to specify the different relations that ends can have to one another and to 
actions in both the Summa Theologica and his other works, the most significant for our 
purposes being the pair of terms proximate and remote.  The explicit division of ends into 
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these two categories is made in the Summa Theologica (I-II, Q. 1, a. 3, resp. 3) and in De 
Malo (Q. 2, a. 4 resp. 9; a. 7, resp. 8); however, Aquinas often divides ends into ordered 
pairs, one being pursued for the sake of the other, which corresponds to the distinction 
between proximate and remote ends.369  In some passages, Aquinas seems to state that 
the proximate end specifies an action; in others, it seems that the remote end gives the act 
its moral species.370  There are philosophical difficulties with whichever end one chooses 
to morally specify actions.  If we rely solely on remote ends, as Joseph Pilsner correctly 
observes, it “would seem to lead to the untenable consequence of fusing all human 
actions into a single species”; that is, all actions would be of one kind, for instance, no 
distinction would be made between a brave act and a just one, both falling under the 
species of charity.371   However, if we rely only on the proximate end, we seem to run 
into the fact that one proximate end may be ordered to any number of higher order ends, 
which are significant both morally and in the description of an action.  Committing 
adultery for financial gain seems distinguishable from committing adultery for pleasure; 
they are different because of the further intentions of the agent, and this affects our moral 
evaluation of the actions.  Both actions are morally bad qua adultery; however, adultery 
motivated by financial gain might be worse because more calculating.372
                                                 
369 Joseph Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 218-219.  Pilsner cites De Malo, Q. 2, a.4, response 9; a. 7, response 8  
  It seems that 
Aquinas holds that both the remote and the proximate end can specify an action.  This 
raises a very important terminological issue because metaphysically speaking an entity 
370 Ibid., 219-223.  Pilsner cites the following passages for the priority of the proximate end in moral 
specification: De Malo, Q. 2, a. 4, resp. 9; a. 6, resp. 9, Q. 8, a. 1, resp. 14; ST I-II, Q. 1, a. 3, resp.. 3; I-II 
Q. 60, a. 1, resp. 3.  Pilsner cites the following passages for the priority of the remote end in moral 
specification: ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 6, resp. 2; I-II, Q. 75, a. 4; Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, V, 
Lect. 3, n. 4. 
371 Ibid., 221. 
372 Ibid., 219, 225.  The example here cited is taken from Pilsner who takes it from Aquinas’ Commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics V, Lect. 3, n. 4 
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cannot have more than one species.  If an act receives different species from its proximate 
and remote ends, it would seem to have one species too many. 
 The term ‘species’ does not have the same meaning in reference to action as it 
does in reference to the metaphysical make up of substances, and its use by Aquinas in 
reference to action is ambiguous.  In the Disputed Questions on Virtue (Quaestiones 
disputatae de virtutibus), Aquinas argues that while one form cannot literally be the form 
of another form as a material subject, more than one form can inhere in the same subject, 
“according to a certain order, such that one is formal with respect to the other” (De Virtut. 
Q. 2 (de caritate quaestio unica), a. 3, resp. 2).373  Aquinas makes this point to explain 
how the cardinal virtues, like charity, can give a second form to an action which is 
already specified by its proximate end.  In the Summa Theologica, argues that something 
can be general in two ways: by predication and virtually.  In the first case, for example, 
animal is general by predication to man and horse: it is “essentially the same for those 
things for which it is general, because a genus pertains to the essence of a species and 
falls within its definition.”  In the second case,  a virtue, like justice, can be general 
virtually “insofar as it orders the acts of other virtues to its own end, that is, to move all 
other virtues through command” (ST II-II, Q. 58, a. 6).  The relationship between the two 
forms, and likewise between the two kinds of species, is hierarchical where one is 
ordered to and by the other.374
                                                 
373 Ibid., 227-28.  Here and in what follows I present Pilsner’s argument with direct citations from the 
works he cites, although I do not proceed in exactly the same sequence as Pilsner’s argument.  The 
translation used here is provided by Pilsner.  The Latin titles are from the Library of Latin Texts, Series A, 
accessed through Brepolis Online Database through the Boston College Library Portal.   
  This ordering is like the relationship between a genus and 
a species, and in ST II-II, Q. 11, a. 1, resp. 2, Aquinas argues that the remote end is to the 
374 Ibid. 229-31. 
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proximate end as the genus is to the species.375
 Aquinas’ different emphasis on the way in which different ends can specify 
actions follows from two different ways Aquinas approaches action description and 
evaluation:  secundum suam speciem (according to its species) or secundum individuum 
(according to the individual act) (ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 8; a. 9).
  Thus, we can see how an act can have 
two species in the sense that a proximate end is ordered to and by a remote end.  The 
proximate end explains, directs, and causes the present action and the remote end 
explains, directs and causes the proximate end. 
376
The first approach considers human actions as kinds, 
abstracted from any ends to which they might be directed, 
while the second considers human actions in so far as they 
exist in reality, that is with all of the particular conditions 
of an individual situation, including any further ends.
   These approaches are 
differentiated by Pilsner in the following manner: 
377
 
  
Prescinding from the consideration of further ends, some species of actions are 
indifferent; however, with respect to individual actions which are fully determined by the 
agent’s intentions and circumstances, every individual action is good or bad (ST I-II, q. 
18, a. 8; a 9).  It is according to the species that the proximate end sufficiently specifies 
an action and the remote end does not.378 When Aquinas focuses on particular actions, as 
he often does in responding to objections, “he is wondering what the species of an action 
would be in a case where a particular proximate end (like theft) is already being ordered 
to a particular remote end (like murdering or almsgiving).”379
                                                 
375 Ibid., 229. 
  Such considerations are far 
376 Ibid. 234. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Ibid., 235-36. 
379 Ibid., 237. 
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from trivial: a good proximate end can be put to a bad use for the purposes of a remote 
end, and a good remote end can be sought through an illicit proximate end. 
The contrast between these two approaches is substantially the same as the 
contemporary contrast between thin and thick descriptions of actions.  When we give a 
thick description of action, the remote end gains prominence as that to which all the 
subordinate ends are ordered.  The thicker the description, the more aspects of a 
particular action are revealed.380 Each end is being intended at the same time, but not in 
exactly the same way, and both bring a specification to the action.381 While the use of the 
terms genus and species with respect to action descriptions in Aquinas is equivocal, the 
relationship between proximate and remote ends is no mere accident.  As Pilsner 
concludes: “Thomas believes that, when one is sought precisely for the sake of another, 
the relation between them is not longer accidental, but essential.”382
 While approaching actions secundum individuum through a full, thick description 
of an agent’s motives and intentions gives them the most accurate and detailed moral 
specification, an act can sometimes be specified as evil only by reference to the 
proximate end.  Some proximate ends sufficiently specify an action’s moral quality such 
that no subsequent remote end can render the action morally licit. 
 The remote end is 
not extrinsic to the present proximate end being pursued or to the present action, because 
it is what gives direction to both.   
383
                                                 
380 The comparison to thin and thick descriptions is my own. 
  Theft, for instance, 
is defined by Aquinas as the “taking another’s thing secretly” (ST II-II, Q. 66, a. 3).  As 
such, theft is always a sin, being contrary to justice by the taking of what belongs 
381 Pilsner, 237. 
382 Ibid., 238. 
383 See Pilsner, 236.  Pilsner uses murder as such a proximate end although he goes on to analogize it with 
theft.  We will reconsider the example of murder below in contrast to killing in self-defense. 
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rightfully to another and through the use of fraud (ST II-II, Q. 66, a.5).  However, not 
every taking of another’s thing, according to Aquinas, is theft: “In cases of need all things 
are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, 
for need has made it common” (ST II-II, Q. 66, a 7).  Circumstances may be such as to 
nullify the claim one man has to the sole private use of his property: 
if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that 
the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at 
hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent 
danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is 
lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of 
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: 
nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery (ST II-II, Q. 
66, a 7). 
 
The circumstance of dire need can change the relevant moral relationship between human 
agents.  Such a circumstance is not accidental to an act, but helps to specify it, by 
reference to reason; for without it, the taking would not be done.384
 There is a similar qualification of licit and illicit killing in Aquinas’ treatment of 
homicide.  Aquinas does not offer a definition of murder as he does of theft; however, in 
his treatment of the Decalogue, he comes close.  In ST I-II, Q. 100, a. 8, the third 
objection argues that the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable, and cites the 
   
                                                 
384 See ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 10.  Here Aquinas says: “But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular 
term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a 
circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the 
principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property 
is specified by reason of the property being ‘another's,’ and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; 
and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional 
circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the 
condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, 
reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional 
repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is 
considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, 
whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the 
moral action whether good or bad.”  As Pilsner notes of this passage and others, ‘object’ here is being used 
in reference to the proximate rather than the remote end of the action; see Pilsner, 133-37. 
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Commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’.  Since it is proper that “evil-doers” and “enemies” 
are lawfully put to death, it seems that the precept is dispensable.  In response to the 
objection, Aquinas says: 
The slaying of a man is forbidden in the Decalogue, in so 
far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this 
sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. 
Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain 
unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the 
common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the 
precept of the Decalogue; and such a killing is no murder 
as forbidden by that precept (ST I-II, Q. 100, a. 8).  
 
Murder is an undue killing.  As Pilsner describes it, the proximate end of murder is 
“taking the life of an innocent person.” Such an end is self-sufficient for determining the 
species of the resultant act as evil.385  However, we must note that the killing of another 
is not per se morally wrong or unlawful; otherwise, even judicial killings would be 
morally wrong.    Rather, the proximate end must be specified to include the condition of 
the person being killed, and this condition is not accidental to determining the species of 
the act but is essential in distinguishing morally licit from morally illicit forms of 
homicide.386
 With this in mind, we can see that our interpretation of Aquinas’ account of 
killing in self-defense does not violate the ‘Pauline Principle’ of Romans 3:8.  Killing is 
indifferent as to its species and the proximate end of self-defense gives prima facie 
  In ST II-II, Q. 64, a. 7, the killing is not undue because one is killing an 
unjust and unlawful attacker in order to save one’s own life.  Just as the condition of dire 
need is relevant to specifying the act of taking of another’s possessions, so too the 
condition of being unjustly and violently attacked is relevant to specifying the act of 
killing.  
                                                 
385 Pilsner, 236. 
386 See note above.  See also Pilsner, 119, for corroboration that killing is indifferent as to its species.   
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grounds to consider the killing morally licit.  It is not sufficient to give the act of killing 
its moral species because one might be defending oneself in pursuit of a criminal or 
immoral remote end: for instance, a man might be a burglar defending himself against a 
homeowner.  Therefore, provided the defender is innocent, there may be doing of evil 
that good may result.  Our interpretation likewise does not violate the claim Aquinas 
makes in ST I-II, Q. 20, a.2 that “for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, 
whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it 
must be good in every respect.”  As he says in the same article, “we may consider a 
twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and 
circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end.”  The defender’s intended end 
of self-defense is licit and the act chosen by the defender is measured by reason to the 
pursuit of that end by the killing of an unjust attacker when the defender’s life is 
threatened.  There is, therefore, no evil aspect to the action.  We must be careful here to 
distinguish between the harm done to the attacker and moral evil.  Aquinas licenses the 
instrumental use of harm which is not the same thing as licensing evil acts.  The doing of 
harm -- for killing or injuring are certainly harms -- is bad to the one who suffers it, but it 
is not necessarily doing evil.387
In the argument we have made thus far, we have extended the license to kill in 
self-defense to private individuals, without respect to public office and the common good.  
This might seem a problem given the end of the main body of ST I-II, Q. 64, a. 7, where 
    
                                                 
387 Here I follow John Finnis in reserving the phrase ‘doing evil’ for wrong-doing rather than for doing 
harm, like a physical injury, which is sometimes called a ‘pre-moral evil’.  Finnis uses the example of life-
saving amputation to illustrate the difference.  Some ethicists say that an amputation is an “imperfect act” 
because of the evil of the loss of a limb.  Against this, Finnis argues, “But the life-saving acts of amputation 
are not imperfect; they are not even doing evil, not at all, not even a little bit . . .”  While I disagree with 
Finnis, interpretation of Aquinas’ account of killing in self defense, I agree with his distinction here, and I 
would say that the interpretation I have offered makes precisely this point.  The chosen killing is not evil.  
See Finnis, Fundamentals, 113. 
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Aquinas says, “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except 
for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer 
this to the public good.”  The limitation of a permission on defensive killing to agents 
acting in a public capacity may seem a substantial objection to our interpretation, but we 
can defuse this objection in two ways.  In the first way, we may grant that there is a 
restriction on defensive killing and this would still not substantially change the account 
we have offered.  This is because Aquinas allows killing by public officials for the sake 
of the common good.  Therefore, the intention of the end, i.e., the promotion of the 
common good, justifies the choice of the action, i.e., the killing.  The article on self-
defense would therefore be following article 2, where Aquinas argues that it is licit to kill 
sinners.  In the second way, we need not grant that Aquinas makes no exceptions for 
defensive killing by private individuals.  That this is actually the case is indicated by 
several facts.  First, Aquinas has already established that it is lawful for public officials to 
kill criminals for the common good; hence, the article on killing in self-defense would be 
superfluous if it were meant only to establish that point.  Second, as the basis for arguing 
that killing self-defense is morally licit Aquinas claims that “it is natural to everything to 
keep itself in being, as far as possible,” and that  “one is bound to take more care of one's 
own life than of another's,” and these claims extend to all men and not simply public 
officials.  Third and finally, in the sed contra, Aquinas says: 
It is written [Exodus 22:2]: "If a thief be found breaking 
into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to 
die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is 
much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. 
Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill 
another in defense of his own life (ST II-II, Q. 64, a. 7). 
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The case presented here is one of a private individual defending his property with lethal 
force; moreover, the example itself has the authority of Scripture.  These facts would 
seem to indicate that there is, at most, a prima facie restriction of the use of lethal force to 
public officials acting in accordance with the public good, but not an absolute one.388
It is important to note that Aquinas’ approach to defensive killing avoids the 
charge of consequentialism while not invoking the distinction between intention and 
foresight.  As Aquinas says in ST I-II, Q. 20, a. 2,  that “which is in respect of the order to 
the end, depends entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or 
circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the 
will, in so far as the will tends towards it.”  There is a reciprocal relationship between 
reason and the will as in human action, both are joined in choice (electio) (ST I-II, Q. 13, 
a. 2).  The circumstances pertaining to an action enter into an intention to act through 
reason and deliberation.  Therefore, a good end, remote or proximate, “is not enough to 
make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of 
the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil” (ST I-II, 
Q. 20, a. 2). The agent’s cognizance of his circumstances as well as his rationally 
measured response enter into his choice of action, which we might call in English the 
proximate intention with which he acts.
  
389
                                                 
388 I am indebted to Gareth Matthews, “Saint Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect,” Aquinas’s Moral 
Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzman, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 75.  Matthews does not give any real argument for his conclusion that the 
restriction of the permission to use lethal force is only a prima facie prohibition – in fact it appears only in 
Matthews’ précis of ST II-II, Q. 64, a. 7.  The argument I make above is my own, but I was inspired by 
Matthews’ précis. 
  Therefore, the agent’s intention, broadly 
speaking to include both the intention of the end and the choice of the means, is still the 
389 I would distinguish here between the ‘proximate intention with which an agent acts’ and the ‘proximate 
intention for which an agent acts’: the former is a choice (electio/prohairesis); the latter is a proximate end, 
in Aquinas’s terminology or a boulēsis in Aristotle’s. 
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primary basis for the evaluation of an action.  This analysis would seem to satisfy 
Anscombe’s anti-consequentialist criteria that “a man is responsible for the bad 
consequences of his bad actions, but gets no credit for the good ones; and contrariwise is 
not [morally] responsible for the bad consequences of good actions.”390
  The idea that one can intentionally kill another human being and that that action 
can be morally good may strike some as being blatantly wrong, but this is because of the 
ambiguity both of the word and the concept of intention.  As we have tried to show in our 
examination of Aquinas’ treatment of killing in self-defense, both Aquinas’ Latin term 
intentio as well as the English word ‘intention’ are ambiguous.  They are ambiguous for 
two reasons.  First, intentions themselves are related in hierarchically ordered chains 
corresponding to different ends, such that each end is intended but not all in the same 
manner; some are ordered to the fulfillment of others.  Second, denoting these intentions’ 
positions within this hierarchy with terms such as ‘end’, ‘means’, ‘proximate end’, 
‘remote end’, etc. is relative to a given episode of action under discussion and can be 
revised almost indefinitely.  The boundaries of a given episode of action can be expanded 
or contracted, such that the proximate end of one description is a remote end of another 
or the means in one description is an end in another.  Aquinas often makes an appeal to 
reason (see ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 10) as the standard for how to judge the morally significant 
features of any action or actions.  Though he gives many examples of reason specifying 
actions and their corresponding intentions and choices, he does not formulate a decidable 
  That is to say, 
someone who kills in a rationally measured act of self-defense is not considered morally 
bad although they did in fact intentionally cause the death of the attacker because the act 
was good. 
                                                 
390 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 12. 
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procedure for applying the standard of reason to action descriptions and evaluations.391
Aquinas and Aristotle are careful to distinguish the relative positions of different 
types of what we call intentions within an episode of human action with ordered pairs of 
terms like intentio/electio and boulēsis/prohairesis, which specify the end and the means 
respectively.  They do this because the ordering of intentions is of critical importance 
both to the explanation and evaluation of action.  An action is not sufficiently specified as 
good, for either Aquinas or Aristotle, until both the end and the means are known and 
described; although it can be specified as evil from the end alone.  Many proponents of 
Double Effect, however, fail to adequately emphasize and distinguish the importance of 
the relative position of intentions within an agent’s action plan or episode of action.  
Thus, Gury et al. assume that Aquinas is using intendere and intentio broadly, which he 
sometimes does, in passages where he is using them narrowly to specify the intention of 
  
What is important throughout is that certain higher-order or remote ends justify certain 
lower-order or proximate ends and choices, but higher-order or remote ends are not 
capable of justifying every proximate end or choice.  Therefore, the reason that it seems 
that intentional killing must always be wrong is because the intention supposed to 
motivate such an action is of some proximate end of vengeance or sadism, or some more 
general and remote end like genocide.  However, as in the case of self-defense, it seems 
that an instrumental intention, an intention of means, what Aquinas denotes as choice or 
electio and Aristotle as prohairesis, can be licitly chosen for the sake of some other end, 
and not as an end in itself.  While Aquinas and Aristotle denote this type of intentionality 
with specific terms, colloquial English usage is far less precise.   
                                                 
391 See Pilsner, 119.  Pilsner says that Thomas’ description of the ratio of an “object” of human action, 
which Pilsner notes often refers to the proximate end of an action, is not explained in detail although 
examples are given. 
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the end rather than the intention of the means.  They are not mistaken in believing that 
electio or choice is a kind of intention; however, they are mistaken in believing that it 
does not matter which kind of intention one is talking about in cases of intentional 
homicide.  Proponents of Double Effect assume that to describe an act as killing already 
sufficiently specifies it as evil; whereas killing for Aquinas is indifferent as a species of 
action without further specification.  Some proponents of Double Effect seem to assume 
that any harm intentionally inflicted on another is morally evil, without reference to the 
circumstances of the agent and the patient or the agent’s intentions.392  Proponents of 
Double Effect then “assimilate intending as a means to intending as an end” such that, 
like Thomas Nagel, they conclude, “to aim at evil, even as a means, is to have one’s 
action guided by evil.”393
For our purposes, with respect to the debate about the Simple View, we must 
make note of the various uses of intention and specify our own.  First, while we 
distinguish between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, we do not use 
any specific technical term to denote this distinction; both are intentions.  However, we 
try to signal the distinction by using phrases like ‘intention of the end’ or ‘intention of the 
    Thus, there are two related errors.  The first is an error with 
respect to the relationship between action description and intention, specifically the 
importance of both the intention of the end and the intention of the means in a full, thick 
action description.  The second is an error with respect to the relationship between the 
intention of the end and the intention of the means: the intention of the end has priority in 
both explanation and justification because the intention of the means is directed to it.  
                                                 
392 See Finnis, Fundamentals, 112-113.  Finnis argues against such a Double Effect position, labeling it in 
that context “proportionalism,” although he espouses another version Double Effect.   
393 The first quotation is from McIntyre, 227; the second from Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 181-182 [cited in McIntyre, 227]. 
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means’.  Second, we hold that for an agent to intend to A as a means entails that: 1) the 
agent intends to A; 2) the agent does A intentionally; 3) the agent has an intention to A; 4) 
the A-ing of the agent was intentional.  Third, we also hold that for an agent to intend to B 
as an end: 1) the agent intends to B; 2) the agent does B intentionally; 3) the agent has an 
intention to B; 4) the B-ing of the agent was intentional.  We use different letters, A and 
B, here to denote two different entities. A means to one end can be an end to another, but 
it cannot be both an end and a means at the same time in the same respect.  Third, the 
four different locutions, verbal, adverbial, nominal, and adjectival are coextensive, so 
long as one retains reference to which sort of intention one is speaking about.  That is not 
to say that the bare locution ‘X does A intentionally’ implies ‘X intends to A’ in 
colloquial usage; it does not.  This is due to the ambiguity between the two senses of 
intention: the former expression is often used indiscriminately to cover cases of 
instrumental intending as well as intending as a means; the latter case is most often used 
to signify that the action was the purpose or goal of the agent.  Keeping this ambiguity in 
mind and making the distinction between ends and means help to resolve the paradoxes 
arising from colloquial usage in Knobe’s surveys.     
One further point: While Aquinas takes pains to consistently distinguish intentio 
and electio, Aristotle, as we have seen in part one, often uses prohairesis to refer to a 
proximate end of an action or even to more general ends at the same time as he defines its 
strict use more narrowly.  While Aquinas’ precision is admirable, we will be using 
intention broadly to cover both the intention of the means and the intention of the end, 
but distinguishing where necessary between the relevant types of intention, of the end and 
of the means.  The distinction between the intention of the end and the intention of the 
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means also has further application to different types of adverbial and adjectival 
modifications of intention locutions  That is to say, means are usually directly, 
conditionally, immediately, and proximally intended, while ends are indirectly, 
unconditionally, and remotely or distally intended. Means are intended so long as they 
will be effective under the circumstances for bringing about the end. Ends are, as 
Aristotle held, held constant at least for some stretch of action or practical reasoning. 
Ultimately, most ends are conditionally intended as means to other ends. 
Our exegesis of Aquinas thus far has yielded some significant results.  We have 
shown that the relatively recent treatment of Aquinas’ account of self-defense misreads 
him to suggest that the death of an attacker cannot be intended, in the broader, English 
sense of intend, but must result as a side-effect.  On our reading, the death may be licitly 
chosen in certain circumstances as a means and, in such a case, is not a side-effect.  This 
means that the distinction between intention and foresight as it is used by proponents of 
Double Effect does not apply to this paradigmatic case.  Likewise, we have shown that 
the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight as it applies to case of self-
defense does not entail consequentialism because of the way in which actions are related 
to intentions in Aquinas’ treatment.  From these results, it follows -- at least for the case 
of killing in self-defense -- that the rejection of the distinction between intention and 
foresight does not of itself cause irrational intentions to be attributed to agents or for 
grossly inaccurate accounts of an agent’s intentions to be given. 
As significant as these findings are, they do not necessarily overcome the 
objections of Bratman, Harman, and Knobe on the intentionality of side-effects.  Our 
argument about killing in self-defense has argued precisely that it is not a side-effect.  
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Therefore, we must renew our focus on genuine side-effect cases where an application of 
the intention/foresight distinction might be relevant.  For that, we will again turn to what 
Aquinas marks as praeter intentionem as a model for understanding the intentionality of 
and responsibility for side-effect consequences, using the insights we have gained about 
action specification.   
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II.4.2.2: Intention, Foresight, Circumstances, and Side-Effects 
 
In Aquinas’ works, the phrase praeter intentionem or, in English, ‘beside the 
intention’, does not denote a special subsistent category of mental entity; rather it simply 
stands in for whatever is not the intentio of the agent.  It is a catch-all category, with very 
disparate members.  As we have seen, Aquinas defines the per se meaning of intentio as 
the intention of the end of an action, although this can be either the proximate or the 
remote end, depending on context.394
 In both the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologica, Aquinas 
discusses the phrase praeter intentionem, that which is ‘beside the intention’, and its 
  The intention of the means, which Aquinas calls 
electio (see ST I-II, 12, 4 ad 2) or in some contexts will (voluntas, velle), is therefore 
praeter intentionem.  However, as the examples from the Summa Contra Gentiles III, 5 
and 6 show, side-effects and consequences are also considered praeter intentionem, but 
they are, nonetheless, also considered voluntary, and subject to moral evaluation.  All that 
we have shown thus far is that the Doctrine of Double Effect, such as it is understood by 
contemporary moralists, does not apply to Aquinas’ treatment of licit self-defense.  This 
does not deal with the central issue of side-effects and the Simple View.  In ST II-II, Q. 
64, a. 7, the death of the attacker is not treated as a side-effect but as a licit means under 
the circumstances.  However, Aquinas’ discussion of what is praeter intentionem in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica offers us an account of the relationship 
between side-effects and intentional action which can be used to flesh out Aristotle’s own 
account as well as to answer opponents of the Simple View. 
                                                 
394 See ST I-II, Q. 12, a. 4; Vitoria, op. cit., 194: quod per se intentum est ut finis.  See also Pilsner, 218-
219. 
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relation to action and moral assessment.  In the Summa Contra Gentiles III, chapters 4 
through 6, Aquinas argues that evil is always praeter intentionem, but it is in some cases 
voluntary.  As we have seen, praeter intentionem can designate an act of the will, 
namely, the intention of the means or choice, but it can also designate something that 
occurs against the will.  Since all rational agents act for ends which they intend, Aquinas 
argues, consequences that occur as a result of an action that differ from the agent’s 
intention are praeter intentionem (SCG III, 4.2).  Likewise, things which result from a 
defect in the powers of apprehension or willing are also praeter intentionem (SCG III, 
4.3, 4.5).  Aquinas is quick to point out that a consequence being praeter intentionem 
does not necessarily render that consequence involuntary.  Hence, a married man who 
wishes to satisfy his lusts with a woman who is not his wife intends the gratification but 
does not intend the sin of adultery, even though adultery is what results by his intercourse 
with that woman.  The adultery is praeter intentionem but voluntary and blameworthy 
(SCG III, 6.7).  As we have seen, acts which are chosen may be praeter intentionem in 
cases of what Aristotle called “mixed action,” as with the sailor and the storm or in some 
cases of self-defense, and they may be pardonable because they are, in a qualified sense, 
involuntary (SCG III, 6.9).  
 Aquinas’ Latin terms for the psychological powers and acts of the soul do not 
always correspond to Aristotle’s Greek terms and concepts in meaning, as we have 
shown in the first part of the dissertation; however, Aquinas does still hold to several 
distinctions that are crucial to an Aristotelian response to challenges to the Simple View.  
In the first place, Aquinas understands that while the process that leads to action is, as it 
were, one motion, it can be broken down into distinct parts, moments, or acts.  Thus, 
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because the terms intentio and intendere, which often correspond to Aristotle’s boulēsis 
and bouleisthai, in themselves pick out the directedness of the soul to its end in acting as 
well as its final end, they can also be used to refer to that which is chosen for the sake of 
the end.  Like Aristotle, Aquinas uses another term to specifically refer to the 
intentionality of means, i.e., electio or choice, which corresponds to Aristotle’s 
prohairesis.   This is no small matter. The same ambiguity applies to the colloquial use of 
the English words ‘intention’ and ‘to intend’ as applies to the Latin terms intentio and 
intendere.  Likwise, the same moral and ethical difficulties which surround the Latin 
phrase praeter intentionem also arise with the English term ‘side-effect’, which denotes 
“A subsidiary consequence of an action, occurrence or state of affairs; an unintended 
secondary result.”395
 As we have seen, the precise description of the means chosen (i.e., which act or 
acts is considered the means) and whether or in what manner the choice of means can be 
called an intention are the sources of much controversy.  There is an ambiguity about the 
relationship between ends, means and consequences which is part of the debate on 
  With respect to Aquinas’ treatment of the things which are praeter 
intentionem another set of useful distinctions can be made.  The phrase can have several 
references with respect to action: 1) it can refer to what is chosen as a means (and is not 
intended as an end) or 2) that which is a consequence of an action besides the goal 
intended or the means chosen.  In the second category, consequences which are not 
constitutive of the means chosen for the sake of the end, can be: a) foreseen or b) 
unforeseen.  Foreseen consequences are attributable to the agent, and the agent may be 
held responsible for them.   
                                                 
395 Oxford English Dictionary online – accessed through Boston College Library.  Entry for ‘side-effect’.  
The OED also notes that the first usage of ‘side-effect’ was in an 1884 translation of the German 
philosopher Lotze’s Metaphysik; the first medical usage occurred in 1939. 
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Aquinas’ contribution to the Doctrine of Double Effect which can also enlighten the 
contemporary debate about the Simple View.  In the case of licit, lethal self-defense, 
Boyle, for instance, distinguishes the death of the assailant from the means chosen by the 
assailed as well as the end result, which is that the assailed’s life is preserved.  He says of 
a case of licit homicide in self-defense, “one is not saved because the assailant is dead but 
the assailant dies because one has stopped the attack.”396  The use of ‘because’ in Boyle’s 
statement is to some extent confusing because it reverses the causal relationship between 
the two events.  The attack is stopped because the assailant is killed; it is a consequence 
of the death of the assailant, who can assail no longer.  In general, stopping an attack may 
not require or entail the death of an assailant; however, in a particular case, the attack 
may only be stopped because the assailant has in fact been killed.  As Gareth Matthews 
correctly observes, “the possibility of an alternative scenario . . . does not show that, in 
the [actual case], the bad effect is ‘not the means by which the good effect is 
achieved’.”397
                                                 
396 Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 681.   
  Another observation that we might make is that the causal relationship 
between the two events is not really instrumental but constitutive.  The death of the 
attacker does not bring about a wholly separate event or state of affairs, i.e., the stopping-
of-the-attack, rather it constitutes the second event as it constitutes in this case the 
preservation of the defender’s life.  Self-defense, as Reichberg rightly observes, is an aim 
or intention, the form of an act, which is materially undefined.  Some acts may or may 
not be proportionate to that end, but there is no definite exclusion of any particular action 
in advance.  The two effects that Aquinas speaks of need not be thought of as result and 
397 Matthews, 68. 
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side-effect; in the case of self defense they can be the intended end and the means chosen, 
which are constitutive of the end.398
 The relationship between effects brings us to the definition of consequences and 
side-effects in relation to intentions and culpability.  When Aquinas speaks of the effect 
that a consequence (eventus sequens) can have on the moral evaluation of an action in the 
Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 20, a. 5, he seems to designate an event which follows 
indirectly rather than directly from the action.  He says, for instance, in the sed contra, “if 
a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, 
this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently 
a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused.” An action, as Aquinas says 
in the body of the article, ‘of itself’ (ex suo, ex quo) may produce results of a certain 
quality, good or bad, which reflect the nature of the action; whereas the results which 
happen accidentally (per accidens) do not reflect upon the agent or the action.  Foreseen 
results generally fall into the former category; unforeseen results, the latter.  If we follow 
Boyle’s analysis of self-defense, the death of the attacker should fall into the category of 
the purely accidental, something which does not result from the nature of the act.  He 
argues that “one can attempt to thwart the attack in such a way that the assailant’s death 
is not what ends the threat, but is rather a consequence of what stops the attack.”
 
399
                                                 
398 Reichberg, 363. 
  If the 
death of the attacker were merely an accidental consequence of the act of defense, which 
did not follow from the nature of the act, it should therefore resemble something like the 
alms-giving example above.  We might imagine an oft repeated cinematic scenario where 
an attacker is pushed onto some sharp object or other lethal device, of which the defender 
399 See Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 661. 
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was unaware.  The quick act of the defender did not have a specifically lethal purpose, 
although it had a lethal result; he lacked foresight.  Yet Boyle wishes to have it both 
ways, arguing that the defender can foresee the result of his action without having that 
result attributed to his willing.  This is not something with which Aquinas would agree, 
nor should we. 
 The distinction between intended and foreseen consequences in Aquinas is not 
meant to limit culpability only to those effects which were intended as the end; quite the 
opposite.  While Aquinas clearly distinguishes between what is strictly intended as a 
result of one’s action, i.e., the end, and what is expected to result, either directly as a 
means or constituent of the means or indirectly by happenstance, he holds that foreseen 
consequences, even when not intended as ends, can be attributed to the agent.  Thus, 
while many circumstances are mere accidents of an action, which do not give the action 
its species, some circumstances can add to the gravity of the sin, to its inordinateness (ST 
I-II, Q. 72, a. 1; a. 8). Thus, Aquinas gives the example of a man who fornicates with a 
woman who is not his wife, which by itself counts as adultery; however, added to this is 
the circumstance that she is the wife of another, which compounds adultery with injustice 
(ST I-II, Q. 73, a. 7).  He comes close to giving a text book side-effect case when he gives 
the case of a man cutting across a field on his way to fornicating. Here, the damage done 
to the field is foreseen by the peripatetic lothario and follows directly and immediately 
from his action, but is not intended as such.  However, the harm done aggravates the sin 
he is already committing but indirectly, as he has harmed another by his indifference (ST 
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I-II, Q. 73, a. 8). 400  The harm done in this case is also praeter intentionem, that is, 
foreseen and not intended as an end, but it is also voluntary and blameworthy.401
The moral responsibility that an agent has for the consequences of his action, for 
Aquinas, is based on their cause in the will and the relation they have to the action, ends, 
and means through intention and choice.  As Aquinas says in the Summa Theologica I-II, 
Q. 6, a. 3, what is called ‘voluntary’ is from the will (voluntarium dicitur quod est a 
voluntate).  This fact is particularly inconvenient for those who wish to find a 
contemporary use of the distinction between intention and foresight in Aquinas.  The 
distinction as it is used today is meant to place the foreseen results outside of the will, as 
we have seen with Harman’s distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning in 
the assessment of consequential responsibility. For Aquinas, the voluntary has an 
intrinsic link to reason, knowledge, and cognizance of one’s circumstances, and although 
a specific goal, object or state of affairs may be intended as an end, the choice (electio) of 
a particular act necessarily concerns circumstances and consequences; most 
consequences follow from the nature of the act.  Circumstances, like why, by what 
means, who, etc. are the differentiating matter of an action, and as such, are ‘proper 
accidents’ of it.  Thus, Aquinas recognizes that in the wide scope of intention, 
consequences are included.  However, Aquinas is no consequentialist.  There is a priority 
to the evaluation of an action, beginning with the internal principle of an agent, namely, 
the act of will known as the intention (intentio).  An intention of the end is a necessary 
   
                                                 
400 I am indebted to Boyle for these citations and for his insightful summary; however, I will be using them 
in a manner opposed to his conclusions.  See Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,”662-663. 
401 See Boyle, “Praeter Intentionem,” 662-63.  Boyle argues that the distinction between foresight and 
intention used by Aquinas in this article helps to distinguish blameworthy consequences from consequences 
like killing which resulted from an act of self-defense, for which he concludes the agent is not morally 
responsible.  He argues that the former has a closer relationship to the act and the agent than the latter.  I do 
not see how there is any difference whatsoever; on the contrary, I think the killing is closer to the other 
harmful consequences named.    
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but not sufficient condition for the goodness of an act; likewise, it is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to evaluate the act’s permissibility.  However, the matter of the 
action, the circumstances of the act and the means chosen, which of their nature entail 
certain consequences, are also subject to moral evaluation.  Of themselves, they do not 
suffice to make a bad intention result in a good and permissible act; however, they can 
make a good intention result in a bad and impermissible act.402
Foresight of the consequences of an intended action links those consequences to 
the agent through the action he performs, and the nature of the agent’s foresight, 
cognizance, goal, means, etc. can be used to distinguish different levels of intention and 
responsibility.  The end desired is a consequence; the side-effects or painful results, the 
cost of performing a certain action at a certain time and place.  The price of deliberate 
choice is responsibility for what happens as a result of what is done.  The agent is the 
cause of his act through his will and what he wills, as end and as a means, and what he 
wills has attached to it circumstances and consequences. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
402 We extrapolate here from several sections of the Summa Theologica.  In ST I-II, Q. 7, a. 1-4, especially 
a. 2, Aquinas details in what ways circumstances are accidental to the nature of an act and in what ways 
they can affect evaluation (i.e., an agent’s knowledge or ignorance of circumstances can affect moral 
judgments of the agent); in ST I-II, Q. 20, a. 5, he explains how consequences can make a bad action worse; 
and most importantly, in ST I-II, Q. 18, a. 10, he explains how according to reason, what is a mere 
circumstance for one act may be a defining condition of the moral species of another act.  He uses the 
example of the circumstance of place in relation to a theft: a theft from a holy place is a different species of 
theft than from a private person.  We examined this in the last section. 
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II.4.2.3: Intentions, Circumstances, Costs, and Quinn on Double Effect  
 
We must pause here to distinguish our account from those of other thinkers 
involved in the discussion of the Doctrine of Double Effect and its variants.  What we are 
proposing seems similar to the account offered by Warren Quinn.  Quinn argues that 
Double Effect, as a free-standing moral doctrine rather than the historical doctrine 
stemming from Aquinas, might rest not on the distinction between intention and foresight 
but rather on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” harmful agency.  According 
to Quinn, this distinction discriminates between  
 . . . agency in which harm comes to some victims, as least 
in part, from the agent’s deliberately involving them in 
something in order to further his purpose precisely by way 
of their being so involved (agency in which they figure as 
intentional objects) and harmful agency in which either 
nothing is in that way intended for the victims or what is so 
intended does not contribute to their harm.403
 
 
In the former case, there is direct harmful agency, in the latter case, there is indirect 
harmful agency.  From this distinction, Quinn argues that “ceteris paribus, a stronger 
case must be made to justify harmful direct agency than to justify equally harmful 
indirect agency.”404
                                                 
403 Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 18.4 (Autumn 1989): 343. 
  The rationale for this ultimately lies with the role of the victims of 
the harm which results from the action.  In direct harmful agency, “victims are made to 
play a role in the service of the agent’s goal that is not (or may not be) morally required 
of them,” and the Doctrine of Double Effect, Quinn believes, “rests on the strong moral 
presumption that those involved in the promotion of a goal only at the cost of something  
protected by their independent moral rights . . . ought, prima facie, to serve the goal only 
404 Ibid., 344. 
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voluntarily.”405  This in turn rests on a “Kantian ideal of human community and 
interaction,” such that the victims of direct agency seem to be illicitly viewed and used as 
a means whereas those of indirect agency do not.406
 Quinn believes that the distinction between direct and indirect agency solves a 
problem associated with the traditional understanding of Double Effect’s use of the 
distinction between intention and foresight.  The problem is that of the “closeness” 
between the intended result and the foreseen harm.  As Philippa Foot pointed out in an 
example, it surely seems absurd to distinguish between the dismemberment of a man by a 
dynamite explosion and his death; the former being intended, the latter merely 
foreseen.
  
407  However, elaborating a clear standard of ‘closeness’ has proven difficult.   
The advantage of Quinn’s distinction between types of agency is that it does not need to 
invoke the distinction between intention and foresight with respect to the harm that 
results from the action; rather the harms are assessed in relation to their role in the agent’s 
plan of action and whether or not they contribute to the satisfaction of his goals.  Insofar 
as the harm helps to realize the agent’s goal, it is the result of direct agency; however, if 
the harm does not help to realize the agent’s goal or plan of action, and is merely 
incidental to it under the circumstance, it is the result of indirect agency.408
 We shall now focus on a case used by Quinn to illustrate the difference between 
his position and ours: the strategic bomber.  Since John C. Ford’s 1944 article “The 
Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” the contrast between terror bombers and strategic 
 
                                                 
405 Ibid., 349. 
406 Ibid., 348-350. 
407 Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Virtues and Vices and 
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 21-22.  I am indebted 
to John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza, and David Copp, “Quinn on Double Effect: The Problem of 
‘Closeness’,” Ethics 103 (July 1993): 709. 
408 Quinn, 348-51.  See also Fischer et. al., 710-711. 
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bombers has been a recurring example in ethical papers.409  The terror bomber, whose 
goal is to kill civilians and terrorize the population, is obviously committing a morally 
evil act when he bombs a city.  The case of the strategic bomber is less clear.  This kind 
of bomber aims at destroying munitions factories or military installations, but his 
bombing inevitably results in civilian deaths because they live in the areas surrounding 
the factories and installations or work in the factories and installations.  The strategic 
bomber has, more often than not, been defended as being engaged in a morally licit form 
of war-making.  Quinn’s defense of the strategic bomber runs as follows: “The civilians 
in [the terror bomber case] serve the bomber’s goal by becoming casualties . . . But in 
cases of indirect agency [i.e., strategic bombing] the victims make no contribution.”410  
According to Quinn, “Those who simply stand unwilling to be harmed by a strategy – 
those who will be incidentally rather than usefully affected – are not viewed strategically 
at all and therefore not treated as for the agent’s purposes rather than their own.”411
                                                 
409 See note 334 above. 
  We 
might rephrase this difference between the two bombers in two counterfactual 
conditionals: if the civilians were not there, the strategic bomber would bomb whereas the 
terror bomber would not; if the civilians were not there, the strategic bomber’s plan could 
still succeed while the terror bomber’s could not.  As Quinn says earlier of a scenario 
where a police sniper might licitly shoot through a hostage to kill a legitimate target: “If 
we act despite their [innocent hostage] presence, we act exactly as we would if they were 
not there.  If, on the other hand, we needed to aim at someone in order to hit a target, that 
410 Quinn, 349. 
411 Ibid., 348. 
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person would clearly figure as an intentional object.”412
 Even if we grant such a prima facie license, it seems doubtful that Quinn’s 
standard can really get around the problems associated with the “closeness” of harm to 
the goal intended.  In Ford’s seminal article on strategic bombing, he was concerned with 
the justification of the Allied bombing of German cities, which involved incendiaries and 
high explosives.  The bombings were not ‘surgical strikes’ using ‘precision guided 
munitions’ as we are used to today; rather, the bombers targeted a whole city and dropped 
the bombs on a wide area (“obliteration bombing”), knowing that in the process, factories 
and military targets would be destroyed.  They also knew that this would involve the 
deaths of thousands of civilians, which it actually did.  After citing the apocalyptic 
destruction wrought by Allied bombing, Ford asks, “If these are the facts, what is to be 
said of the contention that the damage to civilian property and especially to civilian life is 
only incidental?”
  Therefore, the bomber has a 
prima facie license to bomb.   
413  Ford doubts that it is “psychologically and honestly possible” to 
view civilian deaths in a merely incidental light in those circumstances.  He goes on to 
argue that the Allies did intend the civilian deaths as part of a plan to punish and terrorize 
German civilians.414
                                                 
412 Ibid., 345. 
  Prescinding from the question of whether the Allies did actually 
intend the civilian deaths, the significance of Ford’s argument is that Quinn’s distinction 
between types of agency still does not evade the problems of the problems of closeness.  
The Allied argument that Ford responds to would satisfy Quinn’s counterfactual 
hypothetical test of agency: If the German civilians were not in the city, the city would 
still be bombed by the Allies.  Yet Ford’s point is precisely that under the circumstances 
413 Ford, 31; see also 28-35. 
414 Ibid., 31-35. 
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the citizens are in the city and the bombing will kill them.  Even if it can be argued that 
they are not instrumentally involved in the Allies plan, Ford argues that it is absurd to see 
their deaths as extraneous the Allies’ intention under the circumstances.  This is not a 
consequentialist argument but one centered on intention, and it raises the question: can 
we separate the circumstance of civilian deaths from the agent’s intention? 
 Quinn’s account of types of agency distorts intention by obscuring a key 
component of an agent’s practical reasoning, what we will call cost. A trait of Quinn’s 
argument, as well as the arguments of other proponents of Double Effect, is the reliance 
on counterfactual conditional tests to determine an agent’s intention.  An effect, X, is 
unintended insofar as it is not necessary to satisfy the agent’s goal or plan.  The test of 
this is the counterfactual conditional, whereby we ask ‘if X were not to result, would the 
agent still choose to do what he does?’  The problem with this test is that it obscures a 
significant factor in practical reasoning.  Every action has cost, so to speak, whether it is 
in the time it takes to perform it, the resources used by it, the harms inflicted others or 
ourselves, etc.  Every action is undertaken both in light of the benefit expected and the 
cost required.  Counterfactual conditional tests of intention seem to assume that the 
agent’s calculations are based solely on the benefit of the act in question, and not on its 
costs.  The benefit of the immediate act or choice is implicitly conflated with the good of 
the more remote end, which might be satisfied by another course of action with a lower 
cost.  The relationship between the more remote end and the costs of the immediate 
action is always relevant to practical thinking precisely because agents are free under 
most circumstances to choose other courses of action with different costs.  The value of a 
given act to a given end is relative to the circumstances in which the act is performed, and 
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the circumstances factor into an agent’s assessment of the act’s costs and his intention to 
act. 
 Returning to the third objection to the Simple View, characterized by Bratman’s 
example of the marathon runner and his sneakers, we can see how the wearing down of 
the sneakers would satisfy Quinn’s counterfactual conditional test for direct agency and 
yet, at the same time, it is intentional and intended.  First, we can say that the marathon 
runner would still use his sneakers even if they did not wear down when he ran.  This 
would mean that the wearing down, on Quinn’s account, would be a case of indirect 
agency; Bratman calls the same wearing down a foreseen side-effect.  Yet the runner 
knows he is in fact wearing down his sneakers, and that, under normal conditions, they 
must be worn down if he is to run.  In his actual circumstances, he cannot help but wear 
them down.  This salient fact affects his choice of course (an indoor track versus the 
sidewalk), the amount of time he runs, the number of times he runs, as well as, most 
importantly, which type of shoe he buys.  The fact that his sneakers wear down is not 
extraneous to his activity nor is it, in the case of most runners who are deliberately 
training, extraneous to his plans regarding his training; it is a continual element in his 
intentions in acting.  The fact that we normally do not notice the significance of such a 
factor or the way in which it is part of our intentions in acting is due to habit and to an 
unreflective assessment of costs and benefits.   
Another point of significance is that the costs of an action are not necessarily 
convertible with deontological claims of right.  Even beyond morally trivial cases like 
sneaker wear, we cannot always appeal to the violation of rights as the moral cost 
involved in an action.  Quinn’s account of the types of agency dovetails with a 
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deontological system of positive and negative rights, which further factor into his account 
of Double Effect.   As he says, “In all of these cases we seem to find an original negative 
or positive right that, while opposed by other rights, seems to be strengthened by the fact 
that harm will come via direct agency.”415  Quinn is not alone in seeing a strong 
connection between Double Effect and deontological moral claims.416  As Quinn notes, 
the various positive and negative right claims must be balanced.  Yet this balancing 
seems both difficult to do and inimical to the very nature of the moral rights cited.  Most 
importantly, it does not seem that the rights exist wholly apart from circumstances.  I may 
have a right to my property, but whether or not that right is defeasible may hinge on 
something external to it which of itself may not be a right, e.g., Aquinas’ case of taking 
another’s property in the circumstance of dire need.  Perhaps the circumstance gives rise 
to another right, but, without reference to fixed legal rights, we are apt to be arguing 
about rights that exist ad hoc and completely for the benefit of a hypothetical example.417
 For Aristotle and Aquinas, the circumstances of an action are of crucial 
importance to assessing actions and agents; circumstances play a greater role in their 
accounts than in many contemporary authors.  Whether or not an agent is cognizant of a 
certain circumstances makes a great difference in our assessment of his responsibility for 
  
The great difficulty here is that we are at the junction of morality and psychology.  We 
must take pains to distinguish the content of intention prior to judging the action which 
we attribute to the agent. 
                                                 
415 Quinn, 346. 
416 See Garcia, “The New Critique of Anti-Consequentialist Moral Theory,” Philosophical Studies 71.1 
(July 1993): 1. 
417 For a good example of this type of argumentation, see Judith Jarvis Thompson’s, Rights, Restitution, 
and Risk, ed. W. Parent, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986), chapter 3, “Self-Defense and 
Rights,” 33-48.  Thompson is particular creative with the opposing positive and negative rights she uses in 
her hypothetical self-defense scenarios. 
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his action because it makes a great difference in how he understands and intends his 
action and how we understand and ascribe that intention.  Likewise, an agent’s judgments 
based upon the circumstances as reflected in his choices are also critical to assessment 
because they are critical to his intention to act.  As we saw in Part I of the dissertation, for 
Aristotle, cases of mixed action force agents to choose certain harms as the price of 
certain goods.  Their actions are evaluated based on what was chosen as the price of what 
was intended as the end.   But this can be generalized.  As Aquinas holds, the 
circumstances of an action enter into our intentions through our rational cognizance of 
and deliberation about our goals in our present circumstances.  This is faithful to 
Aristotle’s account of the particulars of which an agent has knowledge in NE III, which 
we discussed above.  Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas uses counterfactual conditional tests 
to determine the content of an agent’s intention.  Generally, what an agent foresees as 
resulting from his choice of a particular action at a particular time and place is part of 
what he intends.  The scope of this is not unlimited.  As Aquinas illustrates with his alms-
giving example, we may foresee something coming about as result of what we do but also 
through the subsequent result of other agents or forces.  The scope of intention is 
indefinite, and the indeterminacy surrounding such issues as the accordion effect, 
whereby an agent may be said to intend further consequences brought about by his 
immediate action, and problems of closeness cannot be neatly resolved.    
 What we propose here, therefore, is in partial agreement with Quinn, although 
with significant disagreements remaining.  Quinn’s distinction between direct and 
indirect agency is similar to but not entirely co-extensive with our distinction between the 
intention of the end and the intention of the means.  It is too narrow because it obscures 
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elements that enter not just into decision-making but into the decision itself as an 
intention of the means.  We agree that, in general, there is a strong presumption against 
even the instrumental infliction of harm on others; however, beyond this, the distinction 
between types of intending needs to be augmented by an account of the agent’s 
circumstances and his cognizance of those circumstances in a full, thick description of the 
action.  Finally, we believe that there will always be a question of ‘closeness’ when it 
comes to ascriptions of intention and assessments of responsibility for side-effect 
consequences.  Given the nature of human action, we must always ask both how an agent 
caused an action, that is, how one external event lead to another, and how the agent 
understood his action and that external causality in terms of his intentions.  How close an 
effect or circumstance must be to an agent’s action to be considered part of his choice of 
means is a question which can be given considerable treatment in advance, but there is no 
decidable procedure or a priori rule for such judgments.   
The contemporary debate about the Doctrine of Double Effect is not 
fundamentally about responsibility for consequences; it fundamentally concerns whether 
harm to others or oneself can ever be licitly intended instrumentally and, if so, for what 
ends.  Many defenders of the contemporary doctrine argue that harm can never be 
intended, even instrumentally; therefore, if an intentional action is permissible, then the 
harm which results cannot be intended – it must merely be foreseen or expected.  
Opponents of this view attempt to show that cases of merely foreseen harm are really 
intended, and that there is something dishonest or self-deceptive about describing the 
intended harm as merely foreseen.  Both sides produce innumerable real and hypothetical 
cases, but they argue past each other.  Defenders of the Double Effect have a point when 
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they emphasize that not every expected consequence of an action is intended.  We may 
concede that some results of an action are merely foreseen or expected.  Such results may 
be causally distant from the agent, merely probable, or not a part of the agent’s plan of 
action – we could make qualifications ad nauseam.  Assessing the intentionality of a 
consequence requires a very thick description of an action.  The distinction between 
intention and foresight is often invoked all too easily to simplify the tasks involved in 
making judgments about intention and responsibility, but making such judgments often 
requires knowledge about the state of the agent, the nature of his intended plan, the nature 
of the circumstances, his cognizance of those circumstances, and judgments not just 
about human agency in general, but about particular types of agency.  We can make 
general claims about what types of consequences are necessarily intended by an agent 
when he acts, but we will always need to make contingent judgments.  The distinction 
between intention and foresight is not an a priori rule to be applied to every case, but is 
itself such a contingent judgment.      Opponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect also 
have a point when they argue that some important consequences cannot be classified as 
merely foreseen because of the causal relationship they have to the agent’s actions.  As 
we have tried to show, instrumental intentionality includes at least some types of 
undesired consequences and side-effects often classified as merely foreseen.   
In any case, the limitation of the distinction between intended and foreseen 
consequences and the rejection of the Doctrine of Double Effect does not entail 
consequentialism or the diminished role of intentions in moral evaluation.  This can be 
seen at length in Aquinas’ treatment of licit homicide in self-defense and in his larger 
treatments of intention and culpability, which are largely Aristotelian in their distinctions 
   270 
between intention and choice.  While virtues and habits are important to both, the basis 
for moral ascriptions is the genesis of action in the pursuit and realization of an end; 
virtues and habits are components of that process, but not the whole.  The position 
espoused by Aquinas and Aristotle does not evaluate agents solely on the consequences 
of their actions but on how those consequences relate to the agent and his capacities, 
especially his knowledge, his ends, his deliberations, his choices and physical acts.  Most 
moral theories today restrict moral evaluation to a privileged consequence or set of 
consequences, e.g., the agent’s intention or maxim of action, the effect on the agent’s 
character, the sum total benefit to humanity, etc.418
 
  Aristotle and Aquinas take a more 
holistic approach; however, there is a priority to the elements of moral evaluation 
beginning with the agent’s intentions.   Intentions, specifically intentions about ends, 
retain pre-eminent importance in a Aristotelian account of action, and their role is better 
understood and defended in such an account.  Act and agent assessment require a 
reference to the genesis of an action within an agent, and a specification of the manner 
and degree of intentionality for an actions, action components and consequences.  This 
reinforces and promotes the importance of intentions in act and agent evaluation and 
practical thinking. 
 
 
 
                                                 
418 See John Dewey, Ethics (1932), The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 7 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 223; 249-52.  Dewey criticizes both Kant and the 
Utilitarians for privileging certain consequences over others.  In Kant’s case, Dewey argues that Kant’s 
theory necessarily has concern for consequences through Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative 
as a law of nature. 
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II.5: Understanding Intention as Desire  
 
II.5.1: Introduction to Arguments about Intention and Desire 
 
 Having defused the various objections to the Simple View in sections II.3-II.4, we 
must now focus on the philosophical claim most central to the debate, and that is the 
relationship between desire and intention.  Proponents and opponents in the debate about 
the Simple View both seem to uphold the same distinctions between the two.  For 
starters, intentions and desires are classified as two distinct, irreducible types of mental 
state; intentions are neither a kind of desire nor are they composed of desires.  The basis 
for this distinction is the role that the various thinkers give to intentions and desires in 
relation to action and practical thought.  In the work of Simple View opponent Alfred 
Mele, intentions are distinguished from desires by having “a tighter functional connection 
to action” than “mere” desires.419  Intentions are “executive” states which initiate, 
sustain, and monitor actions.420
                                                 
419 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 172 
   Bratman attempts to distinguish intentions from desires 
from the opposite direction, by emphasizing future-directed intentions rather than the 
intentions with which an agent acts when he acts intentionally.  His emphasis 
distinguishes the function of intention not in the genesis of intentional action but in 
relation to practical thinking, planning and agent rationality.  Intentions, unlike desires, 
are rationally constrained by their connection to planning.  An can desire anything but he 
may only intend what he believes he will be able to achieve consistent with his prior 
plans.  Harman combines both of these approaches, though borrowing from neither 
420 Mele, Springs of Action, 140. 
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Bratman nor Mele, in making intentions self-referential propositional attitudes as 
opposed to desires which are not.  In one stroke, Harman combines Bratman’s emphasis 
on agent rationality with Mele’s concern for the functional relation to action: Intentions 
must be rationally self-consistent because it is the internal self-relation of intentions that 
links them functionally to action.  In each case, the role of desire is demoted to a mere tug 
or pull on the power of intentions in the genesis of action.   
This approach leads to several problems.  First, it leads these thinkers to attack the 
Simple View and divorce intentional action from intentions.  Second, it leads them to 
create as yet unidentified intention surrogates in order to account for action which is 
intentional but not intended: what Bratman calls “motivational potential” or Mele’s 
“positive motivational base.”   This further muddies the water in action theory.  Third, all 
of these approaches undermine moral assessments of blame and responsibility for 
intentional actions and the consequences of intentional actions, as we have already 
observed at length.   
 In this section, we will examine the relationship between intention and desire.  
First, we will briefly examine the arguments made by Harman, Bratman, and Mele in 
favor of separating intention from desire.  We shall respond to each, but with particular 
focus on Harman and Mele’s positions, since both accounts center on the relationship 
between intention and intentional action.  With insights from our critiques, we will then 
make a substantive case in favor of an Aristotelian view of intention as deliberate desire, 
drawing on the insights of Alasdair MacIntyre and our earlier exegetical analysis.  As we 
will argue, it is necessary  to see intention as a kind of desire, as a rational, deliberate 
desire, which can guide human action, and, at the same time, to see desire as an 
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intentional faculty with varying degrees of rationality, conceptualization and 
deliberateness.  The answer to opponents of the Simple View is not to divorce intentions 
and intentional action but to specify the levels and degrees of intentionality in any 
intentional action.  The English word ‘intention’ is ambiguous and its ambiguity derives 
from the nature of thing to which it refers.  Intention entails purpose, but the manner in 
which that purpose is understood by the agent or by an observer, as well as the manner in 
which that purpose drives present or future actions is tremendously varied. Some 
intentions are deliberate, discrete and fully conceptualized by an agent; others are non-
deliberate and closer to being brute urges; still others are somewhere in between.  The 
sense of intention which we wish to mark out as intention par excellence, that sense 
which is unique to human beings, is the sense of deliberate intention, a rational desire, 
what Aristotle called prohairesis.  As such, intention is a species of desire and all desires 
are intentional in that they are essentially purposive.   
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II.5.2: Bratman and Harman on Intention and Desire 
  
While Harman and Mele both emphasize intentions’ relation to immediate 
intentional and rational action, Bratman assumes that the characteristic function of 
intentions lies in relation to future plans.   This particular functional approach seems 
promising but for the fact that it becomes difficult to distinguish functionally intentions 
from desires the farther one gets from intentional actions.  Future-directed intentions, 
Bratman’s preferred exemplars, are phenomenologically the least distinguishable from 
‘mere’ desires; the former commit us, so Bratman argues, to deliberation and rational 
consistency, while the latter do not.421  But these qualifications will not do.  Bratman 
concedes that future-directed intentions do not necessarily commit agents to act, although 
he argues that, nonetheless, intentions exhibit a stronger commitment to action than 
desires.  Yet this would make both intentions and desires “potential influencers of action” 
rather than actual influencers of action.422  Moreover, such intentions do not commit us 
to having deliberated about the intentions themselves, although they commit us to future 
deliberation.423
                                                 
421 Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” 378-81. 
  I may have a non-deliberate future intention which might spur 
deliberation.  However, in such a case, it seems specious to try to distinguish a non-
deliberate future-oriented intention from a mere desire. One may be just as committed to 
fulfilling one’s non-rational or irrational desires as one is to fulfilling one’s rational plans, 
as in the case of addicts of whatever sort.  Adding deliberation to the process does not 
give us any further grounds to distinguish such future-directed intentions from desires as 
422 Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, 16 
423 Ibid., see chapter 3, especially pages 28-36, and chapter 5 on reconsideration. According to Bratman, 
initial intentions need not themselves be deliberate however much they may prompt further deliberation. 
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a distinct kind of mental state or act, for it must be conceded that we also desire things we 
have deliberated about as a consequence of our deliberation.  What might the generic 
difference between intentions and desires then be? 
 Mele and Harman seem to do better on this count.  The difference, at least in 
terms of the pragmatic force of the English words ‘desire’ and ‘intention’ or ‘intend’, is 
one of commitment to action.  When we say ‘I intend to complete my Ph.D.’ we seem to 
mean something stronger than when we say ‘I desire to complete my Ph.D.’; the former 
seems to communicate a settledness of purpose and movement toward action that the 
latter does not.  The strength of the philosophical insights we might draw from this 
distinction in English usage is, however, limited.  If we assume that intentions are 
essentially tied to actions in ways that desires are not, that they are, unlike desires, 
executive states, we have problems accounting for actions which do not embody fully 
deliberate behavior.  If akratic failures are against one’s intention, then it seems that 
desire can cause action without intention.  If akratic failures arise from one intention 
being replaced by another, the latter the result of a “compulsive desire,” then it seems that 
the so-called inertia of intentions is no essential part of their being.  Desire, then, can 
cause actions against one’s intentions.  If this last point is conceded, the problem of 
akrasia only becomes sharpened; for do we account akratic failures to be unintentional?  
If so, how do we find them voluntary and blameworthy?   
 Harman believes that intentions are self-referential and that this quality 
distinguishes them from desires, which are not.  Intentions to perform actions, “positive 
intentions” as Harman calls them, are self-referential in terms of both their content and 
their functional relations, i.e., the intention to A must contain reference to itself as the 
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very cause of the A-ing. 424  In terms of content, the positive intention to do something 
must specify that the action intended occur “something like the way in which the agent 
intended” and that it also be caused by that very intention.  Therefore, “if the intentional 
content of an intention is given by its success conditions, then the intentional content of 
an intention is self-reflexive – the intention is the intention to psi in consequence of 
having that very intention.”425    This content is also functional: it functions as a cause of 
action and other intentional states and “an agent must be able to suppose that the resulting 
intention will indeed lead to the result intended.”  Desires and beliefs do not have 
reflexivity in terms of content or function.  While this account of intentions would seem 
to imply that neither children nor animals can act intentionally, since they seem to lack 
the necessary conceptual apparatus, Harman argues that the concepts of intention, 
causality and intentional action need not be articulated; thus children can form intentions 
“even if they have no explicit concept of intentions or self-reference.”426
 Self-referentiality explains, for Harman, why intentions, unlike desires, require 
strong consistency with each other and with beliefs; specifically, an intention to A 
requires the belief that one will A, which leads Harman to reject the Simple View.  This, 
as we have seen, is used by Harman to argue that not all intentional actions are intended.  
Intentions could not explain human action, as Harman takes them to do, or be essential to 
practical reasoning if they did not require the positive belief in their own efficacy. 
  
427
                                                 
424 Harman, “Self-Reflexive Thoughts,” Philosophical Issues 16 (2006): 336. 
  
Forming intentions through practical reasoning “settles in one’s mind” whether one will 
do or not do any given action; more than that, “It is always a means of guaranteeing that 
425 Ibid. 
426 Ibid., 340 
427 Harman, Reasoning Meaning, and Mind, 56. 
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one will do what one intends.”428  In the case of “positive intentions,” intentions to 
perform specific actions (as opposed to “negative intentions”, intentions not to perform a 
given action), the intention “is also a means of actually doing what one intends to do.”429 
This is so, Harman argues, because the intention to do A and the intention to intend that 
one do A are not separable intentions: “One cannot intend to do A without intending to 
intend to do A.”430  The relationship between intending to do A and intending to do A 
intentionally is immediate, direct and simultaneous. Harman concludes that “If one 
intends to do something, it follows that one believes that one will do it.”431 An intention 
is “instrumental” in its own satisfaction, in an agent’s performing a given action; it 
“guarantees that something will happen.”432
 The view that intentions, or other mental states or propositional attitudes, are self-
referential is philosophically idiosyncratic; John Searle is the only other notable 
proponent of such a view.  There are several major objections which can be leveled 
against self-referential accounts of intentions, and we borrow here from a number of 
criticisms leveled against Searle’s account.  The first objection is that one need not 
assume that intentions have precise and discrete conditions of satisfaction, such that we 
can say in advance that every intention is satisfied by some such decidable condition or 
  If an intention lacked this strong 
complementary belief in its own efficacy it would be either self-contradictory, since 
intentions necessarily contain reference to their own causal power, or it would not be an 
intention, since what distinguishes intentions from mere desires or other similar mental 
states is intrinsic causality. 
                                                 
428 Ibid., 52; 54. 
429 Ibid., 54  
430 Ibid. 
431 Harman, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind,  47;  see also Change in View, 77; 82-84.  
432 Harman, Reasoning, Mind and Meaning, 54; 65 
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conditions, which is the basis for Harman’s functional account of self-reference.  For 
instance, the indicative proposition ‘The cat is red’ can be verified if the subject 
designated is a cat and it is red; however, the proposition expressing the intention ‘I 
intend to get a sandwich’, may be satisfied any number of ways, e.g., by buying one, 
making one, finding one, etc.  While we can choose more or less definite indicative 
propositions and more narrowly circumscribed intentions, e.g., ‘I intend to go into the 
kitchen and make a sandwich’, it seems that indicative propositions can always be 
rephrased unambiguously and made falsifiable while not all propositions expressing 
intention can be made as definite.  If some intentions always remain indefinite with 
respect to what would satisfy them, we may think here of the intentions of certain general 
ends, then it seems that they cannot have a definite number of conditions of satisfaction.  
The second objection is that even assuming that intentions have discrete conditions of 
satisfaction, it is not clear that the intended action is the only thing that fulfills them.  
Likewise, the third objection is that even if we assume intentions have conditions of 
satisfaction, this does not necessitate a self-referential description of intentions.  
Interpreting ascriptions of intention as self-referential, either in first person avowals or 
descriptive utterances, must be argued for on the basis of its explanatory power, and it is 
more plausible to interpret ascriptions of intentions, and by extension the nature of the 
propositional attitude of intention, as not being self-referential. 
 Harman, like most contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, subscribes 
to the view that intentionality in general, and intentions in particular, can be described as 
psychological attitudes with propositional content.  The attitude imparts to the content a 
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direction of fit433 which specifies its conditions of satisfaction, the existence of which 
makes the proposition true.  As Bruce Vermazen rightly points out, “it is quite a lot easier 
to tell someone what the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional phenomenon are than 
it is to explain why those are its conditions of satisfaction.” 434  While Harman attempts 
to base an overall account of intentionality on the claim that every intentional state is 
defined by some such conditions, it is not clear that this is the case.  Vermazen notes 
several interesting examples, in particular the cases of recognized hallucinations, 
dreaming and “vivid visual imaging.”435
                                                 
433 The phrase “direction of fit” refers to the ways in which speech acts or propositions can relate to the 
world, that is, how we evaluate what would make the speech act or proposition true.  According to David 
Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” Noûs 26.1 (March 1992): 8, “In cognitive attitudes [e.g., belief], a 
proposition is grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in conative attitudes [e.g., desire], the 
proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow.”  The idea of direction of fit is intuitive enough 
for indicative propositions.  That is to say, a statement or proposition does or does not accurately describe 
an external state of affairs; the statement fits the world or it does not.  If the statement accurately describes 
the world, it is true; if it does not, it is false.  The idea is less intuitive and more difficult to elaborate with 
propositions expressing desire or intention, as we will examine below.  The phrase ‘direction of fit’ is a 
common, now technical phrase in the literature, particularly Searle’s work.   
  In the case of a recognized hallucination, there 
is a subjective experience that may be phenomenologically indistinguishable from a case 
of real seeing or visual perception.  Yet it is not clear how this mental state might be 
veridically satisfied, given that the sufferer is not under the illusion that what he is 
currently seeing is the case.  It is likewise with vivid dreams and imaginings.  The 
distinction between dreams and waking life has a long and difficult history; in any case, it 
is hard to see that these mental states have truth conditions.  These mental states, where 
the agent is neither deceived nor apparently interested in truth, seem to lack a direction of 
fit, and thus lack conditions of satisfaction.  Nothing is necessarily perceived and nothing 
434 Bruce Vermazen, “Questionable Intentions,” Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 276.  Vermazen is writing 
against Searle’s account of intention; however, since Searle and Harman agree substantially on the essential 
points and make essentially the same argument, I believe that the arguments and points I cite from 
Vermazen hold against Harman as well.  The word ‘Intentional’ appears capitalized in Vermazen’s article, 
and this corresponds to Searle’s capitalization in Intention. 
435 Ibid., 268-69. 
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is necessarily misperceived, if perception and misperception are characterized entirely by 
their relation to external states of affairs.436
 The difficulty in characterizing the direction of fit of certain exceptional or non-
veridical intentional states points toward a larger difficulty about characterizing the 
conditions of satisfaction for intentional action.  When it comes to the feeling of agency 
involved in intentional action, the same issue arises: the feeling of agency can exist 
without actual movement, but nothing in the feeling or experience itself signals this 
difference.  Yet Harman characterizes intentions involved with action as being satisfied 
only if an action which itself is caused by the intention ensues.  To illustrate a problem 
with this, we will turn to Searle’s work in Intentionality.  Searle gives an example of an 
experiment conducted by William James in which a subject has his arm anaesthetized, 
restrained and hidden from view.  The subject is asked to raise his arm, and reports that 
he has, even though the arm has not moved.  Searle says that the subject has the 
experience of raising his arm; thus his intention to raise his arm is satisfied.
 
437  Against 
this, Vermazen asserts that the subject has the experience as of raising his arm.  That is to 
say, he does not have the experience of raising his arm because his arm did not go up; 
however, the experience is as of raising his arm because “What the experimental subject 
experiences is like, perhaps phenomenologically indistinguishable from, what he 
experiences when he actually raises his arm, since he doesn’t raise his arm.”438
                                                 
436 Vermazen notes that Searle never explicitly says that intentional states without a direction of fit have no 
conditions of satisfaction, but this seems to be strongly implied (see Vermazen, note 7, 269; also 277). 
  The 
subject might be mistaken in believing, as James’ subject did, that he had in fact raised 
his arm, even if he has the characteristic experience.  What this suggests is that the 
437 Searle, Intentionality, 89-90. 
438 Vermazen, 275. 
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experience itself is “neutral with respect to the question whether the arm went up, that is, 
to think of it as an experience as of raising one’s arm.”439  If the experience is neutral, if 
it can exist without the act which it would otherwise initiate or direct, “there seems to be 
no reason to say that it is successful or satisfied only if one’s arm goes up.”  Likewise, in 
vivid dreams, imaginings and hallucinations, we may have an episode of seeing or visual 
experience without there being perception.  In the case of intentions involved with action 
as well as the cases of visual experience, it is not clear that they can be described as 
having a direction of fit or be explained by their conditions of satisfaction.  If it is not the 
case that such intentional experiences can be explained by their conditions of satisfaction, 
we need not worry about  intentions, whether involved with action or perception, being 
self-referential.440
These objections notwithstanding, it may be possible both to accept Harman’s 
basic insight regarding intentionality as being tied to conditions of satisfaction and to 
reject that intentions and intentional mental states are normally self-referential.  Harman’s 
account of self-reflexive mental states finds self-reference implicit in intentions involved 
with action.  Most linguists and logicians define a thought as self-referential only if it 
either contains a concept that refers to itself or if it contains a logical quantifier which 
specifies a domain in which the thought itself is included.
 
441
                                                 
439 Ibid. 
  Whether a propositional 
attitude is self-referential (and by extension the related mental state) largely hinges on the 
way in which one unpacks utterances said to exhibit it.  A functionalist account 
specifying conditions of satisfaction does not necessitate a self-referential account of 
intentions; moreover, such an account would have to demonstrate the utility of 
440 Ibid., 275-76. 
441 See Christopher Hill, “Harman on Self-Referential Thoughts,” 346, for this definition. 
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interpreting the conditions of satisfaction self-referentially. As we have seen, the utility or 
explanatory value of self-reference has not truly been shown nor is it widely accepted.  
For it is not clear how explaining intentions in terms of self-reference is better or more 
“revelatory” than not doing so because it is not clear how self-reference adds anything to 
our understanding of how intentions cause actions. 442  Characterizing our standard verbal 
or written expressions of intentions, perceptions and certain beliefs as implicitly self-
referential seems to suggest that our standard discourse is unusually elliptical, since we 
habitually gloss over a significant element of the content of our thoughts, beliefs and 
intentions.  If speech acts are the primary evidence used to assess the nature of mental 
states because they have the same truth conditions as the mental states they represent, it is 
odd that they should be so oblique on this crucial point.443
 
  Harman seems to confuse a 
linguistic or logical issue with a psychological or biological one, as the causal connection 
between thoughts and actions is not, in the first instance, a logical one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
442 Hill, 348. 
443 See Mele, “Are Intentions Self-Referential?” Philosophical Studies 52.3 (Nov. 1987): 316; 324-26; see 
Searle, Intention, 27-28; 164.  In reference to Harman specifically, Mele also argues that Harman confuses 
intending to perform an action with intending to perform that action intentionally.  I do not think this is an 
apt objection because every action is intentional by definition; that’s what makes a particular event an 
action rather than a random or natural happening.  It is simply redundant, or rather tautologous, to assert 
that we intend to perform an action intentionally.   
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II.5.3: Mele on Intention and Desire 
 
Mele’s theory of intentions does not rely on any logico-linguistic apparatus; 
rather, he believes the characteristic attitude towards actions and plans embodied by 
intentions is the key to understanding them and differentiating them from desires.  Mele 
claims intentions are “executive attitudes toward plans” which are settled and determinate 
in a way that desires are not.444  For Mele, the essential difference between desires and 
intentions “lies in the access that they have to the mechanisms of intentional action,” and 
here he means not a logical or linguistic relationship but a psychological one.445  One 
kind of intention can directly initiate, monitor and guide intentional actions: this is the 
class of “proximal” intentions.  Another kind of intention can concern future courses of 
action, and this is the class of “distal” intentions.  Distal intentions need never give rise to 
any actions, as there are many plans we never execute.446  Both desires and intentions are 
“non-compound attitudes” which do not have other “distinct attitudes as parts.”447  
Desires function in the genesis of intentions but intentions mediate between desires and 
intentional action: “the causal route from wants to intentional actions, accordingly, is 
mediated by intentions.  Wants, on these suppositions, dispose us to act by disposing us 
to form or acquire appropriate intentions.”448
                                                 
444 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 27-28. 
 The executive power of intentions, 
according to Mele, does not rest on their perceived strength or on the strength of 
incorporated desires.   
445 Mele, Springs of Action, 143 
446 Ibid., 137. 
447 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 138. 
448 Mele, Springs of Action, 143. 
   284 
According to Mele, subsuming the class of mental states called intentions into that 
called desires tends to go concomitantly with what he calls the “Motivational Strength 
Theory,” or “MST” for short.  MST is the view that action is caused by whatever is the 
agent’s “preponderant motivation,” whatever psychic force has the most strength, 
combined with some appropriate belief.449  Mele argues that intentions can give rise to  
intentional action without and in spite of preponderant motivation.  One example he gives 
is that of someone who intends to finish a steak dinner in spite of being full; the intention 
to finish the meal persists after hunger is sated and it drives the diner to finish his meal.450  
In general, the phenomenon of “motivational conflict,” illustrated by continence and 
akrasia shows that desires and intentions are distinct.451   He gives the example of the 
akratic smoker, whose intention to quit is at odds with his preponderant motivation to 
smoke.  The smoker can sometimes resist those motivations and intend not to smoke 
however often he gives in to those urges.  Intentions can be distinguished from 
preponderant motivation and an intention does not need to incorporate a preponderant 
motivation to give it its executive capacity: The smoker can successfully intend not to 
smoke and so act.  Unlike desires, such as the smoker’s craving, intentions are within our 
conscious control to a large extent, such as the akratic smoker’s some-time intention not 
to smoke.452
                                                 
449 Ibid., 155-56.  While we will argue for the classification of intention as a species of desire, Mele’s 
presentation of MST does not correspond to our view.  MST is a brute-force model of human action as 
Mele presents it, very similar to the philosophy of Hobbes.  We hold that reason can influence desire 
through deliberation and that desires can become rational and conceptualized.  While we might agree with 
MST that the strength of desires does determine action, the ‘strength’ of a desire is not the same as a 
somatic urge or function.   
 What applies to intentions in general also applies to decisions, which are 
proximal intentions to act.  Acording to Mele, “When we decide what to do we do not, in 
450 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 170-171; 1992, 154-57. 
451 Mele, Springs of Action, 163. 
452 Ibid., 163. 
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general, ask ourselves what we are most motivated to do; but we often do ask what it 
would be best to do.  And what we judge best need not be what we are most motivated to 
do.”453  Rational judgments which help to give rise to intentions cannot be reduced to 
desires or preponderant motivations, since, according to Mele, “our assessments of 
attractive and aversive items have a firmer grip on decision making” than our desires.454
 Mele’s arguments against the reduction of intention to a kind of desire and his 
reliance on the exemplar case of akrasia suffer from serious weaknesses.  First, Mele 
concedes that the essential difference between desires and intentions, intentions’ 
executive capacity, cannot be attributed to all intentions because “there are intentions that 
do not trigger, sustain, guide, nor monitor action.”  Second, Mele concedes that some 
intentions neither result from nor prompt practical reasoning.
 
455  These concessions are 
very damaging to Mele’s argument.  The essential feature of intentions, their executive 
capacity, is apparently not essential after all.  Furthermore, they are not necessarily 
marked off from desires, on Mele’s view, by their being necessarily more deliberate or 
rational, since we can have impulsive intentions, generated by preponderant motivations 
or desires.456  Moreover, as George Wilson correctly observes, there are some types of 
“compulsive desires” which can initiate, sustain, and guide actions, those being the very 
desires at play in the inner turmoil of the akratic person.457
Mele does not concede Wilson’s claim about compulsive desires; however, he 
concedes nearly as much when he claims that an akratic person acquires an intention to 
   
                                                 
453 Ibid., 166. 
454 Ibid., 188. 
455 Ibid., 140. 
456 Ibid., 184; 191. 
457 George Wilson, “Review: Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior,” Philosophical 
Review 103.1 (Jan. 1994): 177-78. 
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give in to his forbidden desire from his preponderant motivation.458  In such a scenario, 
the real moving cause is the preponderant desire that gives rise to the intention.  It is 
unclear what an intention adds to the preponderant desire in such a scenario, because it 
does not make the motivation rational or deliberate.  By allowing preponderant 
motivations to give rise to proximal intentions without the medium of deliberation or 
some sort of rational reflection, Mele comes close to admitting a direct “connection 
between preponderant motivation and overt intentional action,” a contention which he 
ultimately denies to assert the irreducible independence of intentions from desires.  If the 
link between preponderant motivation and intentional action were direct, Mele claims, 
then we could have an intentional action without any “pertinent intention.”459    Yet he 
allows this himself because, like Bratman, Harman, and others, he rejects the Simple 
View and allows that an agent may perform an overt intentional action without that act 
being caused by an intention so to act, like “nonintended” “tryings.”460
 Mele’s description of intentions also relies on a account of desires as being 
“underdetermined” in comparison to intentions, which is similar to the views of both 
Harman and Bratman.
   
461
                                                 
458 Mele, Springs of Action, 191. 
  Like Harman, the conceptual clarity of intentions is supposed 
to be evidence for their connection to action; like Bratman, intentions are held to be 
intrinsically more rational than desires because of their rational determination.   This 
distinction bears more of the weight of Mele’s argument once he concedes that not all 
intentions lead to actions, and it becomes clear that one cannot distinguish intentions 
from desires on the basis of their phenomenological proximity to action, as the case of 
459 Ibid., 190. 
460 Ibid., 129-135. 
461 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 17. 
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akrasia illustrates.  However, determinateness does not entail proximity to action, nor 
does proximity to action necessarily entail determinateness.  These insights will open up 
the way to a more promising account of intentions as a kind of desire below. 
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II.5.4: Intention as Deliberate Desire 
 
When we act, we do not always have a determinate intention nor do we 
necessarily have determinate beliefs about our actions and goals.  This can be seen in a 
rather mundane example of satisfying thirst.  Watching a football game on Sunday, I 
might feel thirsty after having consumed salty pretzels.  I walk to the refrigerator and get 
a beer.  I have not deliberated about this action; I don’t necessarily know that I want only 
one beer and no more. I have not necessarily made a determinate evaluative judgment 
that I would like beer more than anything else available.  I have not considered that the 
diuretic effects of alcohol may increase rather than decrease my body’s dehydration 
caused by the salt.  I simply want a beer, and I want that beer because I am thirsty.  My 
action is, to some extent, habitual.  Many actions are like this.  Often, such behavior is 
characterized as absent-minded, but it is, in fact, quite intentional, although the intention 
in question is not so determinate.  We might contrast this example with an almost 
identical example involving deliberation and a determinate intention.  Having watched 
the same game and having eaten the same pretzels, I might go to the refrigerator and 
pause.  I remember that the beer has twice as many calories as the diet soda on the same 
shelf.  I might calculate that given my previous desire and intention to lose weight, I 
should choose the diet soda instead because it has fewer calories.  Therefore, I choose the 
diet soda to slake my thirst.  This action is the result of a more determinate intention. 
The reflective pause at the time of action or at some time prior to the action is a 
hallmark of mature behavior.   The first example given would not be significantly 
different from the behavior of a child getting a drink of another sort to satisfy his thirst.  
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It is not significantly different from the behaviors of many animals, except insofar as 
thumbs might be required to open the refrigerator and the can of beer.   A good deal of 
our behavior happens below the level of reflection and deliberation described in the 
second example.  Often, when such behaviors are harmful, therapy consists in having the 
sufferer confront his responsibility for his choices and habituating him to patterns of 
reflection prior to his acting.  The mistake made by Mele and others is to take human 
action and human intentions par excellence, that is, deliberate action and deliberate 
intention, as defining the entire class of actions and intentions.  It is no doubt the case that 
fully human action and intention are deliberate and determinate, and this can be seen in 
most of the behavior of mature, healthy, and virtuous individuals.  It is a distinguishing 
characteristic of human action that it can be reflective, deliberate, and caused by 
determinate beliefs and propositions, but this characteristic is not a necessary condition 
for action or intention.  Children learn to become reflective and deliberate as they mature; 
however, they surely perform intentional actions prior to full maturity, even if those 
actions are less deliberate and not based on determinate beliefs and intentions. 
The view I have been sketching above is indebted to Alasdair MacIntyre and his 
work, Dependent Rational Animals.  MacIntyre works to break down the wall erected by 
philosophers between human beings and animals in order to fully understand human 
nature’s dependent and animal elements.  The objections of many philosophers to the 
ascription of beliefs and intentions to animals hinges on the lack of determinateness any 
such mental state would have in the absence of language.  While philosophers like 
Malcolm, Davidson and Stich have argued that animals cannot have beliefs and 
intentions as such, MacIntyre objects that: “What each of them achieves is to show that in 
   290 
some particular respect we cannot ascribe to non-language-using animals beliefs that 
have the kind of determinacy that the possession and use of language makes possible.”462 
Therefore, while we may have difficulty specifying precisely what beliefs and intentions 
to attribute to animals, what sorts of modal operators or quantifiers we might use in our 
expressions, it is still clear that we can attribute beliefs and intentions to animals.  
MacIntyre uses the example of a kitten learning to distinguish shrews, which are foul-
tasting, from mice.  While it seems unlikely that the cat has a concept of ‘shrew’ 
contrasted with that of ‘mouse’, still the cat is capable of learning to distinguish the two 
and to avoid eating shrews.  Likewise, a dog may cease waiting at the base of a tree for a 
squirrel if he sees the squirrel running on the ground in a nearby yard.  It seems clear that 
he formerly was waiting for the squirrel in the belief that the squirrel was in the tree, and 
now that he believes the squirrel is not in the tree, he has decided to chase it. The cat and 
the dog both operate with indeterminate, pre- or non-linguistic beliefs which they can 
alter and to which they can act in response.463  The importance of this observation is that 
it can be extended to human beings as well, and not just to infants.  Humans have 
indeterminate beliefs and preferences as well as intentions.  These are the building blocks 
from which reflective and linguistically mediated practical behavior arises.464
The reflective distance that language facilitates between immediate and other 
kinds of desires is the source for the apparent divorce of intention and desire in authors 
like Harman and Bratman.  As part of the maturation process, a child becomes capable of 
refraining from its immediate desires.  However, MacIntyre correctly cautions that we 
should not be misled into thinking that intention is not a form of desire: “It is not of 
   
                                                 
462 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 37. 
463 Ibid., 32-33; 37-38. 
464 Ibid., 38-40. 
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course that the child becomes able to act without desire.  The notion of acting without 
desire is itself a phantasy [sic] and a dangerous one.”465 The dissociation of intention 
from desire parallels the reification of the concept ‘good’; intention becomes a desire for 
the good as if the good were somehow substantially separable from the particular objects 
we choose.  As MacIntyre argues, we must “[n]otice however that in justifying our 
actions and our having acted from this or that desire for this or that object we make no 
reference to the desire for good qua desire.”466  There is no separate desire for the good 
apart from the desires we have for particular goods.  In abstract discussions of intention 
and ethics, “It is therefore of some importance that in our philosophical analyses we 
should not in general assimilate evaluations and expressions of desire.”467
 The distinction between desire and intention is the distinction between a kind and 
one of its species.  Desires are intentional and intentions are appetitive; ‘mere’ desire and 
deliberate intention mark two ends of a spectrum of intentional states.  Even within the 
spectrum, some desires are not necessarily directed toward immediate action.  Some are 
prospective, whether they are long-term plans, wishes, or fantasies. When we talk about 
‘intention’ in English, we must make a distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate 
intentions.  In the debate about the Simple View, this distinction is present but improperly 
drawn.  The difference between the two types of intention is often treated merely as one 
of time rather than one of conceptualization.  Deliberate intentions result from prior 
deliberation, and this process is usually linguistically mediated.  A deliberating agent 
must utilize some sorts of premises about his ends, the actions available to him, his 
circumstances as well as what he foresees as consequences.  These kinds of 
  
                                                 
465 Ibid., 70. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid.     
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considerations necessarily involve some sort of predication, and the intentions which 
result usually have some definite extension.  They also involve forward looking plans 
which involve detailed awareness and use of causal mechanisms and knowledge.  This is 
not usually the case with non-deliberate intentions.  A child, for instance, merely wants 
his snack now, and he does not have an idea of how much of it he wants or how long he 
intends to eat or how this might affect his nap later.  He wants this now.  Likewise, adults 
may be prone to non-deliberate behavior which has a significant impact on their lives.  
Compulsive overeaters often do not deliberate about what they are eating and when they 
eat it – this kind of pause and reflection is often part of their counseling.  In general, 
every person often has some element of their daily behavior which is potentially rather 
than actually deliberate.   
To the extent that one matures, one’s behavior becomes more deliberate, and this 
is the essence of Aristotelian habituation and virtue.  Deliberate intentions roughly 
correspond to boulēsis and prohairesis in Aristotle’s ethical psychology, more often 
prohairesis than boulēsis.  Aristotle describes prohairesis precisely as a bouleutikē 
orexis, or a ‘deliberate desire’.  Boulēsis may also be considered for our purposes to be a 
deliberate desire because: as we have seen, Aristotle says in the De Anima that it is the 
part of desire located in the rational part of the soul, which is opposed to epithumia and 
thumos, one a physical desire often associated with sex and food, the other, anger.  
Deliberate intentions are one end of a continuum both within our species and across 
sentient species.  Not every human action is as deliberate and conceptualized, and 
different animal species are capable of different degrees of intending.  Aristotle, as we 
have seen, characterizes all animals as possessing orexis, and this faculty, as we have 
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argued, is essentially intentional.  Aristotle’s division of orexis into rational and non-
rational types nicely corresponds to the division between deliberate and non-deliberate 
desires.  This also corresponds to some of the uses of ‘desire’ and ‘intention’ in English, 
as we often express the fact that impulsive actions are without deliberation by saying that 
they were the result of a strong desire rather than an intention. 
The Aristotelian solution to the challenge to the Simple View is to affirm the 
Simple View in its bare formulation but also to insist that the terms ‘intention’ and 
‘intentional’ are ambiguous and they require specification in terms of the classification of 
deliberate and non-deliberate desires as well as whether the intention in question refers to 
the end or the means. The conundrum surrounding the Simple View stems from the fact 
that not every intentional action is the result of a deliberate and conceptualized intention.  
The wide range of human action suggests that what is primarily marked out by the term 
‘intentional’ is the purposiveness, the goal-directedness, of an action; likewise, this 
suggests that the term ‘intention’ corresponds in its basic meaning to the notion of an 
agent’s end or goal.   Agents do not always act deliberately or with an intention which is 
precisely conceptualized.  They may not have a greater notion of what they want than 
‘this’, whatever this object is at that moment.  However, agents can also act with much 
more conceptualized and deliberate intentions, such as ‘I would like a small glass of 
water in about five minutes to help with my kidney stones’; the deliberateness and 
conceptualization are not necessary conditions of intentionality but rather are 
qualifications of a basic intentional capacity.  Thus, every intentional action is the result 
of some intention, construed broadly to include non-deliberate intentions often classed as 
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desires.  Likewise, the choice of means is intentional and intended as means to a further 
end and not in themselves. 
The fact that a deliberate intention can be composite, as Aristotle holds that both 
boulēsis and prohairesis are, in the sense of combining reason in deliberation with desire, 
is not an argument in favor of it being psychologically reducible to its component parts.  
Conceptual divisibility does not entail psychological reducibility; that is to say, intentions 
are real forces in human actions which are not simply pairs of desires and beliefs but 
complex wholes of desires, knowledge, and beliefs formed from deliberation.  Agent and 
act assessments take into account the degree of deliberation and conceptualization in an 
agent’s intentions, as well as what is conceptualized and how.468
 
  From these distinctions 
in degree and kind, we can distinguish between unintended consequences and intended 
consequences, and, within intended consequences, between consequences intended as 
ends or means and consequences intended as being constitutive of a given means in a 
certain circumstance, though not desired per se.  Finally, we can say that the Simple 
View is substantially correct and is a firm basis for understanding ascriptions of moral 
responsibility.  Every intentional action is based on some intention, which intention is 
more or less deliberate and conceptualized.   
 
 
 
                                                 
468 We borrow the term “conceptualized” from Thomas Tuozzo, “Conceptualized and Unconceptualized 
Desire in Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32.4 (Oct. 1994), cited in MacIntyre, ibid., 70. 
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II.6: Conclusion to the Second Part and the Dissertation 
 
As we have shown, the major objections to the Simple View are defeasible once 
one understands intention as a species of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope 
includes consequences beyond acts performed and goals achieved.  The paradoxes at the 
heart of the debate hinge on the ambiguity of the English word ‘intention’ and its usage, 
as well as the inherent difficulty of examining psychological concepts.  ‘Intention’ has 
several senses unified by the purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is 
referred.  Senses can often, but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the 
degree and kind of deliberation attendant to them; however, English usage is not always 
reliable.  Intending and intention admit of degrees of rationality, conceptualization, 
deliberateness, as well as foresight and cognizance.  Not everything foreseen is intended, 
but many things that are foreseen are also intended as part of the means to the realization 
of an end.  These can include consequences beyond the end and the act performed.  An 
agent’s goal, circumstances, chosen means, and cognizance are all required to make an 
accurate thick description of his intention and to evaluate that intention morally. 
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